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INTRODUCTION 
The danger o£ mass- d e s t r u c t i o n in t h e event of viar have 
c r e a t e d t h e avjareness to achieve i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y 
In t h i s con tex t , the concept of peace zone and n u c l e a r v*eapons 
f r ee aones emerged as r e g i o n a l m i l i t a r y d e t e n t e . These concep t s 
v;ere cons ide red to encourage the e f f o r t s towards g l o b a l d isarma-
ment . 
These concepts f a i l e d to b r i n g the p o s i t i v e r e s u l t a s 
they became the subjec t to f u l f i l o n e ' s owi p e r c e p t i o n . 
The p re sen t work i s a study of these concepts and t h e i r 
r e l evance in i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y with p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e to 
I n d i a , I n d i a was among the o r i g i n a l founding f a t h e r s of t h e 
i dea of peace aone (in r ega rd to t h e Indian Ocean) and has always 
main ta ined t h a t e x t e r n a l p resence from any region should be 
removed, a s i t p rov ides the b i g g e s t t h r e a t to i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace 
and s e c u r i t y . But I n d i a has not favoured the i dea of a p a r t i -
c u l a r Tone being, dec lared , off hand, a s a Nuclear We^ons Free 
Zone, as t h i s concept i s a c t u a l l y based on d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and 
d i s r e g a r d s the r e a l i t i e s of the s i t u a t i o n , g e o g r a p h i c a l l y . 
In t h i s l i g h t , t h e p re sen t study focuses upon the concep-
t u a l study of peace zone and nuc l ea r weapons f r ee zones and 
t h e i r r e l evance in contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y . The study 
a l s o ana lyses the Indian p o l i c y towards t he se zones and p a r t i -
c u l a r l y t h e p o l i t i c s of Indian Ocean a s a peace zone and South 
- i i -
Asian nuclear \teapons free zone, 
I wDuld l ike to thank my supervisor Dr. Akhtar Majeed 
for h i s guidance and encouragement for the completion of my 
work, I am thankful to a l l the other teachers of the Department 
for the i r encouragement and cooperation. I am also tiiankful to 
the staff of Maulana Azad Library for t h e i r cooperation. 
Lastly, I stand for the r e spons ib i l i t y f o r the opinions 
e ^ r e s s e d and mistakes, if any. 
Kovanber 16, 1988 < ^ ^ " ^ ^^^"^^ ) 
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CHAPTER 
CONCEPT OF PEACE ZONE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
FREE 2DNES 
In the prevai l ing in te rna t iona l systein, peace i s main-
tained on the bas i s of deterrence. I t can break dovoi a t any 
time or, v i th the passage of time, WDuld cease to de t e r . At 
t h i s juncture , "arms control i s re levant vhen tension i s a t a 
cer ta in point , above which i t i s impossible and beneath which, 
2 i t i s unnecessary". In recent years S ta tes in var ious pa r t s 
of the world have been i n s i s t i ng to carry out regional measures 
of mi l i ta ry de ten te . In t h i s context, the concept of zones of 
peace and nuclear-weapons-free zones emerged as regional measures 
for lessening the in te rna t iona l t ens ion . 
The concept of peace zone i s an extention of the s p i r i t 
of detente aimed at contributing towards the re laxat ion of 
in te rna t iona l tension. In the middle of 1950s, Jawaharlal Nehru 
used the term "Peace Zone" to refer those s t a t e s which made 
r e l a t i o n s with power blocs of both East and West and, doing as 
1. Kenneth Boulding. jStable_Peace, London, 1978, p .64 . 
2 . Hedley Bul l . The Control of the Arms Race, London, 
1961, p .75 . 
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such contained the danger of war. Soon af ter t h i s , at the 
XX Congress of the Coitununist Party of the Soviet Union, 
Khrushchev cal led for the creation of "Peace Zone" by means of 
an association between the Soc ia l i s t bloc and the AEro-Asian 
countr ies which had gained the i r independence, Sr i Lanka, 
propagated the idea of peace zone for the Indian Ocean, I t 
focussed on a "demil i tar isa t ion pr inc ip le" whereby the l i t t o r a l 
state,s as well as outside powers would be cal led upon to l imit 
4 
the i r mi l i ta ry capabi l i ty and re la ted a c t i v i t i e s . 
The concept of peace zone in the Indian Ocean was 
based upon the concept of non-alignment and i t s fulfilment 
requires the land t e r r i t o r i e s , the airspace and the t e r r i t o r i a l 
waters of the specified area to be completely closed to the 
big power r i v a l r i e s and subsequent c o n f l i c t s . 
The idea of es tabl ishing a zone of peace in the Indian 
Ocean was f i r s t coined in the second summit of the Non-aligned 
at Cairo (1964), I t condemned the e f fo r t s of the imper i a l i s t s 
3 , Jawaharlal Nehru. Ind i a ' s Foreign Policy - Selected 
speeches. New Delhi, l96 iT P.67, 
4, P . Towle, tjayal Power ,in_the Indian Ocean - Threats, 
Bluffs and.Fantasies, CanBetra7""19777TpT"55T; 
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to e s t ab l i sh bases in the Indian Ocean and cal led t h i s move as 
"an unwarranted extension of the policy of the neo-colonialism 
5 
and imperialism". 
The concept of peace zone was f i r s t formulated in 
September, 1970 at the Lusaka Conference of the non-aligned 
na t ions . I t was declared tha t the defensive and offensive 
armaments should be excluded from the en t i r e high sea area of 
the Indian Ocean region, within l imi t s to be specified l a t e r " , 
A zone of peace may be defined as a geographical area 
from where the danger of war i s eliminated by resolving tensions. 
I t includes the demand for — " ( i ) dismantling of a l l offensive 
mi l i ta ry and naval bases l ike Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, 
( i i ) Cessation of the a c t i v i t i e s calculated to use the Indian 
Ocean as part of the global conf ron ta t ion i s t approach or 
regional mi l i ta ry a l l i ances or neo-colonia l i s t designs, 
( i i i ) stopping of attempts to thwart l ibera t ion movements and 
intimidation to newly l ibera ted countr ies , (iv) affirmation of 
5 , Ministry of National Guidance, Cairo, 1964, p . 352, 
6 , SIPRI Year Book, Stockholm, 1975, p .60 , 
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respect for the sovereignty, s t a b i l i t y and securi ty of the 
l i t t o r a l states* (v) abandonment of the regime of the gunboat 
diplomacy and plans for des tab i l i sa t ion of legal ly cons t i tu ted 
sovereignties , (vi) r e i t e r a t i on of respect for the sovereign 
7 
r igh t of people to t he i r na tura l and other resources" . 
The idea of zone of peace seeks to ensure that nei ther 
wDuld the n o n - l i t t o r a l s t a t e s have permanent naval forces 
s tat ioned in the Indian Ocean nor would they seek mi l i t a ry 
bases in the region. The concept stands for secur i ty of 
regional s t a t e s and the i r s t a b i l i t y to enable them to work for 
t he i r welfare and prosper i ty . 
The concept does not aim to equate super powers but to 
eliminate the d i s t inc t ions between colonial and cold war i ssues , 
I t was conceived both as a disarmament and co l lec t ive secur i ty 
measures without mi l i ta ry a l l i ances and strengthening of i n t e r -
nat ional securi ty through regional cooperation. I t did not 
aim to impose r e s t r i c t i o n s on the maritime a c t i v i t i e s on any 
nation whether external or regional , which tend to promote 
in te rna t iona l trade and s c i en t i f i c inves t iga t ions . I t was also 
7 . Rasheeduddin Khan. "The Context and the Relevance of the 
World Conference on Indian Ocean Zone of Peace", Peace and 
Sol idar i ty , New Delhi, 13(5), May 1982, p . 9 - 11. 
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accepted that the warships and other ships carrying v/ar material 
wDuld have the r ight of t r a n s i t except for emergency reasons 
of a mechanical, technical or humanitarian na tu re . The use of 
sea-bed vould also be prohibited except for the mentioned 
reasons . There vould be a ban on naval manoeuvres, naval 
in te l l igence operat ions and vjeapon t e s t s . Army, navy and a i r -
3 
force bases vjould also be prohibi ted, 
9 The concept of peace zone has five major elements. F i r s t , 
the resolut ion of a nuclear-free zone which was adopted in the 
Lusaka Conference in 1970 and was confirmed by the U,N, General 
Assembly in 1971, urged the United S ta tes , Soviet Union, Bri ta in 
and France which have the capabi l i ty of deploying nuclear weapons 
in the area, to renounce the nuclear bui ld-up . I t also di rected 
the regional countr ies to give an undertaking that they would 
ne i ther allow external powers to build-up nuclear bases in the i r 
t e r r i t o r y nor would they develop nuclear war po ten t ia l them-
se lves . Secondly, the resolut ion aimed at hal t ing the fur ther 
escalat ion and expansion of Great Powers' mi l i ta ry presence in 
the Indian Ocean and eliminating a l l bases, mi l i ta ry i n s t a l l a -
t ions and l o g i s t i c a l supply f a c i l i t i e s the disposi t ion of 
8 , SIPRI Year Book, Stockholm, 1975, p .60 , 
9 , K.S, Sidhu. The_Jndian 0cean__2_A Zone of Peace, 
Ham am Publication"s7 NevToelhi, l983,""pp~"32-"53 , 
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nuclear weapons and weapons of mass dest ruct ion, and any other 
manifestation of great power mi l i ta ry presence in the area, 
in the context of great power r i v a l r y . Thirdly, to achieve 
the elimination of great power r i v a l r i e s and competition from 
the Indian Ocean region i t ca l led for the adoption of p o l i t i c a l 
measures to promote peace, securi ty and so l ida r i ty in the 
region besides the measures for arms control and disarmament. 
Foutthly, the resolut ion stressed the need for s e t t l i ng the 
regional disputes through peaceful means and mutual obl igat ions 
without any external in te r fe rence . I t also ca l led upon the 
regional powers to accept the obl iga t ions of control l ing arms 
and affecting disarmament alongwith control l ing and resolving 
in t ra - reg iona l d i sputes . Lastly, i t ca l l ed for the elimination 
of colonialism and racism from the Oceanic i s lands and mainland 
of Afro-Asia, 
Establishment of nuclear weapons-free zones i s one of 
the approaches to the nuclear arms control problem. The concept 
of a denuclearized zone was i n i t i a l l y proposed by the Soviet 
Union in a draft agreement on the l imi ta t ion of conventional 
10. I . Shchyolokova, "Nuclear-Free Zones: Goal and Content", 
In tern at io n a 1 Af f ai r s (Moscow), 11, November 1981, p . 104, 
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• 
armaments and armed forces, submitted to the Sub-Committee of 
UN Commission on Disarmament on 27th March, 1956, The concept 
of nuclear weapons-free zones was developed in the course of 
disarmament negotiat ions at the United Nations and the other 
11 in te rna t iona l fo ra . I t was f e l t tha t these zones could be 
instrumental for preventing the horizontal p ro l i f e ra t ion of 
nuclear weapons and at the same time, would ensure the complete 
absence of such weapons from those areas of the world where 
s t a t e s , in the par t i cu la r regiou would undertake a commitment 
to es tab l i sh such zones, A study conducted by United Nations 
maintained that non-nuclear world should accept the establishment 
12 
of nuclear weapons-free zones to promote peace and secu r i ty . 
The concept of nuclear weapons-free zones means tha t 
countr ies cons t i tu t ing a region in the non-nuclear world should 
11 • The United Nations Disarmament Year Book. Vol.2 : 1977, 
Department~of""Politi'cal and Security Council Affairs , 
U,N, Centres for Disarmament, United Nations Publ icat ions, 
New York, 1978, p , 159, 
12. United Nations Comprehensive Study of the Question of 
Nuclear Weapons-Free zones in a l l i t s aspects . Special 
Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 
New York, 1976 . 
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agree not to resor t to nuclear p ro l i fe ra t ion and declare t h e i r 
regions devoid of nuclear weapons. By denying themselves 
nuclear weapons these countr ies wi l l get a guarantee from nuc-
lear weapon powers of non-resort to nuclear t h r e a t s . 
In t h i s context, i t i s the r e spons ib i l i ty of the countr ies 
concerned to preserve the i r non-nuclear s ta tus , which, however, 
e n t a i l an obl igat ion for the non-nuclear s t a t e s to re f ra in from 
any threa t to the securi ty of these zones. 
The Ad Hoc Group of Qualified Governmental Experts, 
under the auspices of Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 
attempted to elaborate the concept of nuclear weapons-free zones 
and to deal with such questions as the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of zonal 
and extra-zonal s t a t e s , ve r i f i ca t ion and control with special 
emphasis on the role of IAEA, the re la t ionsh ip of such zones 
with in te rna t iona l law and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
The experts reached consensus on cer ta in p r inc ip les that 
should be considered for the creation of nuclear weapons-free 
13. The United Nations Di^sarmament Year Book, v o l , 1:1976, 
Op.'"cIt"7"l9777 p".78. 
- 9 -
zones, such as ( i ) o b l i g a t i o n s might be assumed by groups of 
S t a t e s and even i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s , ( i i ) arrangement should 
ensure t h a t the zone should be e f f e c t i v e l y f r ee of a l l nuc l ea r 
come 
weapons, ( i i i ) the i n i t i a t i v e fo r the c r e a t i o n of a zone shou ld ' 
from s t a t e s v i t h i n the region concerned and the p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
should be vo lun ta ry , ( iv) the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of a l l m i l i t a r i l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t s t a t e s and p re fe rab ly a l l s t a t e s in t h e reg ion 
vould enhance the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the zone, (v) arrangements 
should inc lude an e f f e c t i v e system of v e r i f i c a t i o n , (v i ) eco-
nomic, s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n o l o g i c a l development of member s t a t e s 
should be promoted through i n t e r n a t i o n a l coopera t ion on a l l 
peaceful u se s of nuc lea r energy and ( v i i ) the t r e a t y e s t -
a b l i s h i n g the zone should be of u n l i n d t e d d u r a t i o n . 
However, the e x p e r t s could not agree on some q u e s t i o n s . 
Some e x p e r t s be l i eved t h a t the term "nuc lear weapon" should apply 
to any nuc lea r explos ive device s ince , in t h e i r view, no 
d i s t i n c t i o n could be made between dev ices usab le f o r m i l i t a r y 
or peaceful purposes . Some e x p e r t s saw a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n 
between a nuc lea r weapon and a nuc lea r exp los ive device developed 
e x c l u s i v e l y fo r peaceful purposes . Some e x p e r t s emphasized 
t h a t , in def in ing the a rea covered by a nuc lea r weapons-free 
-10-
zone, i t s members should respect in ternat ional law, include the 
pr inciples r e l a t i n g to the high seas, to s t r a i t s used for 
in ternat ional navigation and to in ternat ional a i r - space . Other 
experts while agreeing with the importance of those p r inc ip l e s 
maintained tha t they should be considered in the l igh t of the 
requirements necessary to the effectiveness of the zone. In 
respect to the adjacent safety areas some experts f e l t t ha t 
extra-zonal s t a t e s should agree to the removal of nuclear 
weapons geographically close to the zone that might be assigned 
to t a rge t s within the zone. Other experts pointed out tha t the 
extra-zonal s t a t e s were under no obligation to agree to such 
areas and tha t might have serious d i f f i cu l ty in accepting them/ 
because of secur i ty commitments and for some other reasons . 
Some experts s t a t ed tha t the prohibition of t r a n s i t in the 
t r ea ty es tabl i sh ing a zone would be an essen t ia l element of the 
zone, in order to prevent the introduction of nuclear weapons, 
while in t r a n s i t . Other experts pointed out that provisions 
concerning a zone should not affect exis t ing r igh t s of s t a t e s 
to grant or deny the t r a n s i t of nuclear weapons through t h e i r 
air-space or t e r r i t o r i a l waters, freedom of navigation through 
s t r a i t s used for i n t e rna t iona l navigation or the r igh t of 
innocent passage through the t e r r i t o r i a l sea. In connection 
« 
with security assurances, some held that formal assurances by 
- 1 1 -
nuclear veapon s t a t e s not to use or threaten to use such 
weapons against any ineiriber of a nuclear weapons-free zone was 
an e s sen t i a l factor for the effectiveness of the zone. Other 
experts f e l t that undertaking should not be regarded as a pre-
r equ i s i t e , but i t should be considered in each pa r t i cu l a r case . 
- 1 2 -
CHAPTER - I I 
PEACE ZONE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES lisi 
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
The concept of zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and nuc-
lear -weapons- f ree zones, emerged as r e g i o n a l measures to d i s -
armament , 
Despi te d ivergen t i n t e r e s t s , a l l t he l i t t o r a l and 
h i n t e r l a n d s t a t e s supported the mDves proposing t h e Indian 
Ocean as a zone of peace . The major maritime powers agreed to 
t h i s p roposa l in p r i n c i p l e , but they opposed t h e e f f o r t s to 
renove t h e warships from the adjacent a r e a s . The proposa l of 
Indian Ocean as a zone of peace had become a subjec t of d i f f e r e n t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and emphases. This was due to t h e d i f f e r i n g 
p e r c e p t i o n s of g r e a t powers, motivated by t h e i r i n t e r e s t s in the 
Indian Ocean reg ion , which made the idea to be success fu l ve ry 
b leaX, 
After the second world war, the Indian Ocean assumed 
Uni ted S t a t e s i n t e r e s t to conta in the i nc rea s ing Sovie t i n f l uence 
in t h e Afro-Asian r e g i o n , With the pass ing of t ime, i t assumed 
1, Rasul B, R a i s , The Indian Ocean__an^ ^S^Sli£S£^S9:^SLSi 
V i s t a a r PublicatlorTs, FTew ISelBI, 1381, p , 173, 
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a var ie ty of dimensions especia l ly po l i t i co -mi l i t a ry for U.S. 
i n t e r e s t . "The United Sta tes has both a conventional and per-
haps a s t r a t eg ic nuclear mi l i ta ry i n t e r e s t in the Indian Ocean, 
Mil i tary object ives for U.S. conventional forces include the 
capabi l i ty to (i) protect U.S. economic i n t e r e s t s in the 
Persian Gulf, (ii)employ or threaten to use force in support 
of U.S. diplomatic object ives in the Middle East, ( i i i ) secure 
the Indian Ocean a i r and sea routes against harassment or 
in te rd ic t ion , (iv) intervene in support of other objec t ives 
in the l i t t o r a l and re la ted to a l l of these* (v) balance Soviet 
Forces in the region and a t t a in super ior i ty in a c r i s i s . The 
U.S. also possesses a po ten t ia l s t r a t eg ic nuclear mi l i t a ry 
object ives of deploying, when necessary or convenient b a l l i s t i c 
2 
miss i les submarines t a rge t ted on the USSR. The U.S. v i t a l i n t e r e s t s 
include the preservation of Western access to Persian Gulf o i l 
resources, and the maintenance of a local geo-po l i t i ca l balance. 
The U.S. bel ieves that any decisive threa t to these i n t e r e s t s 
can or ig ina te only from Soviet action in the region or from such 
action interwoven with in t ra - reg iona l i n s t a b i l i t y . This challenge 
2, Report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relat ions, 
United Sta tes Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas 
Mil i tary I n s t a l l a t i o n s , Congressional Research Service, 
Washington, 1979, pp. 86-88, 
-14-
to the U.S. posi t ions i s not j u s t t h e o r i t i c a l but very inach 
r e a l , as was evidenced by the Soviet action in Afghanistan and 
the Horn of Africa, The Soviet Union i s contiguous to s t a t e s 
over-looking the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, and her 
mi l i t a ry power can be d i rec t ly projected into the l i t t o r a l , more 
so because her bases in the region (in Yemen, Ethiopia and also 
in Vietnam) are si tuated on maritime s t r a t e g i c choke-points. 
Such Soviet th rea t s had become more menacing for the U.S. 
pa r t i cu l a r ly after events in Afghanistan and Iran which had 
shif ted the geopoli t ical balance adverse to the U.S. i n t e r e s t s . 
Since a reduction of naval force in the area •would only increase 
the preponderance of land forces the Soviets have in the Soviet 
Union and Afghanistan, they could well affoird to champion the 
» 3 idea of an Indian Ocean zone of peace". To achieve i t s aims 
in the Indian Ocean region, Diego Garcia served a base from 
where fuel, ammunition and spareparts in suf f ic ient quantity 
could be stored, where planes of a l l s izes could land, and where 
3 , Phi l ip Wilcox, U.S. Deputy Assis tant Secretairy of State 
in the Bureau of In te rna t iona l Organizations, Backgrounder 
30.4,1982, American Center, New Delhi, p . 3 . 
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a c a r r i e r task group cx)uld anchore, if need be" . The U.S. 
s t r a t e g i s t s believed that i t wi l l enable them to exercise a 
far nore effect ive control over the p o l i t i c a l and economic 
po l i c i e s of the couintries of South Asia, Middle East and East 
5 Africa. In t h i s connection. Admiral Zumwalt s ta ted that United 
S ta tes had no land bridge to the c r i t i c a l Indian Ocean L i t t o r a l 
area, as do the other great powers of the Eurasian land-mass, 
we cannot f ly to these countries except over the t e r r i t o r y of 
o thers or along the lengthy a i r - rou tes over water. The most 
e f f i c ien t way we have of reaching them d i r ec t l y i s by sea. When 
other great powers look on the Indian Ocean area, they find 
ways of projecting the i r influence by t h e i r geographical proxi-
mity over r e l a t i v e l y short a i r and ground rou t e s . The U.S. 
by contrast must re ly almost exclusively on the sea". 
4 . A.J . Co t t r e l l and T.H. Moorer. "U.S. Overseas Bases: 
Problems of Protecting American Mil i tary Power Abroad", 
Washington Papers, Vol. 5, No,47, Washington (U,S.), 
1977, p ,34 . 
5 . N.K, Krishnan, "Pentagon War base in the Indian Ocean", 
Peace and Sol idar i ty , November 1974. 
6 . ElmD R. Zumwalt, "Indian Ocean : C r i t i c a l Importance 
to U.S." Weekly Round Table, New Delhi, 9 June 1974, 
p . 7 . 
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The Soviet Union entered into the Indian Ocean not only 
by politico-economic considerations but also by s t r a t e g i c point 
of view. After the U.S. deployment of nuclear-powered sub-
marines, capable of launching nuclear mediuro-range b a l l i s t i c 
miss i les , the Indian Ocean assumed s t r a t eg i c signif icance for 
the Soviet Union, These s t r a t eg i c weapons deployed in the 
Indian Ocean can be used against the Soviet Union but i t can-
not be used against the United S ta tes as i t l i e s in a d i f ferent 
7 hemisphere. The Soviet naval deployment in the Indian Ocean 
" r e f l e c t s a general aspirat ion to promote Soviet s t a t e i n t e r e s t s 
in keeping with i t s s ta tus as a super power with global i n t e r e s t s 
g 
to promote". Now, the Soviet policy in the Indian Ocean region 
re f lec ted the considerations of the following f ac t s : 
( i ) to defend the i r t e r r i t o r y from the U.S. S.L.B.M,s 
(submarine Laxinched B a l l i s t i c Missiles) operating in 
9 the Indian Ocean area. 
7, Akhtar Majeed. "The Indian Ocean ; S t ra t eg ic Significance" 
in Akhtar Majeed (Ed.) IndianOcean ; Conflict and 
Regional Cooperation, ABC Publi'shing House7''New Delhi, 
1986, p , 12"; 
8 , Jack Spence. "Naval Armaments in the Indian Ocean", 
Organiser, l3 September 1969, 
9 Yodf at and M. Abir. "jn^the^Direction of the Persian 
Gulf", London, 1977, p . 117. 
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( i i ) to keep the Indian Ocean open for t he i r maritime 
a c t i v i t i e s which i s necessary for t h e i r survival , 
( i i i ) to protect the regional countr ies from the U.S. i n t e r -
vention to achieve t h e i r p o l i t i c a l aims by threatening 
to do the same, 
(iv) to exploit the Indian Ocean resources especia l ly food, 
minerals and o i l for themselves, 
(v) to counter-act the ever expanding mi l i ta ry bases in the 
Indian Ocean, 
(vi) to challenge the American global supremacy. 
The Super powers responded to the disarmament proposal 
in the form of the concept of peace zone by being governed by 
those f a c t o r s . The peace zone proposal t a rge t ted on the great 
powers to remove t h e i r mi l i ta ry movements/ i n s t a l l a t i o n s could 
not secure t h e i r cooperative a t t i t u d e . Neither of them took the 
move ser ious ly . The U.S. coincided with demand to promote 
conditions of peace and t r anqu i l i t y in the region, but they 
re jected the view that a group of s t a t e s in cer tain region can 
es tab l i sh a legal regime for the high seas in that region. I t 
argued that " t h i s wi l l affect the fundamental secur i ty i n t e r e s t s 
-18-
not only of the s t a t e s ODmpelled to maintain s igni f icant mi l i -
tary preparedness in t h i s a l l too imperfected world, but also of 
the s t a t e s that re ly on the s t a b i l i t y created by a p o l i t i c a l and 
mi l i ta ry balance in order to pursue other important na t iona l 
goals and to avoid divert ing too much of the i r a t ten t ion and 
resources to the matters of secur i ty" . i t did not accept 
that the great pover mi l i ta ry presence in the Indian Ocean was a 
11 th rea t to peace. I t s ta ted that i t did not deploy i t s mi l i t a ry 
forces with the in tent ions of using or threatening to u s e . I t 
advocated that the great power mi l i ta ry presence, unlike the 
Soviet Union, had safeguarded the legi t imate i n t e r e s t s of the 
12 Indian Ocean s t a t e s and the in te rna t iona l community at l a r g e . 
10, U,1N, Document, k/0, l/^V. 1849, 10 December, 1971, 
11, C.S.R, Murthy, "India and the deadlocked zone of 
paace in the Indian Ocean", IDSA_vJournal, 17( l ) , 
July-September 1984, p . 9 1 , 
12, i b i d . 
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On the other hand, the Soviet Union accepted tha t the 
great power mi l i ta ry presence in the Indian Ocean was a source 
of tension but denied about her such a c t i v i t i e s . Mr, Brezhnev, 
in 1977, had declared that "Our stand i s c lear , we have already 
emphasised tha t the Soviet Union did not have and does not intend 
13 to bui ld mi l i ta ry bases in the region". The Soviet Union 
in s i s t ed for the dismantling of foreign bases in the Indian 
Ocean ra ther than prohibit ing the deployment of foreign naval 
14 forces . 
The U.K., France and Japan are a l l i e d to United S ta tes 
and t h e i r response towards the concept of peace zone d i r e c t l y 
15 
or ind i rec t ly coincided with U.S. behaviour. 
The Br i t i sh representat ive to ld tha t t h e i r mi l i t a ry 
f a c i l i t i e s in the region did not present a threa t to any l i t t o r a l 
16 
s t a t e , I t , however, maintained that the incireased Soviet naval 
13, John Baker White, "Power Balance in the Indian Ocean", 
Navy In terna t ional , Loncton, 82(3),March 1977. 
14, Kim Beazley, "The Indian Ocean : A triumph of i n t e r e s t 
over ideal , "Dissent, 35, 36 (Autunti/Wlnter 1977),p.32. 
15, K.S. Sidhu, The.Indian 0cean :_A Zone of Peace, op, c i t , , 
P. 109. 
16, U.N, General Assembly, 26th Session, 1848th meeting, 
10 December 1971, 
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nDveroent vas bound to have adverse af fec ts on t he i r t rade 
17 
routes across the Indian Ocean. France kept i t abstained from 
voting on the resolut ion for making Indian Ocean as a peace 
2Dne/ keeping in view of the refusal by e i the r big pover to accept 
and support the proposal. Japan accepted to cooperate vjith the 
l i t t o r a l s t a t e s and other major maritime powers in finding out 
the ways to maintain peace and s t a b i l i t y in the Indian Ocean 
18 
region. But i t sided with United Sta tes ixi the wake of fear 
of Soviet expansion and domination over the Indian Ocean region. 
Unlike the United Sta tes , they did not view the Indian Ocean 
from global p o l i t i c a l s t ra tegy . Fearing of Soviet domination of 
Indian Ocean, they took side with United Sta tes with which have 
19 broad p o l i t i c a l ideological and economic a f f i n i t i e s , 
China has p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s in the Indian Ocean and i t 
wants to compete for leadership of the Communist movement in the 
17. S.C, Gangal, "Britain and the Indian Ocean", A paper 
presented in the seminar on Indian Ocean, New Delhi, 
18-19 February, 1974. 
18. U.N, General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, A/C, l/PV, 
1841, 1 December l971, 
19. K.S, Sidhu, The__Jndian_Ocean : A Zone of Peace, 
Op, c i t . , p . T i l . 
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Afro-Asian cx)xintries. Motivated to t h i s , China suppor ted t h e 
American nava l presence to counter ba lance t h e Sovie t n a v a l 
p r e s e n c e . I t supported t h e U .S . presence s ince i t could no t 
af ford to p lay i t s r o l e in r e g i o n a l and g l o b a l diplomacy due 
to i t s r e l a t i v e l y backward navy and the d i s t a n c e of Indian 
20 Ocean from t h e i r home-por ts . 
During 1977-78, t he United S t a t e s and t h e Sov ie t Union 
had b i l a t e r a l t a l k s regarding arms l i m i t a t i o n in t h e Indian 
21 Ocean, This was seen as a primary s t ep c o n t r i b u t i n g to t o t a l 
disarmament in the r eg ion . The f i r s t round of t a l k s , he ld in 
Itosco-w in June 1977, served to e s t a b l i s h p o s i t i o n s and to 
c l a r i f y concepts such as the geographica l a rea to be covered by 
the n e g o t i a t i o n s , involvement of l i t t o r a l s t a t e s (Sog, A u s t r a l i a ) 
and of m i l i t a r y f o r c e s o u t s i d e the Indian Ocean, t he i s s u e of 
bases and of t h e r i g h t to use foreign f a c i l i t i e s , t r a n s i t 
arrangements , d e f i n i t i o n s of nava l presence and so o n , In 
20 . Report from the J o i n t Committee on Foreign A f f a i r s on 
t h e Indian Ocean Region, Canberra, 1972, p , 1 8 . 
2 1 . D i e t e r Braun, The_Indian Ocean :_Rec[ion of C o n f l i c t 
o r 'zone of PeaceT "Oxforci nniversI%~Press7~Rew~I5eIhi, 
1983. p"70."" 
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September 1977, during the second round of t a l k s in Washington, 
a draft was prepared for a preliminary agreement to freeze naval 
forces at the exist ing level of e i t he r s ides and were prepared 
for the subsequent reduct ions. At tha t time, the U.S.S.R. was 
prepared to accept Diego Garcia, 
In December 1977, before the t h i r d roxind of t a l k s , the 
U.S.S.R. had to give up Berbera. For the U.S.S.R., Berbera was 
important to counter Diego Garcia. Consequently, the Soviet 
Union demanded dras t ic reductions in United S ta tes a c t i v i t i e s 
in the Indian Ocean especia l ly in the Diego Garcia, 
Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R, was providing massive support 
to Ethiopia in i t s war against Somalia, which made the b i l a t e r a l 
22 
t a l k s to break-up, "^ e^ United S ta t e s opposed Spviet support 
to Ethiopia during the fourth round t a l k s in Berne in 1978 by 
saying that t h i s behaviour was incompatible with the intention 
to l imit forces . 
22. C, Raja l^ Johan. "Indian Ocean : Zone of Peace or 
Conflict", S t ra tegic Analysis, 10(3), June 1986, 
p . 273. 
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With the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s to c r e a t e zone of peace in the Indian Ocean have 
been minimised. While the Soviet had demanded the Uni ted S t a t e s 
to vaca te Diego Garc ia , the Uni ted S t a t e s countered i t wi th 
Afghanis tan . The U.S . s a id t h a t Soviet occupat ion of Afghanistan 
could pose the most s e r i o u s t h r e a t to wsr ld peace s ince t h e 
23 
second vjorld -war. Rather i t found an o p p o r t u n i t y t o avoid 
t h e concept and in tu rn , proposed for r e g i o n a l n u c l e a r weapons-
f r ee aones to be accepted by the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s . The U .S . c a l l e d 
t h a t in the wake of armed c o n f l i c t s within and among the s t a t e 
of the region i t w i l l be b e t t e r for them to accept n u c l e a r 
24 
weapons-free zones in South Asia, Middle East and A f r i c a , 
The d i f f e r e n t nuc l ea r weapons-free zones had f a i l e d to 
achieve for what they s tand for because of d i f f e r e n t i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n s and emphases. The nuc l ea r weapon powers had expressed 
2 3 . B, Vivekanandan, "The Indian Ocean as a zone of peace; 
Problems and p r o s p e c t s , " Asian Survey, 2 l (12) , 
December 1981, p , l246 , 
24, Statement by U .S . de l ega t e , Wayne Merry to the U.N, 
Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, 17 J u l y 1984, 
P . 3 -4 . 
-24-
their support towards these zones, keeping in view their ovm 
perceptions/ thereby miniinised their effectiveness. The two 
major nuclear weapon powers - the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. were 
desirous to keep certain regions under their respective influence 
and^  if possible, to prevent their nuclear adversary from entering 
into their domain. 
The Antarctic Treaty, concluded on 1st December 1959 for 
an unpopulated region was the first international agreement 
ggtablishing a demilitarized zone, had ensured that nuclear 
weapons would not be introduced into the specified area. The 
treaty aimed to make Antarctica to be used for peaceful purposes. 
It took stand for the freedom of scientific research and for 
the international scientific cooperation in Antarctica, Thus, 
it prohibited actions like the establishment of military bases 
and fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres and 
testing of weapons. Rather it did not prevent the use of 
military personnel or equipment of scientific research to be 
carried out in Antarctica, The treaty prohibited the nuclear 
e:}q>losions for any purposes and dumping of radio-active waste 
material over there. 
The treaty had renounced any territorial sovereignty 
claims by the Contracting Parties in Antarctica, 
- 2 5 -
Regarding ver i f i ca t ion , the t r ea ty provided, for the 
observers appointed by the o r ig ina l contracting pa r t i e s , the 
r ight of a e r i a l observations and of complete access a t any t ims . 
I t permitted the ve r i f i ca t ions of a l l areas of Antarctic region 
including a l l s ta t ions , i n s t a l l a t i o n s and equipment within 
those areas and a l l ships and a i r c r a f t s at points of discharging 
or enibarking cargoes or personnel in that area . 
The t r ea ty was designed for demil i tar iza t ion, but in 
25 
ac tua l i ty Antarctica was never mi l i t a r i zed . " The t r e a ty was 
devised by a few powers for the exploration of i t s vast na tura l 
resources for peaceful purposes without any hurdle . I t was a 
nodest, l imited and r e l a t i v e l y cos t less attempt at in te rna t iona l 
26 
control during the intense cold war. Notwithstanding, t h e i r 
s ta ted support for in te rna t iona l access, both the U.S. andU.S.S.R. 
have reserved a l l the i r r i g h t s with respect to the Antarct ic 
26. Jeffrey D, Mybre, The Antarct ic Treaty; P o l i t i c s , 
Law gaid Diplomacy, Westview Press/Boulder and London, 
1986, p .36 . 
26. C. Raja Mohan, "The Antart ic Regime: Conflict and Change 
at the Frozen Frontier**, IPSA Journal, 16(2), October-
December 1983, p . 154. 
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27 
r e g i o n . This i s t he f axs t t r e a t y in which the Uni ted S t a t e s 
and t h e Sovie t Union agreed t o an o n - s i g h t i n spec t ion of t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e i n s t a l l a t i o n s . Since , t h e t r e a t y came i n t o force^ 
in 1961, no v i o l a t i o n to t h i s t r e a t y has come t o n o t i c e . 
The check t h e extens ion of arms race on t h e sea-bed and 
the Ocean-f loor and in t h e s u b - s o i l thereof and t o use t h e s e 
a r e a s fo r peacefu l purposes t h e "Trea ty on the P r o h i b i t i o n of 
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Des t ruc t ion on t h e 
Sea-bed and t h e Ocean Floor and in the subso i l thereof "was 
28 
concluded in 1972, To prevent the arms race in those a r e a s , 
t h e t r e a t y excluded t h e c la ims of n a t i o n a l sove re ign ty over 
t h e s e a r e a s . Regarding t h i s the Trea ty provided t h a t S t a t e s 
p a r t i e s under take not t o emplant or emplace on the seabed and 
t h e ocean f l oo r and in the subso i l thereof beyond the o u t e r 
l i m i t of t he sea-bed zone any n u c l e a r weapons o r any o t h e r t ypes 
of weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n as we l l as s t r u c t u r e s , launching, 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s o r any o t h e r f a c i l i t i e s , s p e c i f i c a l l y des igned 
29 
for s t o r i n g , t e s t i n g or using such weapons. 
27 . i b i d . , Po 153. 
2 8 . Ashwani Kumar Chopra. I n d i a ' s P o l i c y on Disarmament, 
ABC Pub l i sh ing House, New Delhi , 1 9 8 4 , p , i 4 l . 
2 9 . J^, S ingh, Outer Space, Outer Sea^ Cuter Land And 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, Ham am P u b l i c a t i o n s , New Delh i , 
1987, p , l 6 2 . 
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But t h i s t r e a t y has expressed no th ing r ega rd ing 
v^apons in the super jacent water coluim o r water sur face i . e . 
30 
ca r ry ing of nuc l ea r weapons in submarines and sur face s h i p s . 
I t d id no t inc lude the por t ion of the sea-bed which i s adjacent 
3 l to the coas t of n u c l e a r weapon s t a t e s . I t a l s o d id no t 
p r o h i b i t t h e n u c l e a r weapon powers from i n s t a l l i n g n u c l e a r 
weapons beneath the t e r r i t o r i a l wa te r s of o t h e r s t a t e s provided 
32 
t h a t those s t a t e s had au thor ized such i n s t a l l a t i o n s . 
I t had now become pos s ib l e to launch n u c l e a r v;arheads 
from o r b i t in o u t e r space aga ins t t a r g e t s on e a r t h . Therefore^ 
to keep the o u t e r space and o the r c e l e s t i a l bod i e s for peace-
fu l purposes and to avoid m i l i t a r y e x p l o i t a t i o n / the "Trea ty 
on P r i n c i p l e s Governing the A c t i v i t i e s in the Explora t ion and 
Use of Outer Space, inc lud ing the Moon and Other C e l e s t i a l 
Bodies" was concluded in 196 7 . The t r e a t y d id no t r ega rd the 
30 , Hanna Newcoiribe. "A NWFZ in the A r c t i c — A Proposa l" , 
B u l l e t i n of Peace Proposa l s , New York, 12(3) , 1981, 
p . 252 ." 
31, J. Goldblat. "Arms Control Agreements, Humanitarian 
Laws of War", in Marek Thee (ed.), op. cit., p. 310. 
32, ibid. 
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claim of n a t i o n a l sovereignty^ by means of use o r occupat ion 
33 
o r by any o the r means. The t r e a t y p r o h i b i t e d the s t a t i o n i n g 
of v?eapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n on s a t e l l i t e s o r b i t i n g the 
e a r t h or on c e l e s t i a l b o d i e s . In t h i s connect ion, the United 
S t a t e s and Soviet Union submit ted d r a f t t r e a t i e s bu t remained 
34 
s i l e n t regarding the d e l i v e r y v e h i c l e s . 
This t r e a t y , however, d id no t p r o h i b i t such weapons 
f ly ing through ou t e r space, l i k e on ICBMs or in f r a c t i o n a l 
o r b i t s nor did i t p r o h i b i t the d e s t r u c t i o n of non-of fens ive 
s a t e l l i t e s with nuc l ea r weapons c a r r i e d by m i s s i l e s f i r e d from 
35 
e a r t h . 
Besides t h i s , t he r e a re t\-K> n u c l e a r weapons f ree 
zones — the Lat in American n u c l e a r weapons f ree zone and 
south p a c i f i c n u c l e a r - f r e e zone, 
3 3 . J .N , Singh. Op. c i t . Appendix - I — Treaty on 
P r inc ip l e Governing the A c t i v i t i e s of S t a t e s in the 
Explorat ion and Use of Outer Space, inc luding the 
Moon and o t h e r C e l e s t i a l Bodies, p . 265 . 
34. Ashwani Kumar Chopra. Op. c i t . , p . 145. 
3 5 . Hanna Newcombe, Op. c i t . , p . 252. 
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Regarding these zbnes/ the Uni ted S t a t e s and the 
U.K. cons idered t h a t both the c r e a t i o n of such zones and 
o b l i g a t i o n s of the nuc lea r powers to r e s p e c t t h e i r s t a t u s 
should be q u a l i f i e d by the phrases "where app rop r i a t e " and 
"where poss ib l e " r e s p e c t i v e l y , s ince t h a t would nore adequate ly 
take i n t o cons ide ra t ion the e x i s t i n g s t r a t e g i c r e a l i t i e s in 
the world . The United S t a t e s based i t s support for the 
37 
n u c l e a r weapons f ree zones, i r c o n s i s t e n t with the fol lowing — 
( i ) the i n i t i a t i v e coines from the reg ion , ( i i ) a l l s t a t e s 
whose p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s important , do p a r t i c i p a t e , ( i i i ) t he 
zonal arrangement e f f e c t i v e l y p r o h i b i t s i t s p a r t i e s from 
developing o r o therwise possess ing n u c l e a r explos ive dev ices 
for whatever purpose, ( iv) the e s t ab l i shment of the zone does 
no t d i s t u r b e x i s t i n g s e c u r i t y arrangements , (v) the zone 
does no t a f f ec t the e x i s t i n g r i g h t s of i t s p a r t i e s under 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law to grant o r deny to o t h e r s t a t e s t r a n s i t 
p r i v e l e g e s within i n t e r n a l wa te r s , inc luding por t c a l l s and 
o v e r f l i g h t s , (vi) and the zone arrangement does no t seek to 
36. !I1}S ]lnJ:i§^-M^^^2Il^-.^Jt^^-£I9BH!^U^-lP^I-^°2]S' vo l , 3:i978, 
Op.'-cit '^, p~30 
3 7 . The United Nat ions Disarmament Year Book, Vol . 10:1985, 
o-p"''cTt-:7~19"B57~P"r"2T33-
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impose r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e e x e r c i s e of r i g h t s unde r i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l lav; r e g a r d i n g freedom of n a v i g a t i o n of h i g h s e a s / in 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l a i r space^ and t h r o u g h s t r a i t s f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
a i r space and i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a v i g a t i o n , and t h e r i g h t of 
i n n o c e n t pa s sage t h r o u g h t e r r i t o r i a l s e a s . 
The S o v i e t Union v iewed t h e c r e a t i o n of n u c l e a r 
w e a p o n s - f r e e zones a s an i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t in t h e s t r u g g l e f o r 
s t r e n g t h e n i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and t h e n o n - p r o t i f e r a t i o n 
r e g i m e . S i n c e t h e main d a n g e r of t h e c a u s e of p e a c e was t h e 
n u c l e a r arms r a c e , i t c o n s i d e r e d i t n e c e s s a r y t o h a l t and then 
r e v e r s e t h i s t o a c h i e v e n u c l e a r d i s a r m a m e n t . Thus i t f a v o u r e d 
among o t h e r p r a c t i c a l measu res , t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of g u a r a n t e e s 
of t h e s e c u r i t y of t h e n o n - n u c l e a r weapon s t a t e s and t h e non -
emplacement of n u c l e a r weapons on t h e t e r r i t o r i e s of S t a t e s 
n o t p o s s e s s i n g them. I t e x p r e s s e d i t s r e a d i n e s s t o r e s p e c t 
t h e s e zones p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e y were g e n u i n l y f r e e of n u c l e a r 
weapons and t h a t t h e r e l e v a n t a g r e e m e n t s c o n t a i n e d no l o o p h o l e s 
and c o r r e s p o n d e d to t h e g e n e r a l l y r e c o g n i z e d norms of i n t e r -
38 
n a t i o n a l l a w . 
3 8 . VCN» 10/PV, 10-22 and V C N . 10/PV„ 9 - 22, 
Cor r igendum, 
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France i n s i s t e d t h a t any o b l i g a t i o n s of the nuc l ea r 
powers v i t h r ega rd to such 2ones ought t o be n e g o t i a t e d j o i n t l y 
39 between the non-nuc lea r and n u c l e a r powers . 
China has come with uncond i t iona l pledge for no t to use 
n u c l e a r weapons a g a i n s t t h e s e zones and supported t h e e f f o r t s 
of the c o u n t r i e s in t h i s d i r e c t i o n i f come on a vo lun t a ry b a s i s . 
The P ro toco l I of t he Treaty of T l a t e l o l c o c a l l s on 
n a t i o n s o u t s i d e the t r e a t y zone t o apply the d e n u c l e a r i z a t i o n 
p r o v i s i o n s of the t r e a t y zone to t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s in the 
zone. Four powers namely the U.K,, the Nether lands , France 
and the Uni ted S t a t e s have such t e r r i t o r i e s , ou t of which 
France has not s igned t o t h i s p r o t o c o l , 
France re fused to sign the P ro toco l I of the t r e a t y by 
arguing t h a t " in ma t t e r s of defence, i t could draw no d i s t i n c t i o n 
between t h e v a r i o u s p a r t s of French t e r r i t o r y and as a n u c l e a r 
power, i t could no t accept a denuc lea r i zed s t a t u s for a p a r t 
of i t s own t e r r i t o r y " ^^ 
39 The Uni ted Nat ions Disarmament Year Book, Vol , 3:1978, 
40 T T. Pou lpse , Uni ted Nat ions and_Nuglear P r o l i f e r a t i o n , 
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The Netherlands s ta ted that Protocol I sha l l not be 
in te rpre ta ted as prejudicing the posi t ions of the Netherlands 
as regards i t s recognition or non-recognition of the r i g h t s 
or of claims to sovereignty of the pa r t i e s to the Treaty, 
or of the grounds on which such claims are made, 
U.K. expressed that the Treaty defining the term 
• t e r r i t o r y ' as including the t e r r i t o r i a l sea, a i r space and 
any other space over which the s t a t e exercises sovereignty 
in accordance with ' i t s own l e g i s l a t i o n ' , the U.K. does not 
regard i t s signing or r a t i f i ca t ion of the protocol as implying 
recognition of any l eg i s l a t ion which does not, in i t s view, 
41 comply with the relevant ru les of in ternat ional law. 
The United S ta tes r a t i f i ed i t by saying tha t the 
provisions under t h i s do not affect the exclusive power and 
legal competence under in ternat ional law of a s t a t e adhering 
to t h i s protocol to grant or deny t r a n s i t and t ranspor t p r i -
veleges to i t s ovffi or any other vessels or a i r c ra f t i r r e spec -
t i ve of cargo or armaments, r igh t s under in te rna t iona l law of 
4 1 , S. Lodgaard. "Arms Control and Disarmament - Appoidix_ 
Sta tus of the implementation of the major m u l t i l a t e r a l 
arms control agreements", in Marek Thee (Ed.) Arms and 
Disarmament: SIPRI Findings^ op, c i t , , p , 4 l 4 . 
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a state adhering to this protocol regarding the exercise of 
the freedom of the seas, or regarding passage through or 
42 
over waters subject to the sovereignty of a state. 
Earlier, in 1965 the U.S. refused to sign Protocol I 
because it did not want the virgin Islands and Puerto Rico to 
come within such zone. It took position for the Panama Canal 
zone that its inclusion into the zone should not affect the 
right of transit through the Canal as well as Guantanarao base, 
if cuba became a party to the Treaty', 
The Additional Protocol II of the treaty stands for 
the nuclear weapons powers to oblige towards Latin American 
nuclear weapons-free zone. 
Under the treaty, peaceful nuclear explosions were 
allowed and procedures for this purpose were specified. But 
these countries interpret this as prohibiting the manufacture 
of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes unless and 
43, T,T, Poulose, United Nations and Nuclear Proliferation, 
op. cit„ p. 97, 
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u n t i l n u c l e a r dev ice a re developed which cannot be used as 
vjeapon s . 
China undertook uncond i t i ona l l y not t o use o r t h r e a t e n 
44 to use n u c l e a r weapons a g a i n s t n u c l e a r - f r e e zones . Whereas 
the U . S . , t h e U.K. and France which undertook n o t t o use 
n u c l e a r weapons a g a i n s t non-nuc lear weapon s t a t e s i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y 
committed n o t to acqu i r e such weapons was condi t ioned t h a t 
n u c l e a r - f r e e c o u n t r i e s should not p a r t i c i p a t e in an ag ress ion 
aga ins t them or t h e i r a l l i e s m a s s o c i a t i o n with ano ther 
45 
n u c l e a r weapons power. The sovxet Union made such r e s e r v a t i o n 
aga ins t t he s t a t e s of t h e zone committing an act of aggress ion 
46 
with the support of, or t oge the r wi th a n u c l e a r weapon s t a t e . 
The r e c e n t l y e s t a b l i s h e d n u c l e a r - f r e e zone under t h e 
Treaty of Rarotonga has t h r e e p r o t o c o l s t o be s igned and 
r a t i f i e d . Of the accompanying P r o t o c o l s , P ro toco l I was to be 
44 . G.E. F r e y . "The South P a c i f i c Nuclear Free Zone" 
in Marek Thee (Ed.) Arms and Disarmament; SIPRI Findings , 
New York, 1986, p . 359. 
4 5 . i b i d . 
46 J , G o l d b l a t , "Arms Control Agreements, Humanitarian 
Laws of War'^ in Marek Thee (Edo), op,^ c i t . , p . 3 l 2 . 
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signed by France, the U.K. and the United States, which have 
territories in the region, to apply the provisions of the 
treaty to their territorial possessions covered by the nuclear-
free zones. Protocol 2 was to be signed by the nuclear weapon 
powers, which would agree to fully respect the treaty and not 
to use, or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states within 
the zone. Protocol 3 was meant for prohibiting nuclear weapon 
powers from nuclear testing in the region. 
Of these nuclear weapon powers, only the Soviet Union 
and China signed the protocols. The Soviet Union acceptance 
was phrased to exclude port calls by nuclear armed vessels 
and China said that its compliance would cease if the agree-
47 
ment will be violated by any signatory. 
France rejected the Treaty of Rarotonga as it was mainly 
targetted on French nuclear testing. U.K. refused to sign 
the treaty after it was opposed by United States, 
47. International Herald Tribune, 12 February, 1987. 
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The U.S. decided not to accept the Protocols "at this 
time". The inclusion of samsa because of its nuclear related 
activities and other important security arrangements in the 
48 South Pacific was important for the U.S. to consider. 
While the idea of nuclear weapons-free zones emerged 
in the international relations to ensure the complete absence 
of nuclear weapons in various regions of the world but in 
actuality it could not happen. There are no regions beyond 
the reach of nuclear weapons. 
Both the Treaty of Tlatelolco as well as Treaty of 
Rarotonga spoke for only one aspect of nuclear arsenal — the 
warheads, to be freed from the particular region, This kind 
of expression had legitimised all the other kinds of nuclear 
49 
arsenals such as missiles. The emphasis on nuclear warheads 
and ignoring the nuclear infrastructure which facilitates the 
continued development of nuclear weapons and their use, is a 
common weakness of these zones. 
48 G.V.C, Naidu, P. rtoorthy. "The South Pacific Nuclear 
Free Zone", Strategic Analysis, 12(2), May 1987,p. 181, 
49 C Raja i^^ han, "The Treaty of Rarotonga", op. cit., 
PI 728, 
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One analyst has very r igh t ly concluded that "the main 
flow in exist ing nuclear-free po l i c i e s or nuclear free-zone 
proposals i s that they set up a system whereby non-nuclear 
means nothing but the absence of nuclear warheads, while the 
in f ra - s t ruc tu re i s ignored. In the 1950s and 1960s when 
nuclear weapons were large and d i f f i cu l t to t ranspor t or 
assemble/ the mere r e s t r i c t i on of warheads might have made sense 
as an arms control i n i t i a t i v e . But today warheads are small 
and l igh t weight and require minimal preparation and unkeep. 
Vir tual ly every ship and airplane avai lable to the nuclear 
powers can carry them anywhere on earthy as long as the 
in te l l igence , t a rge t t ing , basic t ra in ing and communication 
"50 anfra-s t ructure i s on place to support them. 
Under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, nuclear explosions for 
peaceful purposes are allowed and the procedure regarding t h i s 
are specif ied. But some countries have in terpre ted t h i s as 
prohibi t ing peaceful nuclear explosions unless and xintil 
advances in technology have made possible the development of 
50, BulJ^etin of Atomic Sc ien t i s t s / June/July, 1985, 
PP. 13-14" 
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devices for such explosions which are not capable of being used 
51 for vjeapon purposes. 
Besides^ there has been concern over the geographical 
extent of the nuclear-free zone which defines extremely large 
a rea . At present the zone of application i s confined to the 
t e r r i t o r y of s t a t e s for which the Treaty i s in force, which 
includes the t e r r i t o r i a l sea, airspace and any other space 
over which the s t a te exercises sovereignty according to t h e i r 
own l e g i s l a t i o n . The nuclear weapon powers did not recognise 
any leg i s la t ion which did not, in the i r vjay, comply vjith the 
ru les of the in ternat ional lawo I t also did not prohib i t 
the weapon-related ac t iv i ty or the t r a n s i t of nuclear-armed 
ships or c r a f t . Because of such ambiguities the t r e a t y could 
not eliminate the danger of nuclear weapons. 
I t did not prevent the Br i t i sh from using a nuclear-
propelled submarine, I-U"iS Conqueror, in the Ocean area included 
into the zone and torpedoing the Argentine cru iser . General 
5 1 , Joseph Gallacher, "Art icle VII, The Treaty of Tiatelolco 
and Colonial Warfare in the 20th Century", in Ian 
Bellanay, Coit B. Blacker & Joseph Gallacher (Ed.) 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Frank Cass Si Co., 
Ltd. , London, 1985. 
52. K, Subrahmanyam. "Our Nuclear Predicament", 
S t ra teg ic Ar^alysis, 9(7), October 1985, p . 656. 
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Belgrano, I t did. not prevent the U.K. from deploying a 
n u c l e a r m i s s i l e sxibmarine with cont ingency p l ans to f i r e i t s 
m i s s i l e s . I t d id no t prevent t h e U.S, from having cont ingency 
p l ans t o p lace an t i - submar ine n u c l e a r warheads in Pue r to Rico, 
53 
a p a r t of such zone. 
Besides a l l t hese , v a r i o u s c o u n t r i e s of t h i s zone has 
no t acceded to the T r e a t y , 
Unl ike the Treaty of T l a t e l o l c o , t he next t r e a t y 
declariing South P a c i f i c n u c l e a r - f r e e zone included t h e p r e -
vent ion of peaceful nuc l ea r exp los ions and the ban dumping of 
r a d i o a c t i v e m a t e r i a l . However, t h i s t r e a t y could no t serve 
the purpose of the n u c l e a r - f r e e zones but only f u l f i l l e d i t s 
essence of oppos i t ion t o t h e dumping of r a d i o a c t i v e m a t e r i a l s . 
I t d i d no t included Guam, the only p l ace in South P a c i f i c which 
s t o r e s n u c l e a r weapcxis, i n t o t h e t e r r i t o r i a l coverage of t h e 
South p a c i f i c n u c l e a r - f r e e zone. Guam i s the c e n t r a l t o U . S . 
n u c l e a r war p l ans for the p a c i f i c because of i t s l o c a t i o n . 
53 „ i b i d . 
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The South p a c i f i c n u c l e a r - f r e e zone i s l i m i t e d on t h e e a s t 
by t h e La t in American n u c l e a r vieapons-free zone, on t h e west 
o 
by A u s t r a l i a , and on the south by the A n t a r c t i c . And a t 15 
54 
n o r t h l i e s t h e U . S . base of Guam, 
The Rarotonga Treaty could not apply to t h e p r o h i b i t i o n 
55 
of m i s s i l e s . The U .S . t e s t s i t s n u c l e a r m i s s i l e s in the 
P a c i f i c wi th a permanent n u c l e a r m i s s i l e t e s t i n g f a c i l i t y a t 
Kwajalein A t o l l , j u s t South of t h e Equa tor . The Sov ie t t e s t s 
i t s m i s s i l e s nea r the Cook i s l a n d s and Chinese t e s t s m i s s i l e s 
n e a r Solomon i s l a n d s . 
I t did not prevent the hos t ing of n u c l e a r weapon r e l a t e d 
56 bases in the r e g i o n . The U .S . ma in ta ins n u c l e a r weapons 
r e l a t e d communication and s u r v e i l l a n c e f a c i l i t i e s a t Nurrvingar, 
5 4 . C. Raja Itohan. "The Treaty of Rarotonga", 
o p . G i t . , p . 728. 
5 5 . i b i d , , p . 729. 
5 6 . i b i i J , , p . 728 
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North West Cape and Pine Gap in Aus t ra l ia , By allowing such 
bases in the region, there wil l be continued par t i c ipa t ion of 
the region for the global nuclear arms race. 
The t r e a ty also did not ban the the t r a n s i t of nuclear 
weapons through the region and the question of Port Cal ls 
remained l e f t to be decided by the concerned coxantrye 
- 4 2 -
CHAPTER - I I I 
Ib^ DliO^ POLICY TOWARDS PEACE ZONE AND NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS FREE 2DNES 
I n d i a ' s po l i cy tovjards Indian Ocean i s based on i t s 
s e c u r i t y concerns . The Indian pen insu la i s j u t t e d about a 
thousand miles i n to t h e Indian Ocean* having S r i Lanka a t i t s 
apex. The loca t ion of Ind ia , in t h i s con tex t , p rov ides tvo 
coinpla'Tientary opt ions — t h e Indian subcont inent be ing t h e 
c e n t r a l a x i s in the s t r a t e g i c p a t t e r n of Asia can serve a s a 
tremendous base in t h e oceanic reg ion , while the Indian Ocean 
i t s e l f can ac t as a v i t a l s p a t i a l f a c t o r in de termining 
2 
I n d i a ' s fu tu re s a f e t y , The s e c u r i t y of Ind ia depends on 
t h e Indian Ocean and he r freedom a t t he mercy of any coxmtry 
3 
capable of c o n t r o l l i n g them. 
The Indian Ocean provided a long range of economic 
i n t e r e s t s , bu t i t i s no t only t h e economic i n t e r e s t s which 
1. K. S. Sidu. The Indian Ocean ; A Zone of Peace, 
op . c i t . , p . T T 
2 . P . R, Ramchandra Rao. Indian and Ceylon, Bombay, 
1954, P . 7 . 
3 . i b i d . 
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a t t r ac t ed the world powers p a r t i c u l a r l y the Super powers. The 
Super powers, af ter the second world war, s t a r t ed to strengthen 
t h e i r posi t ions against each other by forming mi l i t a ry 
4 
a l l i a n c e s . The bipolar ised world with a l l i t s h o s t i l i t y , 
tension and suspicion began to bui ld-up arspnals creating 
5 an atmosphere of cold war. The p o l i t i c a l tension m the 
Indian Ocean region provided opportxinit^^ to the external 
powers to exploit them to su i t the i n t e r e s t s of the l a t t e r . 
Despite r iva l ry between the big powers there has always been 
a threa t that the same force wi l l be used against these s ta tes 
in case of an emergency, to achieve t h e i r imper ia l i s t i c 
i n t e r e s t s . To counter-act the big power r i v a l r y so near her 
land, India chose to organise community of na t ions of the 
Indian Ocean region to persuade them to accept the Indian 
Ocean as a peace zone which i s based on the policy of non-
alignment. 
S.R, Choudhury. Mili tary All iances and Neut ra l i ty In 
war and Peace, Delhi, 1966, p . l , 
S,N. Kohli, 'Maritime s t ra tegy and force leve ls" , 
Chanakya Defence Annual, Allahabad, 1976, p , l 3 0 . 
A. Chemyshov. "Peace and Securi ty of the Indian 
Ocean", In ternat ional Affairs , Vol, 12, Moscow, 
Dec,, 1976,. P . 43 , 
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India proposes for the Indian Ocean as a peace zone 
because i t being an arms control and disarmament measure, 
i s one of the several important i n i t i a t i v e s of the non-aligned 
countries to el iminate arms race and in ternat ional tensions 
which hinder the peaceful economic development v i t a l l y needed 
by them. I t also imparts a new dimension to the Afro-Asian 
struggle against colonial ism. 
In t h i s context Mr, Balram Bhagat, the then Indian 
minister of External Affairs, said "we believe that the secur i t ] 
of ttoe countr ies of the region must re ly ul t imately on t h e i r 
nat ional strength and t h e i r wil l ing cooperation as sovereign 
independent s t a t e s . " 
On March 13, 1972 President V,V, Giri^ while addressing 
the Indian parliament, had r e i t e r a t ed the Indian stand tha t i t 
wanted the Indian Ocean area to be free from power r i v a l r i e s 
or domination and to develop into an area of peace and 
Q 
co-ordination ra ther than one of confrontation. 
7, K.R, Singh, .The_Irisli§2_0cean i_B_ig power presence 
and local response, New DelTTi, 1977, p.""2i9, 
8 . K.S. Sidhu, The Indian Ocean i A Zone of Peace, 
op. c i t . , p ,74, ' ' 
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Mr, A.B, Vajpayee had r epea t ed t h e apprehensions of t h e 
government in the par l iament and s a i d " t h e inc reased m i l i t a r y 
and nava l presence in the a rea and f ea r of involvement of 
g r e a t powers cannot ease but only add to the t e n s i o n s in t h i s 
v i t a l region which has a l ready seen dramat ic upheavals and i s 
9 
s t i l l see th ing with t ens ion and u n c e r t a i n t y " . 
In the United Nat ions and Non-al igned movement, I n d i a ' s 
r o l e t o pursue the peace zone p roposa l regarding the Indian 
Ocean i s worth ment ioning. 
The Indian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , in the F i r s t Committee of 
the Uni ted Nat ions , r e i t e r a t e d Indian Government viewpoint 
and sa id " Ind ia toge the r with a l l t h e non-a l igned c o u n t r i e s has 
subscr ibed to the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace" . He added 
t h a t t h i s proposal aims a t keeping the a rea f ree from g r e a t 
• , • r . 1 1 
power r i v a l r i e s and c o n f r o n t a t i o n . 
9 . P.K,S^ iNiamboodiri. "New U . S . moves in Indian Ocean 
P o l i t i c s " , Foreign News and Featxires, Vol , 10 (7) , 
New Delhi , March 17, 1979, 
10, U.N. General Assembly, F i r s t Committee Report , 
26th Session ( P r o v i s i o n a l ) , h/Q, l /PV, 1838, 
November 29, 1971, 
13, il5id. 
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During the twenty-eighth session of United Nations 
General Assembly, the Indian delegation voiced that "our fear 
i s that any la rge-sca le and loud presence of the navy of the 
external power i s bound to create problems for l i t t o r a l 
countries, the overwhelming majority of which are desirous 
12 
of keeping the Indian Ocean as a zone of t r a n q u i l i t y " . 
Indian delegate, while pa r t i c ipa t ing in the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Indian Ocean in 1973, emphasized the "need 
for informal consul tat ions among the delegations to determine 
.. 13 
acceptable practical steps" for the implementation of the 
proposal, India insisted that while formulating its 
recommendations/ the Committee should know the position of 
the major powers and the major maritime users of the Indian 
14 Oceans, But there were certain obstacles which had to be 
overcome for informal consultations to succeed. First, the 
lukewarm response of the big powers towards Ad Hoc Committee 
12, United Nations General Assembly, Twenty-eighth session, 
November 23, 1973, 
13, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean 
29. A/9029, 1973. 
14, ibid. 
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which necessiated t h e i r cooperation. In t h i s regard the 
Indian representat ive suggested that "the big powers and 
maritinie users of the Indian Ocean should cooperate in the 
process of construct ive dialogue bet\<een the countr ies of 
the region on one hand and the maritime external na t ions on 
15 the o ther" . Such a step has to be adopted for making the 
implementation a success. Secondly, the ves t iges of colonia-
lism was a major hurdle which opposed to the peace of the 
region. In t h i s context, India forcely expressed tha t a zone 
of peace cannot be rea l i sed without the elimination of such 
16 
aggression. 
Again in 1975, India proposed in the United Wations 
that the big powers and other maritime users of the Indian 
Ocean should be associated with the proposed in te rna t iona l 
conference to consider the implementation of the United 
17 
Nations reso lu t ion . 
15. ib id . 
16. ib id . 
17. K.S, Sidhu, I2?e_Indijn__Ocean__j_ A Zone of Peace, 
op. c i t . , p . 34. " ~ 
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During the debate in the F i r s t Committee, a t the 35th 
session of General Assembly, India expressed the hope that 
with the par t ic ipa t ion of the permanent members of the Security 
Council in i t s work, the Ad Hoc Committee would be in a 
posi t ion to proceed expeditiously towards the transformation 
of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace as o r i g i n a l l y 
envisaged in 19 71 by most of the non-aligned l i t t o r a l and 
h in ter land s t a t e s of the Indian Ocean, India s t ressed tha t 
such a development would strengthen in te rna t iona l peace and 
secur i ty , and in the long run, would be in the i n t e r e s t of 
18 
the great powers themselves. 
Regarding the change in the objec t ives of Ad Hoc 
Committee, India advocated for the objec t ives and mandate 
19 
according to or ig ina l declaration of 1971. India found that 
the work of the Ad Hoc Committee had been subjected to a 
systematic attempt to whi t t le away at i t s very bas i s in order 
to su i t the in t e re s t s of a few new members. This was contrary 
18. The Un_ited_Nations Dijarmatnent Year Book. Vol. 5:1980, 
op'.^cit., l98l ,"p" '"36l . 
19. The Un itgd^I^ at ion j_^Disarmamen t Year Book. Vol. 6:1981, 
o p . ' c i t . , 19827~p.3l2"; 
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to the expressed w i l l , i n t e r e s t s and a s p i r a t i o n s of the over-
whelming number of the l i t t o r a l and h i n t e r l a n d coiantr ies of 
the Indian Ocean. The Ad Hoc Committee could no t go about 
changing i t s mandate, but should have concen t r a t ed on i t s urgen 
implementat ion. The s e t t i n g up of p r e - c o n d i t i o n s wi th r ega rd 
to the harmonization of views or the p o l i t i c a l a r e a were 
20 
merely p r e t e x t s to k i l l the proposal for a confe rence . 
During the debate in the F i r s t Committee a t t he Uni ted 
n a t i o n s , in 1983, some s t a t e s s t a t e d t h a t the goa l of 
e s t a b l i s h i n g a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean would remain 
e l u s i v e un l e s s the Committee addressed i t s e l f to both the 
non- reg iona l and r e g i o n a l a s p e c t s of the t h r e a t to the s e c u r i t y 
of t h a t a r e a . Pak i s t an , a s for example, r a i s e d the quest ion of 
Afghanis tan , Commenting upon t h i s , Ind ia t o l d t h a t the 
Committee should focus a t t e n t i o n on those i s s u e s according to 
r e s o l u t i o n 2832 (XXVI) . Ind ia f e l t t h a t the s e t t i n g of p r e -
c o n d i t i o n s wi th r ega rd to e i t h e r harmonizat ion of views or the 
20 , O f f i c i a l Records of the General Assembly, T h i r t y s i x t h 
sess ion . F i r s t Committee, Se s s iona l F a s i c l e , Corrigendum 
- 5 0 -
p o l i t i c a l and secur i ty cliinate in the Indian Ocean area was 
merely a pretext to k i l l the proposal for the conference while 
i t was generally accepted tha t some degree of convergence of 
views was necessary before i t could take p lace . Such 
harmonization was an on-going process and could not become a 
pre-condition for i t s convening. The seriousness of the 
p o l i t i c a l and secur i ty climate in that region, caused by the 
presence of the great powers and t h e i r confrontation in the 
21 
area,necessiated the ear ly and urgent holding of the conference, 
India continues to advocate for the implementation of 
Indian Ocean as a peace zone in the United Nations as 
envisaged in the 1971 Declarat ion. I t showed regre t 
whenever attempts were made for the acceptance of nuclear 
weapons-free zones to t he i r land-mass on the complaraentary 
b a s i s . India s ta ted that there was a need to examine the 
question in global terms since t h i s was not merely a regional 
22 
disarmament matter . 
21 , Official Records of the General Assembly, F i r s t 
Committee, 3rd to 48th meetings, 1983. 
22, The United Nations Disarmament Year Book, vo 1,9:1984, 
op, c i t , , ' " l985 , p . 44 . 
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In t h e N o n - a l i g n e d forum^ I n d i a s u p p o r t e d a l s o a l l 
t h o s e r e s o l u t i o n s which opposed t h e b i g power p r e s e n c e in t h e 
I n d i a n O c e a n . 
At t h e Lusaka N o n - a l i g n e d Confe rence in 1970, Mrs , Gandhi 
23 
spoke f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of I n d i a n Ocean a s a p e a c e z o n e . 
The F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Mr. Dinesh S ingh r e f l e c t e d t h e 
24 
I n d i a n v i e w s and s a i d t h a t t h e n o n - a l i g n e d a p p r o a c h t o s a f e -
g u a r d i n g j j i t e m a t i o n a l p e a c e and s e c u r i t y i s t h r o u g h t h e 
s t r e n g t h e n i n g of s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and d e f e n c e p o t e n t i a l of 
each c o u n t r y and n o t t h r o u g h t h e dependence on o t h e r s . 
S t a t i n g b e f o r e t h e F o u r t h Confe rence of N o n - a l i g n e d 
c o u n t r i e s a t A l g i e r s , in 1974^ Mr, Swaran S ingh m e n t i o n e d t h a t 
t h e d e c i s i o n t o d e v e l o p t h e Anglo-American b a s e f a c i l i t i e s 
in t h e i s l a n d of Diego G a r c i a was go ing a g a i n s t t h e d e s i r e of 
l i t t o r a l S t a t e s of t h e I n d i a n Ocean t o make i t zone of p e a c e 
25 
t h r o u g h t h e g r e a t power r i v a l r i e s and t e n s i o n s . 
2 3 , Mrs , G a n d h i ' s speech a t Lusaka Summit C o n f e r e n c e of 
N o n - a l i g n e d N a t i o n s , Review of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s 
( B e l g r a d e ) , N o , 4 9 1 , September 21 , 1970, p p , 2 1 - 2 3 , 
2 4 , S t a t e m e n t by F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r , D inesh S i n g h a t t h e 
Prepara tory ' - Meeting of t h e N o n - a l i g n e d C o u n t r i e s , 
D a r - e s - S a l a a m , A p r i l 16, 1970, 
2 5 , S t a t e m e n t by t h e M i n i s t e r of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , Mr, Swaran 
S ingh , a t t h e F o u r t h Confe rence of N o n - a l i g n e d c o u n t r i e s . 
Meet ing of t h e Bureau, A l g i e r s , March 1 9 - 2 1 , 1974 , 
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Mr, Chavan, t h e ' t h e n Min i s te r of Ex te rna l Affairs^ ^^ 
s a id t h a t some powers were cont inuing t o pursue the s t r a t e g y 
of ba lance of power. He c a l l e d t h e Great Powers t o r e s p e c t 
the wishes of the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s of t he Indian Ocean a r ea 
and d e s i s t from a c t i o n s which d e t e r i o r a t e d t h e s i t u a t i o n ther t 
and were s t i l l cont inued , 
27 Mrs. I n d i r a Gandhi sa id t h a t "many of our n a t i o n s 
remain p o l i t i c a l l y vu lne rab le to e x t e r n a l p r e s s u r e s . The 
e f f o r t to undermine the power of n a t i o n a l i s m and p o l i t i c a l 
cohesion^ to d i s c r e d i t and remove l e a d e r s and governments 
who symbolise independent th ink ing and s e l f - r e l i a n c e , and t o 
i n s t a l l more p l i a b l e i n d i v i d u a l s and p a r t i e s , i s unaba ted . 
Sconomic e x p l o i t a t i o n s p e r s i s t s in o ld and new g a r b s . So do 
the t echno log ica l d i s p a r i t i e s and psycho log ica l complexes bred 
by Colonia l i sm. Al l c o u n t r i e s around the Indian Ocean who 
wish t h i s a rea to be a zone of peace, a r e p e r t u r b e d by the 
es tab l i shment of bases and i n t r u s i o n of r i v a l r i e s " . 
In the Non-al igned coord ina t ing Bureau Meeting a t 
26 . Statement by Min i s t e r of Ex t e rna l A f f a i r s , Mr. Y.B. 
Chavan, a t the Plenary Session of the M i n i s t e r i a l 
Meeting of the Co-ord ina t ing Bureau of Non-a l igned 
Coimtr ies , Havana, March 18, 1975. 
27 Prime Minis te r I n d i r a Gandhi ' s a d d r e s s to the Confereno 
of Heads of S t a t e Govertiment of Non-a l igned Count r i es , 
Colombo, Apr i l 17, 1976. 
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28 Havana, Indian representat ive expressed concern over the 
lack of progress for the inplementation of peace 2one proposal 
He cal led that cooperation of Great povjers and major maritime 
users with the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s cons t i tu te an e s sen t i a l 
element of t h i s objec t ive . He fur ther said for the current ly 
dead-locked ta lks between USA and USSR on t h i s subject to be 
resumed. 
The Indian delegation to Havana Summit of non-aligned 
29 
countries, Mr, S.N. Mishra, to ld tha t the strengthening of 
exis t ing mil i tary bases, such as Diego Garcia, would cause 
further in tens i f ica t ion of arms race and a setback in the 
relaxation of in ternat ional tensions in the a rea . He strongly 
urged for the dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United 
S ta tes to be resumed. He further urged a l l great powers to 
cooperate effect ively with the Ad Hoc Committee in the United 
Nations in pursuance of the objec t ive , 
Mrs. Gandhi called, at the inaugral session of 7th NAM 
Summit, for strengthening more the e f fo r t s for convening the 
28, Speech by Samarendra Kundu, Minister of Sta te for 
External Affairs, at the bon-aligned Co-ordinating 
Bureau Meeting, Havana, May 13, 1978, 
29, Speech by S.N, Mishra, Minister of External Affairs, 
and Leader of the Indian delegation to Havana Summit 
of Non-aligned countries, September 6, 1979, 
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United Nations Conference on the Indian Ocean. she further 
ca l led for r e s i s t i ng the intervention of others in t h e i r 
in te rna l a f f a i r s , 
India has been opposed to the concept of nuclear 
weapons-free zones. I t s opposition l i e s on several f a c t o r s . 
F i r s t l y , i t i s discriminatory as i t divides the world in to 
3 1 two groups — the nuclear haves and the have-nots . According 
to t h i s , the concept of nuclear weapons-free zones legiti-i^i-ses 
the nuclear weapons in the hands of nuclear weapon powers. 
The nuclear weapons-free 2one idea, in the way i t has emerged, 
ypuclear 
amounts to the noniLcountries accepting the leg.itin'acy of t h e i r 
exis t ing nuclear weapon arsends. 
The second arguraoit put forward for the benefi t of the 
have-nots was tha t if they surrender the control to the nuclear 
weapon powers, they would get p o l i t i c a l guarantee of non-
reso r t to nuclear use , 
India f e l t tha t a nuclear weapons-free zone would not 
help to combat the nuclear threat to the world at la rge but 
30, Seventh NAM Summit : Selected Documents, v o l . I I . 
Indian I n s t i t u t e for LMon-aligned""Studies, New Delhi 
Publications(P) Ltd., New Delhi, March 1984, p , 3 . 
3 1 . K.R, Singh, "Po l i t i c s of the peace zone", in Akhtar 
Majeed (Ed.) The i&idian Ocean: Conflict aid,Rg^ionjal 
Cooperation , Op.'clt. , p . 131. 
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provide an advantage to the n u c l e a r weapon s t a t e s , s ince 
n u c l e a r weapons and t h e i r d e l i v e r y system were i n t e r - c o n t i n e n t a l 
32 
in n a t u r e . I t argued t h a t the n u c l e a r disannanient, l i k e peace, 
33 
could not be geograph ica l ly p iecemea l . 
Ind ia argued t h a t p roposa l s for n u c l e a r weapons-free 
zones can succeed only when nuc l ea r weapon powers a l s o agree 
t o denuc lea r i se and n u c l e a r weapons a re d e l e g i t i m i s e d by the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l comrounity. 
According to the Indian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e "nuc l ea r weapons-
free zones c o n s t i t u t e on ly a c o l l a t e r a l measure, they a re no t 
35 
and should not become a s u b s t i t u t e for nuc l ea r disarmament". 
3fi Ind ia r e i t e r a t e d i t s pledge not to manufacture o r 
acqu i re nuc l ea r weapons even if the r e s t of the world did so, 
and abjured n u c l e a r exp los ions even for peaceful pu rpose s . I t 
suggested some s t eps for the g loba l disarmament, which a re — 
32« United Nat ions Disarmament Year Book, Vol ,2 ; 1977, 
o p , c i t . , 1978, p~"i80. 
3 3 . Year Book_of the_United N a t i o n s , 1982, v o l , 36, 
Office of Publ ic"Informat ion , Uni ted Na t ions , New York, 
1986, p . 6 3 , 
34 . P -S , Jayaramu, "Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Non-Pro l i fe ra -
t ion Treaty and South Asia", in K. Subrahmanyan (Ed.) 
Nuclear Myths 3nd__Rea_lit_ie_s , ABC Publ i sh ing House, 
New Delhi , l98l7"'p"S4~ 
3 5 . UN Document A/C. l/PV. 2016, Nov. 11,1974. 
36 . O f f i c i a l Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Spec ia l 
Session, Supplement N O . 1 ( A / S - l O / l ) , v o l . 1 . 
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( i ) a d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t vjould outlaw u t i l i z a t i o n of n u c l e a r 
technology for m i l i t a r y pu rposes , ( i i ) q u a l i t a t i v e and 
q u a n t i t a t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s on n u c l e a r armaments and immediate 
f reezing of p r e sen t s t o c k p i l e s under i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s p e c t i o n , 
( i i i ) formulat ion of a time bound programme — not exceeding 
a decade — for g radua l reduct ion of s t o c k p i l e s wi th a view 
to achieve t o t a l e l im ina t i on of n u c l e a r weapons and ( iv) a 
comprehensive t e s t ban with p r o v i s i o n s for safeguards through 
independent i n s p e c t i o n . 
The Indian Prime l- i inister in 1978, sa id a t t h e Ui\i 
Specia l Session on Disarmament t h a t " i t i s i d l e to t a l k of 
r eg iona l n u c l e a r - f r e e zones when t h e r e would s t i l l be zones 
which could cont inue to be endangered by nuc l ea r weapons. Those 
vjho have such weapons l o s e nothing if some d i s t a n t a rea i s 
dec la red n o n - n u c l e a r . The n a t i o n s without n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y 
who imagine t h a t t h e i r i nc lus ion in such zones a f fo rds them 
s e c u r i t y a re su f fe r ing from a d e l u s i o n . We are convinced t h a t 
the re cannot be a l i m i t e d approach to the quest ion of freedom 
from n u c l e a r t h r e a t s and dangers , but the whole world should be 
37 dec la red as a n u c l e a r - f r e e zone" . 
37 I ' torari i D e s a i ' s Address to the UN Spec ia l Session on 
Disarmament, Text reproduced in S t r a t e g i c Diges t , 
v o l . 8, No. 7 and 8, J u l y - August 1978, p , 1 4 . 
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India argued tha't n u c l e a r weapons were nore than 
weapons of war, r a t h e r they were ins t ruments of mass ann i -
h i l a t i o n . Commenting upon the F i n a l Document of the Tenth 
Specia l Session of the General Assembly, Ind ia r e c a l l e d t h a t 
the Document did not r e f l e c t a t a l l t he sense of urgency to 
s top the n u c l e a r arms race s ince i t could not formulated a t ime-
bound programme for the implementation of measures p e r t a i n i n g 
to nuc l ea r disarmament. 
India i n i t i a t e d a d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n in United Nat ions 
38 General Assembly alongwith 34 c o u n t r i e s , on December 14, 197S 
dec la r ing t h a t — ( i ) t he use of n u c l e a r weapons would be a 
v i o l a t i o n of the Uni ted Na t ions Cha r t e r and a crime a g a i n s t 
hurr.anity and ( i i ) use of nuc lea r weapons should t he re fo re be 
p r o h i b i t e d pending n u c l e a r disarmament. By the d r a f t r e s o l u -
t i on , the Assembly would c a l l upon a l l s t a t e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the nuc l ea r weapon s t a t e s , to submit p roposa l s on arrangements 
for the conclusion of a convention or any agreement on the 
non-use of nuc l ea r weapons so t h a t i t could d i s cus s the subjec t 
a t i t s 34th s e s s i o n . The d r a f t was adopted as r e s o l u t i o n 33/7IB 
by a vote of 103 to 18 ( inc lud ing France, the UK, the USA and 
38 UNGA O f f i c i a l Records, T h i r t y - t h i r d Session, 
Supplement No. 45 (A/33/45), p . 4 8 . 
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o t h e r vjestem countries.) , China d id not p a r t i c i p a t e d in the 
v o t e . At the i n i t i a t i v e of India , the i s sue vas again pursued 
a t i t s 34th and 35th sess ion in 1979 and 1980 r e s p e c t i v e l y 
( r e s o l u t i o n s 34/83G and 35/153D). S t a r t i n g in 1981, i t assumed 
g r e a t e r iinportance in t h a t the General Assenibly adopted t h r e e 
r e s o l u t i o n s on the i s s u e — 36/100, 36/921 and 36/81 B — 
e n t i t l e d r e s p e c t i v e l y , "Declara t ion on the Prevent ion of Nuclea 
Ca tas t rophe" , "bJon-use of nuc l ea r vjcapons and p reven t ion of 
n u c l e a r var" and "Prevent ion of nuc l ea r war" , 
At the 1980 session of the Comirdttee on Disarmainent, 
39 Ind ia had emphasized the importance of conducting n e g o t i a t i o n s 
on n u c l e a r disarmament under the a e g i s of the Committee on 
Disarmament, r e i t e r a t e d i t s convic t ion t h a t pending n u c l e a r 
disarmament v?hich alone can remove the t h r e a t of n u c l e a r 
vjar, t he r e should be a t o t a l p r o h i b i t i o n of the use of such 
weapons covering both nuc l ea r vieapon and non-nuc lea r weapon 
40 
s t a t e s I nd i a dec la red t h a t if a nuc l ea r war should break out , 
nuclcar -weapons- f ree zones would no t escape i t s ca tac lysmic 
e f f e c t s . S i m i l a r l y , r eg iona l measures of disarmament would 
39 . The JJp ite^_N cLj; i^^_i^^ajinaiP^J;_J'.e.g£-Bfifl^. 
Vol. 5:1980, c p . c i t . , 1981, p . 1 0 1 . 
40 , The United Nat ions Di^armama:i_t_Year_Book. Vol .6 : 1981, 
o p . c i t . , 1982, p . 162. 
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have r e l e v a n c e o n l y i f c o n c i e v e d w i t h i n a framework f o r 
41 
a c h i e v i n g g e n e r a l ana comple te d i s a r m a m e n t . 
At t h e tv. 'e lf th s p e c i a l s e s s i o n a t t h e G e n e r a l Assembly^ 
in 1982, I n d i a p u t fo rwarded a d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n t h a t t h e 
G e n e r a l Assembly would c a l l on a l l n u c l e a r weapon s t a t e s t o 
a g r e e t o a f r e e z e on n u c l e a r weapons , p r o v i d i n g f o r a t o t a l 
s t o p p a g e of t h e f u r t h e r p r o d u c t i o n of such weapons and a 
comple te c u t - o f f in t h e p r o d u c t i o n of f i s s i o n a b l e m a t e r i a l 
42 
f o r weapon p u r p o s e s . 
In t h e F i r s t Committee t o t h e t h i r t y - e i g h l h s e s s i o n 
43 
of t h e G e n e r a l Assembly, I n d i a s t r e s s e d t h a t undue emphas i s 
was l a i d on p i e c e m e a l and p e r i p h e r a l a s p e c t s of d i sa rmament , 
such a s n u c l e a r weapons - f r ee zone , in o r d e r t o d e l a y p r o g r e s s 
t o w a r d s n u c l e a r d i s a r m a m e n t . I t r e c a l l e d t h a t t h e c r e a t i o n of 
such zones cou ld be b e n e f i c i a l o n l y i f t h e y were c o n c e i v e d a s a 
p a r t of a c r e d i b l e programme f o r t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of n u c l e a r 
d i s a r m a m e n t . In view of t h e f a c t t h a t any n u c l e a r war would 
4 1 , O f f i c i a l Records of t he G e n e r a l Assembly, T h i r t y - s i x t h 
S e s s i o n , F i r s t Commit tee , S e s s i o n a l F a s c i c l e , 
Corr igendum, 
4 2 , The Upi ' ted •N,Q't_y?^s Disarmament Year Book, V o l . 8 : 1 9 8 3 , 
o p . c i t . 7 " l 9 8 4 , p . l 5 4 . 
4 3 , JfcAd./ P . 2 2 1 . 
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engulf the e n t i r e vorld; i t believed that the idea of such 
zones had become u n r e a l i s t i c , 
44 In 1984, India r e i t e r a t ed i t s posit ion that i t would 
not support proposals which disregarding the massive arsenals 
of nuclear weapons in the possession of the nuclear weapon s ta tes 
ca l led for the creat ion of nuclear weapons-free zones in what 
i t considered a r b i t r a r i l y selected regions. I t added tha t 
the findings of a panel of s c i e n t i s t s that a nuclear war, if 
fought on a minimum scale would lead to a nuclear winter made 
i t impossible to bel ieve that a group of non-nuclear weapon 
s t a t e s fa l l ing within a nuclear weapons-free zone could r ea l ly 
feel a sense of secur i ty when the nuclear weapon powers were 
continuing to build-up t h e i r weapons and deploy them wherever 
they l iked . In i t s view, as long as those powers i n s i s t ed on 
ensuring t h e i r secur i ty by using, if necessary, nuclear weapons 
in complete disregard of the securi ty of non-nuclear na t ions , 
no place on ear th was safe, regardless of whether or not i t had 
been declared a nuclear-weapons free zone. 
During the general debate in plenary meetings and in the 
45 F i r s t Committee of General Assembly India expressed concern 
44, i b id . . Vol. 9:1984, op. c i t . , 1985, p.238. 
45. i b id . , 10:1985, op. c i t . , 1986, p.258. 
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upon such proposals that" would only provide a ra t iona le and 
indeed j u s t i f y the exist ing vrarld order in which a couple or 
nore nuclear powers were jeopardizing the continuation of 
human species i t s e l f . Taking into account the findings about 
nuclear winter that indicated tha t nuclear war could not be 
ef fec t ively tackled in regional or p a r t i a l terms, India 
concluded that i n i t i a t i v e s for nuclear weapons-free 2ones were 
u n r e a l i s t i c in the context of sp i r a l l i ng arms race , 
46 Indian Foreign Minister s ta ted, at the meeting of 
bjon-aligned countries, that i t i s e s sen t i a l to ensure tha t 
agreements on disarmament are adhered to universa l ly and they 
do not aggravate or perpetuate the exis t ing inequa l i t i e s 
between the haves and the have-nots — between the great powers 
and o the r s . He called for safeguarding in te rna t iona l peace 
and securi ty to be carr ied out through the strengthening of the 
social , p o l i t i c a l and defence po ten t i a l and not through the 
g[gp@ndence on o thers . He added that disarmament negot ia t ions 
raist take into account the need to enable a l l developing 
countr ies to take full advantage of peaceful uses of atomic 
energy without any discriminat ion. 
46. Statement by Foreign Minister, Dinesh Singh a t the 
Preparatory Meeting of the Non-aligned Countries, 
Dar-es-Salaam, April 16, 1970. 
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At the Non-a l igned Co-ord ina t ing Bureau Meeting a t 
Havana, I n d i a ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e made emphasis to s top t h e 
s tockp i l i ng of n u c l e a r weapons and to adopt s t e p s t o u l t imate l^ , 
el i i t i inate them. He sa id t h a t t h e use of nuc l ea r vjeapons must 
be outlawed a s a crime a g a i n s t humanity. He c a l l e d t h e nuc l ea i 
powers to respond in a p o s i t i v e manner in formula t ing a 
r e a l i s t i c and time bounded programme and concre te measures 
47 for disarmament wi thout f u r t h e r d e l a y . 
Mrs, Gandhi s a i d a t the inaugra l sess ion of 7 th NAM 
48 Summit, t h a t on ly gene ra l and complete disarmament can 
provide c r e d i b l e s e c u r i t y . N e g o t i a t i o n s confined to a c l o s e 
c i r l c e of n u c l e a r weapon powers have made l i t t l e p r o g r e s s . We 
are non-a l igned s t a t e s who want n u c l e a r energy used on ly for 
peace . She c a l l e d upon n u c l e a r weapon powers to g ive up t h e 
use o r t h r e a t of use of nuc l ea r weapons in any c i rcumstances , 
suspend a l l n u c l e a r weapon t e s t s and product ion and deployment 
of nuc l ea r weapons and to resume disarmament n e g o t i a t i o n s wi th 
determinat ion to reach agreement . 
47, Speech by Samarendra Kundu, Min i s t e r of S t a t e fo r 
Ex te rna l A f f a i r s , a t the Non-al igned Co-ord ina t ing 
Bureau Meeting, Havana, May 18, 1978, 
48 , Seventh NAM Summit; Se l ec t ed Documents, Vol . I I , 
6 p . ~ c i t . , F,9 
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India, however, supported the concept of nuclear weaponi 
free zones only if a l l the countr ies of that area were 
49 
unaninous for doing so. India emphasized the volunatry 
nature of the par t ic ipa t ion of the countries of a region in 
the denuclearization of a region. The countries of a part iculaj 
region must take i n i t i a t i v e for t h i s purpose. 
India expressed i t s happiness over the keen in te res t 
shown by some countr ies for achieving the i r region as nuclejar-
50 free zone, I t expressed i t s happiness because i t f e l t tha t 
such zones would be i n i t i a l steps for achieving the world free 
of nuclear weapons. 
India f e l t that any region es tabl ishing nuclear weapons' 
free zone should be large enough to sa t i s fy the securi ty and 
51 
other v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of a l l members of the region. 
I t considered tha t t h i s idea could be applied with the 
act ive co-operation of nuclear weapon powers. The non-cooperat: 
a t t i t ude even of a single power can resu l t in deter iorat ion of 
49. Ashwani Kumar Chopra, I nd i a ' s Policy on DJ-s^rmamgijt, 
op, c i t . , p , 129. 
50. ib id . , p , 128. 
5 1 . ib id . , p . 130. 
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the concep t . Ambassador'Hus sain s t a t e d t h a t "Agreements on 
denuc lea r i zed zones vrauld a l so r equ i r e t h a t n u c l e a r weapon 
powers under take to r e spec t the s t a t u s of such zones and lend 
t h e i r f u l l co -opera t ion in irrplamenting arrangements concerning 
52 
t h e i r e s t a b l i s h m e n t . " 
Ind ia opposed the idea to r e f r a i n from developing n u c l e a r 
energy inc lud ing peaceful nuc l ea r exp los ions even in the 
denuc lea r i zed zone. Ind ia considered them v i t a l for enhancing 
economic development of the developing c o u n t r i e s and t h e r e f o r e 
maintained t h a t " the use of nuc lea r energy for peacefu l purposes^ 
inc luding the development of peaceful n u c l e a r exp los ive dev ices , 
53 
should no t be p r o h i b i t e d by any t r e a t y " . 
The quest ion of A n t a r t i c and i t s peaceful u se s was f i r s t 
d i scussed by the Indian de lega t ion in the Uni ted N a t i o n s . 
Ambassador L a l l expressed h i s happiness over the conclus ion of 
the Treaty of A n t a r c t i c a which provided t h a t A n t a r t i c a should be 
used for peaceful purposes only and t h a t any measure of a 
m i l i t a r y n a t u r e such a s a es tabl i shr rent of m i l i t a r y b a s e s and 
5 2 . Foreign Af f a i r s Record, September 1968, p . 2 0 1 . 
5 3 , Uw General Assembly, F i r s t Committee, 22nd Sess ion , 
I 5 l 0 t h meeting, October 31, 1969, p . 6 . 
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f o r t i f i c a t i o n , the ca r ry ing out of m i l i t a r y manoeuvres a s 
54 
wel l as t e s t i n g of any type of weapons could be p r o h i b i t e d . 
India expressed i t s happiness over the Trea ty of 
T l a t e l o l c o for the p r o h i b i t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons in La t in 
Arterica. In t h i s context , Airibassador G. P a r t h a s a r a t h i s t a t e d 
"The Indian de lega t ion expresses i t s profound g r a t i f i c a t i o n 
a t t h i s achievertent . The t r e a t y , in our view, should help 
in recuc t ion of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n . We hope t h a t t he conclu-
sion of t h i s t r e a t y w i l l encourage the n u c l e a r powers to make 
s e r i o u s e f f o r t s to work towards gene ra l and complete d i s -
armament, more p a r t i c u l a r l y n u c l e a r disarmament"," .H 55 
India viewed the Treaty of Tlatelolco in accordance with 
its policy on the question of reducing the danger of war. 
India being aware of the possibility that nuclear 
weapons could be stored in the sea-bed, the ocean floor and 
56 
the sub-soil had warned against these. 
5 4 . ENDC/PV.37, May l5 , 196 2, p . l S . 
5 5 , UN General Assembly, F i r s t Committee, 22nd Sess ion , 
1510th meeting, October 27, 1969, 
56 o I b i d . , 1530th meeting, November 16,1967, p . l . 
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I t c a l l e d upon the nuc l ea r povjers to change t h e i r motive 
of seeing everything from the s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r y a n g l e . I t 
c a l l e d to keep the ocean f l o o r out of major powers r i v a l r y and 
to be used only for peaceful purposes . I t c a l l e d for the 
s igning of a t r e a t y regarding the p r o h i b i t i o n of emplacement of 
nuc lea r weapons and o t h e r -weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n in t h e 
sea-bed^ on the ocean f loor and in the s u b - s o i l . According 
to the I n d i a ' s Ambassador, the proposed t r e a t y would be based 
according to the General Assembly Resolut ion 2467 (XXIII) which 
s t a t e d t h a t the sea-bed beyond the l i m i t s of the p r e s e n t 
n a t i o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n should be rese rved only for peacefu l 
58 pu rpose s . 
Thus i t supported the measures c o n t r i b u t i n g to i t wi thout 
i n t e r f e r i n g in the communication l i n k s , nav iga t ion e t c . On 
J u l y 20, 1973 i t s igned the "Treaty on the p r o h i b i t i o n of the 
emplacement of nuc lea r weapons and o t h e r weapons of mass 
d e s t r u c t i o n on the sea-bed and ocean f loo r and s u b - s o i l thereof" 
India viewed the idea of peaceful u s e s of o u t e r space 
59 
as a p a r t of disarmament. Due to t t e p rog re s s m space 
57, Ashwani Kumar Chopra, Jndj£j_E__Po2icj_on_Di_sarmamerrt, 
op„ c i t . , p^ 142, 
58 , ib_id., 
59 , i b i d . , p , 146, 
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research the outer space was not beyond the reach to be exploited 
for mi l i tary purposes i . e . for the emplacement of nuclear 
weapons and the i r delivery veh ic les . Regarding t h i s , Ambassador 
6 n Lall said ' i t seems to us that there i s a complex of problems 
d i r ec t ly connected with the securi ty of a l l nat ions and man's 
a b i l i t y to send vehicles into outer space, which forms a 
c r i t i c a l background for the consideration of many other i s sues . 
For' example, ICBMs sometimes reach a height of 600 miles above 
the ea r t h . I t appears too that a time might come when advances 
in space technology would permit s a t e l l i t e s with nuclear 
warheads to be launched secre t ly and to be maintained on 
d is tan t or b i t s u n t i l recal led for use against t a rge t s on ea r th . 
This crucia l aspect of problem, namely the control of such 
non-peaceful uses of outer space, i s e s sen t i a l ly a par t of the 
problem of world peace — that i s disarmament", 
India viewed that the question of outer space could be 
solved through an agreement between the United S ta tes and the 
Soviet Union because they were capable of misuse of outer 
01 
space for mi l i tary purposes, Ind ia ' s Ambassador Lall said that 
60. aJDC/PV. 37, May 15, 196 2^ P . 14. 
6 1, Ashwani Kumar Chopra^ j n d i a ' § ,Pol icy on pi??_?j" .^^ !'}"^r 
op. c i t . , p . 144, " •-
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"there should be in ternat ional cooperation in the peaceful uses 
of outer space. I t might be said that t h i s i s not d i r e c t l y 
a disarmament measure, but we think i t i s closely connected 
with disarmament and we would be happy to see such an idea 
included in the disarmament plan as an anc i l l a ry to the actual 
disarmament measures". Therefore, India supported the "Treaty 
on Pr inc ip les ' Governing the Ac t iv i t i e s of Sta tes in the Explo-
ration and use of outer space iiicluding the Moon and Other 
Ce les t i a l Bodies" (or the Outer Space Treaty). I t signed the 
t r e a ty on March 3, 196 7. 
In August 1985/ the Treaty of Rarotonga es tabl i shed the 
South Pacif ic nuclear-free zone. During the general debate 
in the plenary meetings and in the F i r s t Committee, some s t a t e s 
welcomed t h i s move. 
Unlike others , India expressed concern about what i t 
considered e f for t s by nuclear weapon s t a t e s to leg i t imise the 
possession of weapons of mass destruction and t h e i r use or 
threa t of use . I t believed that there was a para l le l i sm of 
6 2 . ENDC/PV. 37, May 15, 196 2, p . 14. 
6 3 . '^ li?_Un_i t ed Nat ion s_ Disarmament Year;^Book. 
Vol.•^10:1935, op" c i t . , 1986, p"258 
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discrimination between the provisions of the non-prol i ferat ion 
Treaty and proposals encouraged by nuclear veapon s t a t e s for 
es tabl ishing nuclear weapons-free zones in di f ferent p a r t s of 
the world — proposals which would only provide a r a t iona le and 
indeed j u s t i f y the exist ing world order in which a couple or 
more nuclear weapon s t a t e s were jeopardizing the continuation 
of the human species i t s e l f . Keeping in view the findings 
about nuclear winter that nuclear war,could not be e f fec t ive ly 
tackled in regional or p a r t i a l terms, India concluded tha t 
imi t i a t ives for nuclear weapons-free zones were u n r e a l i s t i c in 
the context of sp i ra l l ing arras r ace . 
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CHAPTER - IV 
INDIA AND THE POLITICS OF INDIAN OCEAN AS A 
PEACE ZONE 
The manipulat ive a c t i v i t i e s of the super powers 
in the Indian Ocean and the e rup t ion of r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t s have 
1 
c r e a t e d the awareness to dec l a r e Indian Ocean as a peace zone. 
The concept of peace zone in the Indian Ocean was based on 
fol lowing assumption. 
F i r s t , the a s p i r a t i o n of the r e g i o n a l s t a t e s to p r o t e c t 
t h e i r sovere ignty and independence from t h e i r hegemonic d r i v e s 
and g r ea t power r i v a l r i e s . 
Secondly, the p r e v a i l i n g concept of ba lance of power 
to ensure i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y provided d i s s a t i s -
f ac t i on among the r e g i o n a l s t a t e s . 
Th i rd ly , to achieve u n i v e r s a l peace, end of arms race 
and e l imina t ion of n u c l e a r war have s t rengthened the i d e a . 
Four th ly , to achieve r e g i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l coopera t ion 
when s t a t e s face problems t h a t a r e i n so lub l e domes t i ca l ly and 
cos t unbea rab ly . 
1, K.S . Sidhu. The i£dd^_0cean2__A__Zone of Peace, 
Op. c i t . , p . v l l i " 
2 . i b i d , , p . 34-35 , 
•71-
Lastly, in view of the developments in South Asia, South-
East Asia and Africa, especial ly Iran and Afghanistan and also 
-where nuclear arms are present, the p o s s i b i l i t y of nuclear war 
3 
can not be completely ruled ou t . Such a war involving big 
powers (if they are present in the Indian Ocean) would be harmful 
to regional s t a t e s in the i r socio-economic development and 
sovereignty. 
On 16 th December, 1971 General Assembly adopted a reso-
lution 2832 declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. The 
resolut ion cal led for : . 
The great powers to enter into immediate consultat ion 
with the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s of the Indian Ocean with a view to 
(a) ha l t ing the further escalat ion and expansion of t h e i r 
mi l i ta ry presence in the Indian Ocean and (b) el iminating from 
the Indian Ocean a l l bases, mi l i tary i n s t a l l a t i o n s , l o g i s t i c a l 
supply f a c i l i t i e s , the disposi t ion of nuclear weapons and 
weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great power 
mi l i ta ry presence in the Indian Ocean context of great power 
r i v a l r y . 
I t also ca l led upon the l i t t o r a l and hinter land s t a t e s of 
the Indian Ocean, permanent members of the Security Council and 
3 . Raymond W. Copson. "East Africa and the Indian Ocean -
A Zone of Peace, "African Affairs, London, 76(304), 
July 1977, p . 339. 
4, United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 2832(xxvi), 
16 December 1971/ operative paragraph 2, 
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other maritiite users of the Indian Ocean to consult on the 
establishment of a system of universal co l lec t ive securi ty in 
the region and to f a c i l i t a t e the implementation of the decla-
r a t i o n . The securi ty arrangements indicated in the declarat ion 
covered a broad range of subjects especial ly the proposal tha t 
vjarships and mil i tary a i r c r a f t vjould not use the Indian Ocean 
for any threa t or use of force against the sovereignty, t e r r i -
t o r i a l i n t eg r i ty and independence of any l i t t o r a l or h in ter land 
s t a t e of the Indian Ocean. Apart from these, no l imi t a t ions 
were proposed on the free movement of commercial shipping and 
7 
innocent passage of naval v e s s e l s . 
Since then the resolut ion has been an annual r i t u a l a t 
the United Nations and the subject of consideration a t the UN 
Ad Hoc Committee on Indian Ocean formed in 1972, 
The pat tern of in t e r - r e l a t ionsh ip among the regional 
powers and between the regional powers and the great powers 
3 
determine the fate of peace zone i s sue . In t h i s regards, the 
nature of threa t perceptions, the se l f -def in i t ion of na t iona l 
5 , i b id . 
6 . i b i d . 
7. United Nations General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Annexes, Document A/8584, p ,24 . 
8 . K.R. Singh, "Emerging issues in the Indian Ocean: The 
P o l i t i c a l dimension" IPSA Journal , 17(4), April-June 1985, 
P. 377. 
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p r i o r i t i e s and the pa t ron-c l ient re la t ionsh ip with external 
powers has provided a set-back to i t» 
The o r ig ina l resolution of 1971 gradually a l t e r ed and 
appeared in the regional context for the acceptance by regional 
powers. The o r ig ina l resolution was transformed by the following 
methods: - "Expansion of the t e r r i t o r i a l scope of the Indian 
Ocean Peace Zone from the water - spread and i t s na tura l exten-
sions to include the land-mass with the l i t t o r a l and h in ter land 
s t a t e s . 
By shif t ing the emphasis from great power r i va l ry to the 
p o l i t i c s of the l i t t o r a l , 
Making the acceptance of the Indian Ocean Peace Zone 
by the big powers conditional upon the rec iprocal o b l i -
gations by the l i t t o r a l and hinter land s t a t e s . 
Since the Soviet Union i s the preponderant land power on 
the Eurasian land-mass* the West had a r ight to counter i t with 
sea power in the region", 
The United States did not want to lose control over the 
ex-colonies of Britain as these contributed p o l i t i c a l , economic 
9, K.R. Singh, "The Indian Ocean : P o l i t i c s of the Peace 
Zone", in Akhtar Majeed (Ed,), Jn.dj.an_Oceari:Conf 1 ict_and 
Regional Co-operation", op. cit~7 P~''l24~ 
10. G. Raja Mohan. "Indian Ocean: Zone of Peace or Confl ict" , 
S t ra teg ic Analysis, 10(3), June 1986, p . 270, 
•74-
11 
and s t r a t e g i c importance to i t . Besides t h i s , the Indian 
Ocean emerged as a p a r t of the 'Global S t r a t e g y ' a f t e r second 
World War to contain the expansion of communism in the Afro-Asian 
12 
r e g i o n . The United S t a t e s conceived t h a t Indian Ocean has 
13 p o t e n t i a l i t i e s to b r ing major s h i f t s m the g loba l power b a l a n c e . 
The U .S . s t a t e d t h a t i t had no " land br idge to the c r i t i c a l 
Indian Ocean L i t t o r a l a rea , as do the o t h e r g r ea t powers of the 
Indian Ocean of the Eurasian land-raass/ we cannot f l y to t he se 
c o u n t r i e s except over the t e r r i t o r i e s of o t h e r s or along the 
lengthy a i r - r o u t e s over wa te r . The most e f f i c i e n t way we have 
of reaching them d i r e c t l y i s by sea . When o t h e r g r e a t powers 
look on the Indian Ocean a rea , they f ind ways of p r o j e c t i n g t h e i r 
inf luence by t h e i r geographic proximity , over r e l a t i v e l y sho r t 
a i r and ground r o u t e s . The U .S . by c o n t r a s t must r e l y almost 
14 
e x c l u s i v e l y on the s e a " . 
The U.S.S.R. competed with the West in t h i s a rea to weaken 
the West in t h i s a rea and enhanced i t s p o s i t i o n in the developing 
wor ld . I t cons idered the growing de t en t e between U ,S . and China 
15 
as a h o s t i l i t y towards h e r . For the containment of t h e i r r i v a l s 
11 , K,R, Singh, "Emerging i s s u e s in the Indian Ocean:The 
P o l i t i c a l dimension", 2R.i.S?-^" P» ^"^^ • 
12, K ,5 , Sidhu. "The Indian Ocean : A Zone of Peace", o p , c i t , , 
p , 92 , 
13, Elmo R. Zumwalt. "Indian Ocean: C r i t i c a l Importance to U.S . " , 
l"[S5i5i^_^l^£^_2^^i^' iNiew Delh i , 9 June 1974 ,p .S . 
14, U3id., p , 7 , 
15, Virendra jsiarain, "Super Powers Pe rcep t ions and responses 
of the Indian Ocean L i t t o r a l Coun t r i e s (of South A s i a ) " , 
i n A W h t - a r - MPfi aari ^ TT/^  ^ T»-v ^ n a n nt/^r^n^ r"—-.£ 1 ^ _ J 
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both of them need to f a c i l i t a t e the deployment of major s t r a t e -
gic (nuclear) weapons in the Indian Ocean region. Therefore, 
the in teract ion between the great powers and regional powers 
developed on two leve ls — f i r s t deals with t he i r cold war and 
global nuclear strategy and secondly with the regional i n t e r e s t s 
of the Great Powers, 
Regarding the establishment of peace zone in the Indian 
Ocean they did not respond pos i t ive ly , Soviet Union held tha t 
• a l l continents , i s lands , oceans and seas (should) become t o t a l 
zone of peace and suggested that i t was d i f f i cu l t to achieve 
17 
everything at the same time. 
U.S. made objection to the view that great power 
mi l i t a ry presence, by i t s nature, was a threa t to peace. Rather, 
i t maintained that the armed conf l i c t s within and among the 
s t a t e s of the region are the foremost challenge which confronts 
18 
with the establishment of peace zone. 
I t made objections to paragraph nine of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Indian Ocean which re fe r s to the "dangers posed 
16, K.R. Singh, "Emerging issues in the Indian Ocean: 
The P o l i t i c a l dimension", op, c i t , , p , 378. 
17, Byelorussia ' s statement in GADR, Session 26, F i r s t 
Committee, 1840 meeting, Nov. 30, 1971, 
18, Wayne Merry's statement to the Ad Hoc Committee 
on the Indian Ocean, July 17, 1984, p , 3 . 
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by the mi l i ta ry presence of the great powers and also other 
19 foreign mi l i ta ry presence in the region". I t asser ted tha t 
except the forces of Soviet Union and i t s surrogates 'S/ the 
forces of non-regional power deployed in the sea safeguarded 
the legi t imate securi ty i n t e r e s t s of both the regional s t a t e s 
and the in ternat ional comiiunity. The U.S. argued tha t i t had 
no intent ion of using or threatening to use i t s mi l i t a ry forces 
against the l i t t o r a l count r ies . I t cal led for the resolut ion 
of conf l ic t s , hal t ing the spread of nuclear weapon, protec t ing 
the sovereignty of weak s t a t e s against those more powerful and 
preserving the in tegr i ty of legi t imate governments. Acquiring 
progress in these f i e lds wi l l bring p o l i t i c a l and secur i ty 
climate in the region which wi l l be the bas i s for es tab l i sh ing 
^ = 21 
zone of peace. 
The USSR favoured nuclear weapons-free zone for naval 
forces but the U.S. disagreed on the question of t o t a l exclusion 
22 
of a l l nuclear weapons. U.S. supported the General Assembly 
resolution for nuclear weapons-free zones in South Asia, Middle 
East and Africa, 
19. ib id . , p . 2 . 
20. C.S.R. Murthy. "India and the dead-locked zone of peace 
in the Indian Ocean", IDSA_Journal, 17(1), Ju ly-
September'84, p . 9 1 , 
21 . Wayne Merry, US Delegate to the UN Ad Hoc Committee on 
the Indian Ocean, July 17, 1984, p . 6 . 
22. George W. Shepherd J r . "Arms Limitation in the Indian 
Ocean: Retrospect and Prospect", IPSA Journal , 17(4), 
April-June'85, p . 435, 
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Like the n u c l e a r weapons f ree zones in the r e g i o n s of the 
Indian Ocean, mutual arms reduct ion among the r e g i o n a l powers and 
a b u i l t in mechanism for ensur ing peace and for c o n f l i c t 
r e s o l u t i o n were g radua l ly added to the Indian Ocean peace zone 
23 p r o p o s a l . The acceptance of these p roposa l s by the r e g i o n a l 
powers were made complamentary for the Indian Ocean peace zone 
p roposa l by the g r e a t powers. Since Ind ia was the major motive 
force behind the p roposa l , t h e s e t o o l s were used to p r e s e n t 
Ind ia as the main hurd le in the es tab l i shment of peace zone. 
By 1973 t h e Ad Hie Committee sought to r e v e r s e the 
24 p r i o r i t i e s . The r eg iona l problems were cons idered p r i o r to 
the 'Grea t Power r i v a l r y * . The r eg iona l powers were asked for 
accept ing t h e f u l l - s c o p e n u c l e a r sa feguards . Af ter 1974, t h e 
r e g i o n a l powers were accused for a f f e c t i n g peace and s e c u r i t y 
r a t h e r than the g r e a t powers. In 1974 and 1975, t he quest ion 
of c r e a t i n g a nuc l ea r weapons f ree zone in South Asia a t t a i n e d 
25 p r i o r i t y before c r e a t i n g peace zone in the Indian Ocean, 
The F i r s t Committee and Plenary Meetings of the General 
Assembly and those of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean 
2 3 , K.R. Singh, "Emerging i s s u e s in the Indian Oceani 
The P o l i t i c a l dimension", op^ c i t . , p .392 
24o i ^ i d . , p . 395, 
25 , Rasul Bo R a i s , "The Indian O'im^^^^^^^^^ver Powers", 
oPo c i t . , p . 239. , ^ r ' ^ 
* C AcG No. 
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during t h e XXIX and XXX sessixjns of t h e Uni ted Na t ions shovis t h a t 
the ques t ion of c r e a t i n g a denuc lea r i zed zone in South Asia had 
overshadowed the quest ion of c r e a t i n g a peace zone in the 
Indian Ocean, The fore ign powers which had a l n o s t boyco t t ed 
the Ad Hoc Committee were engaged in d i s r u p t i n g the Peaceful 
Nuclear Programme of I n d i a , 
After n u c l e a r explosion of Ind ia , Pak i s tan r e p o r t e d 
t h a t " r e g i o n a l s t a t e s should be as su red a g a i n s t t h r e a t s from 
26 both wi thin and o u t s i d e the r e g i o n " , 
Pakis tan took advantage of p r o j e c t i n g her r i v a l r y with 
Ind i a and thus c a l l e d for acceptance of n u c l e a r weapons-free 
zone in South Asia a s wel l a s well quest ion of p a r i t y in 
convent ional arms between Ind ia and Pak i s t an , c o n d i t i o n a l 
for Pakis tan support for the e l imina t ion of g r e a t power p resence 
27 
from the Indian Ocean, 
In t h i s regard , Pakis tan proposed in the Uni ted Na t ions 
to evolve a code of conduct r e g u l a t i n g r eg iona l r e l a t i o n s and 
28 ba lanced m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h among the s t a t e s of the r e g i o n , Ind ia 
26, Report of t h e Ad Hoc Committee, A/10029, p , 2 . 
27, Rasul B, R a i s , The Indian Ocean and the Supe£ Powers- , 
o p , c i t „ p . 237, 
28 , K.S. Sidhu. The Indian Ocean: A Zone of Peace , 
o p , c i t . , P . 8 5 . 
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cons idered i t an o b s t a c l e in the es tab l i shment of Indian Ocean 
29 peace zone as i t i s bound to c r e a t e new c o n t r o v e r s i e s , 
Pakis tan alongwith China r a i s e d the quest ion a t the 
meetings of Ad itoc Conimittee of the Uni ted Na t ions in 1974 
arguing t h a t I n d i a ' s n u c l e a r explosion has a f f e c t e d the peace 
and s e c u r i t y of the vjhole region in the Indian Ocean, Pak is tan 
v;ent on saying t h a t t h i s w i l l enhance the m i l i t a r y p resence of 
31 g r e a t powers, thereby, j e o p a r d i s e the p r o s p e c t s of peace zone. 
Mr, Matin of Pakis tan po in t ed out dur ing h i s speech in 
the F i r s t Committee : 
"The arrangements for s e c u r i t y among the l i t t o r a l and 
h i n t e r l a n d s t a t e s could be e s t a b l i s h e d through a p o l i t i c a l regime 
and expressed in the form of a code of conduct to guide t h e 
r e l a t i o n s among the Indian Ocean s t a t e s . An important p a r t of 
such a code would be an agreement among the l i t t o r a l S t a t e s to 
maintain a reasonable r a t i o in t h e i r nava l and m i l i t a r y fo rces 
a s wel l as under tak ing no t to acqu i re o r produce n u c l e a r weapons 
32 i n t o t h e r e g i o n " . 
29 , i b i d . , p . 8 5 . 
30 , K.R, Singh, The Indian Qceant £ig_]Power_pres^ce and 
Local response' ,""south Asia""Books, New Delhi , 19787"?.243, 
3 1 . J J u a . / P . 244. 
32 . A/C. l/PV, 2098, 26 Novent>er'75. 
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S r i Lanka which took i n i t i a t i v e for the United Na t ions 
General Asserribly r e s o l u t i o n dec l a r ing the Indian Ocean Zone of 
33 Peace got d i v e r t e d from i t s b a s i c concept . I t c a l l e d , a f t e r 
the n u c l e a r explosion of Ind ia , for i n t e r l i n k i n g of n u c l e a r 
weapons-free 2Dne in the Indian Ocean r e g i o n . S r i Lanka sought 
t h a t c r e a t i o n of the n u c l e a r weapons-free 25one in the Indian 
Ocean region could be the f i r s t s tage in the p r o c e s s of c r e a t i n g 
pea te 2one, Amerasinghe from S r i Lanka t o l d t h a t " I f a new 
nuclear-weapon power were to emerge in the Indian Ocean reg ion , 
the denuc l ea r i z a t i on and a l so the d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n of the a rea 
35 
would be s e r i o u s l y j e o p a r d i z e d " . 
South Afr ica and A u s t r a l i a a re the two l i t t o r a l c o u n t r i e s 
of the Indian Ocean, which a re l oca t ed on e i t h e r ends a re 
v i r t u a l l y western a l l i e s , A u s t r a l i a had doubts about the m e r i t s 
of peace zone. The Aus t r a l i an p r e s s main ta ins t h a t i t i s 
in the i n t e r e s t of i t a n d ' t h e region to c r e a t e an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
37 guaran tee for peace in the r e g i o n . I t a b s t a i n e d from vo t ing 
the r e s o l u t i o n . 
South Afr ica had doubt over the implementation of the i d e a , 
3 3 . U.N. Document, h/C, l/h, 590. 
34 . A/C. i/PV. 2089, 17 November'75, p . 3 6 . 
3 5 . A/C. l/PV. 2015, p . 2 4 4 . 
36 . U,N. Document, 1848, 10 December, 1971. 
37 . K.S, s i d h u . The_J^dLian_Oceanj A Zone of Peace , 
o p , c i t , , p . TTl, " 
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Their r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o l d in the United Na t ions t h a t they -were 
" s t i l l unce r t a in a s to what the p roposa l s involve and as to i t s 
i m p l i c a t i o n s and consequences. We a re s t i l l u n c e r t a i n a s to 
38 how i t w i l l be iraplertented by them" . Keeping such view, South 
Afr ica a b s t a i n e d from vo t i ng on the r e s o l u t i o n . 
All the o t h e r l i t t o r a l s t a t e s had supported the r e s o l u -
t i o n . But t h e i r mutual b i l a t e r a l d i s p u t e s and i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c o -
economic c o n d i t i o n s c r e a t e problems. The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for 
i n v i t i n g and su s t a in ing the m i l i t a r y , e s p e c i a l l y nava l r i v a l r y 
in the region and the subsequent f a i l u r e of peace e f f o r t s l i e s 
b a s i c a l l y with the r eg iona l n a t i o n s as they provide o p p o r t u n i -
t i e s to the g r e a t powers to i n t e r f e r e and magnify the r e g i o n a l 
39 
c o n f l i c t s in to b igger wars , 
I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y can not be detached from the developments 
in the Indian Ocean, When the peace of Indian Ocean i s d i s t u r b e d , 
i t w i l l c e r t a i n l y have an impact on I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y . S e c u r i t y 
has v a r i o u s dimensions such a s , s e c u r i t y — from m i l i t a r y 
t h r e a t s , from p o l i t i c o - s t r a t e g i c t h r e a t s , from t h r e a t to i t s 
40 
economic i n t e r e s t s and a g a i n s t psycholog ica l p r e s s u r e s . 
38 , U.N. Document, 1849, 10 December, 1971, 
39 , U.N, General Assembly Meeting, 3 May, 1974. 
40, Surendra Chopra, "Indian Ocean P o l i t i c s — A Chal lenge 
to I n d i a ' s diplomacy" in Akhtar Majeed (Ed.) Indian 
Q^g.^l_Confl ic t and Regional Cooperat ion, op c i t 
P . 8 3 . "• " 
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The d i r e c t s t rugg le and cxjitpetition between the super powers 
r e l a t e s to p o l i t i c a l , econoraic and m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s in t h e 
41 
race for the r i g h t to impose o n e ' s w i l l on the o t h e r . The 
42 
Indian Ocean has predominant inf luence on the Indian des tany 
because Ind ia has an open c o a s t l i n e of about 2,000 mi les and 
over 90% of her foreign t r a d e i s s ea -borne . Thus, who c o n t r o l s 
the Indian Ocean w i l l dominate her sea-borne t r ade and in the 
next he r very independence. 
T h a t ' s why, Ind ia cont inued to advocate fo r t h e Indian 
Ocean as a zone of peace according to the 1971 r e s o l u t i o n . Y.B. 
Chavan argued while address ing to the General Assembly t h a t 
" p r i o r i t y a t t e n t i o n should be given to mobi l i s ing the support 
of t he i n t e r n a t i o n a l community for concre te and c o n s t r u c t i v e 
ac t ion for implementing the d e c l a r a t i o n of the Indian Ocean 
as a zone of peace by e l imina t ing a l l m i l i t a r y ba se s conceived 
in t h e con tex t of g r e a t power r i v a l r y and r eve r s ing t h e p r e s e n t 
43 t r e n d of e s c a l a t i n g g r e a t power r i v a l r y in t h e area* . 
Ind ia has been vehemently opposed to the newly added 
p r o p o s a l s , Ind ia sees t h a t these p roposa l s a re the p r e t e x t s to 
44 k i l l the o b j e c t i v e s of peace and s e c u r i t y . i n the Indian Ocean, 
4 1 , J a s j i t Singh, "Indian Ocean in Global S t r a t e g i e s " , 
IPSA Journa l , 17(4), A p r i l - J u n e ' 8 5 , p , 453 , 
42 , K.M. Pan ikkar , indlia__andjt2}e_^idian_0cean, Bombay, 1954, 
P . 14, 
4 3 , A/PV. 2364, 26 September, 1975, p . 8 1 . 
44 , '^2i?»iJ'^^ied Nation£_Disarmamenj^Year Book. 
Vol. 67 19817 op. cit.,"l9B?7 p . l lTT 
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By adher ing to the n u c l e a r safeguards, i t w i l l r e ce ive s e t -
bacH in her economic development. She wanted a l s o to keep 
n u c l e a r o p t i o n s open in view of the h o s t i l e n u c l e a r power China, 
The d i s p a t c h of t h e U.S . nava l t a sk f o r c e s in to the Ind ia Ocean 
a t t he time of Indo-Pak war over Bangladesh in Deceniber 1971, 
and l a t e r during the 1973 A r a b - I s r a e l i war can be seen in 
the way t h a t i t s presence i s in tended to provide support f ac i -
l i t i e s for a more e f f e c t i v e U.S . r o l e in the Indian Ocean, On 
the o t h e r hand, she has been sof t regarding the U.S.S.R, She 
c o n s i d e r s U.S.S.R. move in the Indian Ocean a s r e a c t i v e and 
45 d e f e n s i v e . Fur the r , Sovie t Union has c e r t a i n r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
under the Indo-Sovie t Treaty of F r i endsh ip , Peace and Cooperat ion, 
Sovie t presence may be he lp fu l to Ind ia in case of a t h r e a t 
46 to her a s happened in 1971. However, Ind ia cannot i g n o i s t h e 
e f f e c t s of nava l compfetition among Super powers a s they " fue l 
the r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t s and i t might r e s u l t in l o c a l wars by 
„47 proxy" . 
Ind ia , one of the S t a t e s d i r e c t l y i n t e r e s t e d in t h e 
Indian Ocean, has been aware t h a t without persuading the b ig 
powers the idea can not be r e a l i s e d . I t d e s i r e d , as o t h e r Indian 
45 , S,P. Se th , "The Indian Ocean and Indo-American R e l a t i o n s " , 
Asian Survey. 15(8), Aug. 1975, p . 6 4 5 , 
46 , Surendra Chopra, "Indian Ocean P o l i t i c s - A Chal lenge 
to I n d i a ' s Diplomacy" in Akhtar Majeed (Ed.) Indian 
Ocean : Conf l i c t and Cooperat ion_, o p . c i t . , p , 8 0 . 
47 , S .P, Sethy The Indian Ocean and the Indo-American 
R e l a t i o n s " , o p , c i t . , p . 649 . 
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Ocean StateS/ the par t ic ipa t ion of those powers in the del ibe-
ra t ions of the in ternat ional conferences held for t h i s purpose. 
The 19 71 declaration was i n i t i a l l y c r i t i c i s e d by both 
western and eastern bloc na t ions . Only in the second half 
of the seventies the Soviet Union s t a r t ed to support the proposal 
I t was c r i t i c i z e d on the bas i s that a group of s t a t e s in a 
certain region could not es tab l i sh a legal regime for the high 
seas in the region. I t was argued that the extra-regional naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean area was required "in the i n t e r e s t s 
of not only the securi ty of the nat ions concerned but also of 
the S ta tes that rely on the s t a b i l i t y created by a p o l i t i c a l and 
48 
mil i tary balance". Oil embargo of 1973 provided the j u s t i -
f icat ion that the o i l lanes had to be protected and access to 
o i l - f i e Ids should be secured. 
Lately^ the Soviet Union had affirmed that the zone of 
peace in the Indian Ocean wi l l not, in any way, conf l ic t with 
49 i t s i n t e r e s t s . But i t always abstained from voting, to that 
proposal, in the United Nations General Assembly, 
The United States , by confusing to nuclear weapons-free 
48. United Nations Document A/C i/PV 1849. 
Dec. id, 1971, pp. 16-17, 
49, The United w at ions Disarmament Year Book, v o l , 5:1980, 
SpT'clI .7 1981, "PT '^SS" ; 
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zones on the landr-mass, wanted to leave the oceans open to 
nuclear deployments, thereby, defeatijig the zone of peace 
concept. I t has never given a categorical assurance tha t i t 
wi l l not deploy nuclear weapons in the area . Through these 
proposals, i t wanted to bring under fu l l scope safeguards even 
the peaceful nuclear progranwes of Afro-Asian s t a t e s including 
India . 
During 1972, the question of an Indian Ocean as a zone 
of peace continued to be discussed within and outside the United 
n a t i o n s . The Secretary-General, pursuant to paragraph 4 of the 
50 
resolut ion 2832 (XXVI), reported to the Assembly at i t s 
twenty-seventh session that no progress has been nade in the 
declarat ion of the implementation. At that session, the 
Assembly adopted resolution 2992 (XXVII) in which i t ca l led 
upon the l i t t o r a l and hinter land s t a t e s of the Indian Ocean, 
the permanent members of the Security Council to support the 
concept that Indian Ocean should be a zone of peace. By tha t 
resolut ion, a i5-member Ad Hoc Committee, consis t ing of Austra l ia , 
China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the United Republic of Tanzania, 
Yemen and Zambia, on the Indian Ocean was es tab l i shed . 
50 The United Nations Disarmament Year Book Vol 1:1976. 
op . C I T ; , 1^77, pJ215, 
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Since the twenty-eighth session in 1973, the General 
Assembly's consideration of the Indian Ocean issue has generally 
been centred on the reports of that Ad Hoc Committee, In t h i s 
year, the Committee suggested in i t s report tha t a study be 
prepared by the Secretary-General with the ass is tance of Consul-
tan t experts on the great power's mil i tary presence in the 
Indian Ocean, and the General Assembly in i t s resolut ion 
3080. (XXVIII)/ requested the Secretary-General to prepare a 
factual statement of that presence in a l l i t s a spec t s . The 
statement was completed in 1974 and annexed to the Committee's 
51 
report to the General Assembly at i t s twenty-ninth sess ion. 
In 1974, the General Assembly requested the l i t t o r a l and 
hinter land Sta tes of the Indian Ocean to enter into consulta-
tion with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean, 
52 In 1975, the General Assembly noted that those Sta tes 
had reached agreement in pr inciple on such a conference and 
invi ted a l l S ta tes , in pa r t i cu la r the great powers and the major 
maritime users of the Indian Ocean to cooperate with the Ad Hoc 
Committee, By resolution 3468 (XXX), the General Assembly 
requested the l i t t o r a l and hinterland Sta tes of Indian Ocean 
51 , Off ic ia l Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth 
Session, SupplemtnNo, 29 (A/9629 and Add,1), 
52, i b id . . Th i r t i e th session, supplement No. 29 (A/10029). 
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to continue t h e i r consul tat ions on the convening of the 
conference, with pa r t i cu la r a t tent ion to the purposes of the 
conference, i t s date and duration, i t s venue, the provis ional 
agenda, par t ic ipa t ion and level of pa r t i c ipa t i on , 
53 In 1976, the General Assembly requested the Ad Hoc 
Coiranittee and the l i t t o r a l and hinter land S ta tes of the Indian 
Ocean to continue i t s work and consul tat ions in accordance 
v i th i t s mandate. 
The declaration was i n i t i a l l y c r i t i c i z e d by both 
western and eastern bloc na t ions . Only ixi the second half of 
the seventies the Soviet Union s ta r ted to support the proposal , 
54 In the memorandum on disarmament, which the USSR, submitted 
session 
to the General Assembly a t i t s t h i r t y - f i r s t / s t a t e d the Soviet 
Union regarded the Indian Ocean peace zone proposal with under-
standing. I t s tressed, in that regard, that the key issue was 
the elimination of foreign mil i tary bases from the area and 
ne i the r i t had nor did now intend to bui ld mi l i ta ry bases in 
the Indian Ocean region. I t also indicated that i t was prepared 
to join with other powers in seeking ways to reduce, on a 
reciprocal bas is , the mi l i ta ry a c t i v i t i e s of non-coastal s t a t e s 
53. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean 
as a Zbne of Peace, General Assembly Resolution 31/88. 
54. A/31/232. 
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in the Indian Ocean and in the regions d i r ec t ly adjacent to i t . 
I t added, hov?ever, that such measures must not in te r fe re with 
the freedom of navigation on the high seas as well as with 
research and the need for commercial stops a t the por t s of coast 
s t a t e s of the Indian Ocean a rea . I t was also prepared to consider 
the question of convening an Indian Ocean conference in the 
l igh t of the views set out in i t s memorandum. 
In t h i s oontect, a number of S ta tes of the Indian Ocean 
area, among those Mauritius and Sr i Lanka, held tha t an Indian 
Ocean zone of peace would not in ter fere with free and impeded 
peaceful navigation in the Indian Ocean. 
However, the Soviet Union abstained from voting the General 
55 Assembly resolution 31/88, I t based i t s abstention mainly 
on the fourth preambular paragraph of the draft resolut ion; 
which expressed deep concern that in the Indian Ocean there 
had been an escalat ion of the mil i tary presence of grea t powers, 
conceived in the context of great power r i v a l r y . I t s t ressed 
once more that the key issue was the elimination of foreign 
mi l i ta ry bases from the area and i t did not had any mi l i t a ry 
bases t h e r e . 
The United Sta tes , in explaining i t s abstention to the 
55. The United Nations Disarmament Year Book. 
VolTlJl976,"'op,"*cIt,, p . 220. 
-89-
resolution,^^ expressed reservat ions in terms of the freedom of 
navigation and the c r i t i c i sm directed against i t s naval f a c i l i t y 
on Diego Garcia, I t s ta ted that i t was committed to the goals 
of peace, s t a b i l i t y and securi ty for the S ta tes of the Indian 
Ocean region, and for in ternat ional shipping in the Indian 
Ocean, the United Sta tes explained further tha t i t had deployed 
only modest forces in the Indian Ocean to ensure the l i nes of 
communication v i t a l to world peace and securi ty vere not in t e r -
fered with. I t indicated that i t s naval deployment in the area 
vjas not increasing and i t urged other na t ions likewise to reveal 
openly and candidly the nature of t h e i r mi l i tary a c t i v i t i e s in the 
Indian Ocean, Referring to the resolution adopted a t Colombo 
conference, the United Sta tes held that i t s naval f a c i l i t y on 
Diego Garcia had been singled out for c r i t i c i sm while only s l igh t 
references were made to the mi l i ta ry a c t i v i t i e s of other external 
powers. I t s t ressed that i t could not accept that comparable 
a c t i v i t i e s by different S ta tes should be judged according to 
different s tandards. Referring to the provisions of the draft 
resolut ion concerning the convening of the Indian Ocean Conference^ 
i t held that the Ad Hoc Committee had opted too readi ly and 
u n c r i t i c a l l y for that approach. I t expressed the view that 
p r ac t i ca l steps to prevent a competitive expansion of mi l i ta ry 
strength in the Indian Ocean area should be based on r e s t r a i n t 
£ 
56, ib id , , p . 221, 
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by the Sta tes in the region «ind r e s t r a i n t by the great powers, 
Pakistan, which had been a sponsor of the draft resolu-
tion proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee, abstained because cer ta in 
of i t s aspects, pa r t i cu la r ly the t h i rd and fourth preanibular 
paragraph, did not r e f l ec t i t s views. 
In 1977, the Asseitibly requested the Ad Hoc Conmittee to 
make, preparat ions for a meeting of the l i t t o r a l and h in ter land 
S ta tes as a step towards convening the expected conference. 
The proposal for the establishment of zone of peace in 
the Indian Ocean was referred to in the Final Document of Tenth 
57 
specia l session of the General Assembly, in 1978, At i t s 
regular session that year, the General Assembly, by resolut ion 
33/68 decided to convene a meeting of the l i t t o r a l and h in ter land 
Sta tes of the Indian Ocean in 1979. This meeting set out 
recommendations concerning the convening of a f u l l conference 
oa the Indian Ocean and included in i t s report to the General 
58 Assembly which embodied the Final Document of the meeting, a 
set of p r inc ip les for the implementation of the dec la ra t ion . 
There was high hope regarding the peace zone proposal 
while Bresident Carter of United S ta tes came with the proposal 
57, Off ic ia l Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special 
Session, Supplement No,4, (A/S - 10/4), para .64 , 
58, i b id , . Thirty-fourth session. Supplement No, 45 
(A/34/35 and Corr, l ) . 
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of demil i ta r iza t ion of the Indian Ocean in h i s news cxsnference 
59 
on March 9, 1977. This hope was disappeared in the next few 
days when he talked of hoping to es tab l i sh with the Soviets 
mutual mi l i ta ry r e s t r a i n t in the Indian Ocean. On March 2, 197 
the Soviet President responded to t h i s offer declaring tha t . 
the Soviet Union was will ing to discuss demi l i ta r i sa t ion of the 
Indian Ocean, US-Soviet working group were set up to consider 
demil i tar iza t ion of the Indian Ocean and to curb the arms sa les 
to developing na t ions . During the b i l a t e r a l t a l k s in Waghingtoi 
the Soviets had proposed a ban on the deployment of ships and 
submarines armed with nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean. 
On Oct. 4, 1977 President Carter of United S ta tes to ld 
the United Nations General Assembly that ne i ther the United 
S ta tes nor the Soviet Union had a large mi l i ta ry presence there, 
nor was there a rapidly mounting competition between these two 
n a t i o n s . 
The lAiited Sta tes s ta ted that while i t appreciated and 
shared many of the goals of the supporters of the Declaration oi 
the Indian Ocean as a peace zone, i t believed tha t such zones 
59. K, Subrahmanyam, Emergency issues in the Indian Ocean; 
Retro_sgect_and_Proj£ect, working paper "prepared for'"th€ 
In do-American Task Force on Indian Ocean) New Delhi, 
Nov, 25 - Dec, 2, 1984, p .17 , 
60 . .ibid,, p . 18, 
6 1 . The United Nations Disarmament Year BooK. Vol, 4:1979, 
^rp:-(2TC-:7"19757-pT3t5T; 
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of peace could only coind into effect through an agreement of 
a l l S ta tes concerned, wherever s i tua t ed . I t could not accept 
the proposition that a regional group of s t a t e s could declare 
a legal regime for the seas to which other s t a t e s were expected 
to adhere or which could be binding on other s t a t e s without 
t h e i r consent, nor could the General Assembly by i t s e l f take 
meaningful action to e s tab l i sh such a legal reginve, beyond 
endbrs'ing what might have been negotiated and agreed upon among 
Mertiber S ta tes by consensus. 
In 1979, the General Assembly, by resolution 34/80 A and B, 
decided to convene the conference in 1981 a t Colombo S r i Lanka 
and to enlarge the Ad Hoc Committee further , invited the 
permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime 
users of the Indian Ocean to serve on i t and p a r t i c i p a t e in i t s 
work, pa r t i cu l a r ly in the preparation for the conference. The 
USSR abstained from voting on draft resolut ion A, while the 
United Sta tes abstained from both, 
ft 9 
While explaining the abstention, the USSR s ta ted that 
i t was conpelled to do so. Referring to the term "great-power 
r iva l ry" in the resolut ion, the delegation was unable to subscribe 
to the presupposition that the Soviet Union among other S ta tes , 
62 . The United na t ions Disarmanient Year Book. Vol. 4:1979, 
op ."c i t . , "1980 , p . 3 2 2 ~ 
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bore respons ib i l i ty for the tension prevail ing in the Indian 
Ocean, or to the in terpre ta t ion that the main cause of tha t 
tension was mi l i ta ry competition between the two major powers. 
The United Sta tes , while explaining i t s abstention from 
6 3 both the resolut ions , s ta ted that i t had never agreed with 
certain basic concepts of the Committee's mandate and could not 
associate i t s e l f with a firm decision to ca l l for a conference 
on the Indian Ocean in 1981, or even at some l a t e r date, u n t i l 
i t was c l ea r that a promising bas i s exis ted for a consensus to 
emerge at such a conference. 
The General Assembly adopted resolution 35/150 on 
December 12, 1980 include "To make every ef for t , ixi sonsiderat ion 
of the p o l i t i c a l and secur i ty climate in the Indian Ocean area, 
pa r t i cu l a r l y recent developments as well as the progress made in 
the harmonization of views referred to in sub-paragraph (a) , 
to f i na l i ze , in accordance with i t s normal methods of work, a l l 
preparat ions for the conference including the dates of i t s 
convening". 
64 The United Sta tes questioned the v a l i d i t y of the exis t ing 
concept of zone of peace and cal led for a change in mandate of the 
63 , j^ ic lw P« 322. 
64. The United Nations Disarmament Year Book. 
Vol. 6: l981,"'op. c i t . 7 1982, p . 313^ 
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Ad ho-c Coroinittee, I t pointed out that i t had never accepted the 
1971 Declaration as i t regarded the Declaration as "faul ty and 
outrtDded", as inconsistent with the r ight of a l l S ta tes , under 
Art . 5 l of the United Nations Charter to individual and oollect i^ 
self-defence, and d i f f i cu l t to reconcile with in te rna t iona l ly 
recognized r igh t s to freedom of navigat ion. I t ca l led tha t there 
vjas no harmonization of views on the basic issues in the Ad Hoc 
Committee, and because of Soviet Union refused to withdraw i t s 
forces from Afghanistan, the climate of confidence needed for the 
holding a successful conference was lacking, 
65 The Soviet Union argued that the United S ta tes was 
using the events in Afghanistan as a pretext to j u s t i f y the 
introduction of i t s mil i tary, naval and a i r fo rces into the regior 
Facts made i t c lear that long before these events, the United 
Sta tes had broken off t a lks with the Soviet Union on the 
l imita t ion of t h e i r mi l i ta ry presence in the Indian Ocean, and 
had begxin to create the base on Diego Garcia, bringing a i r c r a f t 
c a r r i e r s and other ships into the Persian Gulf, preparing plans 
tor forming a rapid deployment in te rvent ionis t force, and layinc 
down a broadly based inf ra -s t ruc ture for mi l i ta ry bases . 
In the ve i l of p o l i t i c a l conduciveness as an e s sen t i a l 
factor towards the implementation of the proposal the Indian 
66. ib id . , p . 314, 
-95 -
Ocean s t a t e s were asked to accept them at regional l e v e l . Some 
of the Indian Ocean s t a t e s also appeared to make these factors 
condit ional upon the acceptance of such zone as they feel danger 
from regional powers a l s o . Viewing t h i s a t t i t ude of regional 
powers and the big powers especial ly the United S ta tes and 
the Soviet Union which want to enjoy the commanding posi t ion by 
using the pre tex ts , one or the another, the prospects for the 
implementation of such zone in the Indian Ocean appear b leak . 
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CHAPTER - V 
INDIA AND THE POLITICS OF SOUTH ASIA AS 
A NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONE 
P a k i s t a n , on 28th October 1974, had in t roduced a r e s o -
l u t i o n in the Uni ted Nat ions General Assembly to c r e a t e a n u c l e a r 
weapons-free zone in South As ia , I t r eques ted the S e c r e t a r y -
General of United Na t ions to convene a conference of South Asian 
s t a t e s fo r t h i s a b j e c t i v e . The Pakis tan demand of c r e a t i n g a 
n u c l e a r weapons-free zone in South Asia had appeared in the wake 
of I n d i a ' s n u c l e a r explosion of May 18, 1974, Pak i s tan cons ide red 
t h a t Ind ia becoming a n u c l e a r power would be a t h r e a t to i t s 
n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . I t sought, the re fo re , to check I n d i a ' s n u c l e a r 
a c t i v i t i e s . The Pakis tan r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a id t h a t " h i s c o u n t r y ' s 
prime concern a t t h a t j u n c t u r e was — ( i ) the s e c u r i t y of non-
n u c l e a r s t a t e s viewed In the context of s p i r a l l i n g n u c l e a r p r o -
l i f e r a t i o n by n u c l e a r c o u n t r i e s and by c o u n t r i e s which have j u s t 
j o i n e d t h e n u c l e a r c lub , and ( i i ) to s t rengthen the p r o s p e c t s 
2 
of s e c u r i t y of t he non-nuc lear s t a t e s . " 
At t h e reques t of Pak i s tan , the General Assembly a t i t s 
twenty-n in th sess ion (1974) cons idered the quest ion of the e s t -
abl ishment of a n u c l e a r weapons-free zone in South As ia , In t h i s 
1, United Nat ions General Assembly, F i r s t Committee 
Report, Twenty-ninth Session, A/C, 1/P.V, 2002, 
P . 4 1 . 
2 . i b i d . 
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regard, the Asseitibly adopted two resolut ions on December 9, 1974, 
By the preamble to the f i r s t s the Assembly expressed i t s 
conviction tha t "the highest p r i o r i t y should be accorded to 
measures in the f ie ld of nuclear disarmament and reca l led i t s 
resolut ion of 20th November 1959 which establ ished the goal of 
general and complete disarmament under effect ive in te rna t iona l 
control and other resolut ions re la t ing to the establishment of 
3 
nuclear weapons-free zones." I t expressed awareness tha t condi-
t ions and procedures for the creation of such zones differed from 
region to region and by agreements among s t a t e s concerned, the 
establishment of such zones could promote the cause of general 
and complete disarmament under effect ive in terna t ional control, '^ 
The General Assembly, through the operat ive paragraph of 
the f i r s t resolut ion; pointed out that the i n i t i a t i v e for the 
creat ion of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Asia should come from 
the s t a t e s of the region concerned, considering i t s special 
5 features and geographical ex ten t . 
The General Assembly, through the preamble to the second 
resolut ion, recognized the r ight of s t a t e s to harness nuclear 
3^ Year Book_of_the United Nations. Vol, 28; 1974, 
opTc i t IT 1977, p1"20, 
4 . i b id . 
5 . i b id . 
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energy for peaceful purposes and expressed i t s be l ie f that 
the establishinent of nuclear weapons-free zones could contr ibute 
strongly towards ha l t ing the pro l i fe ra t ion of nuclear weapons, 
approaching towards general and coirplete disarmament \ander 
effect ive in ternat ional control , and to strengthen the secur i ty 
of regional s t a t e s against nuclear t h r e a t . By the operative 
7 
provisions, the Assembly considered the affirmation by the S ta tes 
of the region not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and 
endorsed, in pr inc ip le , the concept of a nuclear weapons-free zone 
in South Asia, I t invi ted a l l s t a t e s of the South Asian region 
and in te res ted neighbouring non-nuclear weapon s t a t e s for 
necessary consul tat ions and to refrain from any action which goes 
against the achievement of such objec t ives . 
Reacting to t h i s , India said that "we do not bel ieve tha t 
i t i s the fxinction of the General Assembly to inv i te S ta tes in a 
p a r t i c u l a r region to « i t e r into (such) consul ta t ions . We bel ieve 
that the i n i t i a t i o n of such consultat ion, in fact the very i n i t i a -
tion of an idea of nuclear weapons-free zone, must be from the 
s t a t e s of the region — roust flow from agreement within the 
region", 
With regard to Pakis tan ' s proposal, Ind ia ' s representa t ive 
6 . i ^ i d . 
7 . i ^ i d . 
8 . U.N, Document A/L. 1/PV, 2025, November 20, 1974, 
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said in the Ifciited Nations that "we have supported such zones 
whenever i t has been denonstrated that there i s an agreement in 
regard to them in pa r t i cu l a r regions. This has meant p r i o r consul-
9 
t a t i ons and agreement among the s t a t e s of the region", 
I nd i a ' s Ambassador Mishra spoke against the Pakistan pro-
posal tha t "we would not l ike to inpose our view on any one, 
however, small or big that country might be . At the same time, 
we cannot accept imposition of a concept from any one. That i s a 
matter of p r inc ip les , tha t i s a matter of sovereign equal i ty of 
s t a t e s represented here , I am afraid, I must say with humility 
and with a l l respect that concepts are acceptable to us if there 
i s mutual agreement which has arisen from mutual consul ta t ions 
.. 10 but not otherwise", 
India opined that a l l s t a t e s whether big or small possess 
the r ight of equal s ta tus under in terna t ional law and were 
e n t i t l e d to re jec t any concept being irtposed on them against 
11 t h e i r wishes. Even the in ternat ional organization l i k e United 
Nations had no r ight to force a s t a t e to accept any p a r t i c u l a r 
p r inc ip le or concept, India made objection to the Pakistan step 
of asking the General Assembly to declare South Asia as a nuclear 
weapons-free 2one by s ta t ing that i t had v io la ted the p r inc ip l e s 
of in ternat ional law. 
9 . UN General Assembly, F i r s t Committee Report, Twenty-ninth 
Session, A/C, 1/PV, 2002, p , 76. 
10. UN General Assembly, F i r s t Committee, Twenty-ninth Session, 
2022nd meeting, November 18, 1974, pp. 12 Sc 15-16, 
11. Ashwani Kumar Chopra, Ind ia ' s Policy on Disarmament^. 
op, c i t . , p . 137. 
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While supporting the concept of nuclear veapons-free zones 
in d i f ferent pa r t s of the vrorld, India always made emphasis on 
two fac to r s . F i r s t , the region to be declared a nuclear vjeapons-
free zone should have conditions conducive for such declarat ion 
and secondly, the i n i t i a t i v e must come from the countr ies of tha t 
region themselves. 
India maintained that South Asia vas a sub-region and an 
in tegra l par t of Asia and the Pac i f i c . I t also to ld tha t South 
Asian s t a t e s were surrounded by nuclear weapon Sta tes or countr ies 
12 belonging to t h e i r a l l i a n c e s . India s ta ted that while asking 
for a small nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia, Pakistan had 
ignored the various securi ty i np l i c a t i ons . In the east of South 
Asia; the nuclear power China i s s i tua ted and in the Indian Ocean, 
to the south of the region, presence of mi l i ta ry bases could not 
be overlooked. These things had marred the concept of such zone 
to be es tabl ished in t h i s region, India viewed Pakistan playing 
col laborat ive role to extend the influence of western powers over 
the t h i rd world. I t saw the Pakistan proposal of such a zone 
13 in terms of t he i r t r ad i t i ona l collaborationism, as i t did not 
include China, the nuclear weapon power, India perceived i t an 
example of i t s collaboration with an external power to countervail 
India . 
12, P .S, Jayaramuo "Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and South Asia", in K, Subrahmanyam (Ed.) "Nuclear 
Myths__and__Rea_lit_iej"/ op, c i t , , p , 82, 
13. i;b_id., p . 83 . 
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Further, the concept of nuclear weapons-free zone provided 
the nuclear f a c i l i t i e s for ver i f ica t ion which were reg i s te red 
with IAEA. If a country has separate programme under i t s defence 
to manufacture nuclear weapons, t e s t the weapons and building up 
an arsenal outside the zone, the nuclear weapons-free zone wi l l 
not prohib i t i t . Pakistan has es tabl ished i t s Uranium enrich-
ment programme, project 706, under t h e i r defence ra ther under 
14 their 'Atomic Energy Department, 
India made object ions on those grounds, besides her refusal 
to subscribing the legi t imizat ion of nuclear weapons by nuclear 
vjeapon po we r s, 
Pakistan, besides, requesting the General Assembly for the 
creat ion of nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia slso "sought 
15 the support of the ASEAN mernbers". I t fetched the support as 
the Malaysian Foreign Ministry spokesman, en l2th September 1974, 
announced that the ASEAN were coincided with the Pakis tani proposal 
to support for the creation of South Asian nuclear weapons-free 
zone, in the United Nations,'' 
Both India and Pakistan tabled draft resolut ions regarding 
thiS/ in the United Nations General Assembly, Mr, Singh presented 
the Indian draft resolut ion, K/C, I /L , 681 on l5th November 1974 
14, i^ i? .* P. 78. 
15. K.R. Singh, The Indian Ocean_ ;__Big Power Presence and 
Local ResppnseT South Asia"Books, New DelhiJ 1978, p , 243 
16, i b i d . 
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before the F i r s t Conmittee, which had emphasized the following 
17 four points — He said that Pakistan had brought the question 
before the United Nations without consulting India , However, 
there was s t i l l the way for India and Pakistan to adopt the r ight 
procedure and to search for an understanding through mutual 
consul ta t ions . He to ld that Indian draf t resolution was based on 
t h i s ges tu re . He to ld that 'our draft supports the creation 
of nuclear weapons free zones in appropriate regions of the world 
by a process of consul tat ions and agreement among the s t a t e s 
concerned. However, i t avoids any prejudgement concerning the 
concept, feature or delineation of the zones. Those are matters 
best l e f t for discussions and eventual agreement among the 
in te res ted c o u n t r i e s ' . He also emphasized Ind i a ' s des i re to use 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only but made object ions to 
any regime to inpose on Ind i a ' s nuclear programme which i s not 
universal and non-discrirainatory and to which India i s not a p a r t y . 
He brought another point that South Asia was not a geographical 
en t i ty l ike Africa or Latin America, He to ld further tha t ' t he 
presence in Asia of countr ies belonging to mi l i ta ry a l l i ances and 
the existence of nuclear weapon powers have a v i t a l bearing on the 
v i a b i l i t y of a nuclear weapons-free zone' , 
Pakis tani representat ive Mr, Agha shahi introduced the 
draftJ"^ V C . I/L 682, in the F i r s t Committee, on 15th November 1974 
17. A/C. 1/PV 2020, p p . 2 3 - 8 . 
18, ib id . 
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c r i t i c i s e d the Indian argument t h a t i t s n u c l e a r programme v?as 
for peacefu l pu rposes . He t o l d 'For our p a r t , we do n o t cons ide r 
t h a t t he f e a s i b i l i t y of peaceful n u c l e a r explosion has been 
e s t a b l i s h e d . However, we b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s i s an i s s u e which 
should be l e f t to be determined by the t e c h n i c a l s t u d i e s t h a t 
a r e being i n i t i a t e d on t h i s s u b j e c t . We hope, n e v e r t h e l e s s , 
t h a t u n t i l the f ind ings of these s t u d i e s a r e a v a i l a b l e , t h e r e 
w i l l be a moratorium on peaceful n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n ' . He po in t ed 
out about the a s su rances of some n u c l e a r powers t h a t they would 
no t launch a n u c l e a r a t t a c k a g a i n s t a non-nuc lea r s t a t e . In 
t h i s r ega rds , he s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned the name of France and 
China, 
Both the d r a f t s were debated in the F i r s t Committee, 
Amerasinghe, from S r i Lanka, sa id in h i s speech on 18 November 1974 
t h a t t h e r e was a f a t a l flaw in the Indian d r a f t and i t d id no t 
have any o p e r a t i v e paragraph for concre te a c t i o n . He r e j e c t e d 
the argument of having p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n s necessa ry fo r the s a i d 
o b j e c t i v e a s General Assembly had endorsed the p r i n c i p l e of 
l 9 
c r e a t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons-free zones, 
20 B.C. Misra, the Indian de l ega t e t o l d the F i r s t Committee 
t h a t the p r a c t i c e of the U^. a s regards the c r e a t i o n of a n u c l e a r 
weapons-free zone, was t h a t no ac t ion was taken by the General 
19, K,R, Singh, The Indian Ocean : Big Power Presence and 
Local Response, o p , cl"?,, p ' ^T^F; "" 
20 . A/C. 1/PV. 2027, p p . 12-16. 
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Assembly without the agreement of the s t a t e s concerned. He added 
that , in pa r t i cu l a r regions, there" were some s t a t e s which would 
l ike to move fas te r on a pa r t i cu l a r reason. Some would l i ke to 
take gradual steps, each step by agreement, so that the end-
product should be t o t a l l y acceptable to a i l , Misra s ta ted tha t 
the concept of nuclear weapons-free zones involved the v i t a l 
i n t e r e s t s of s t a t e s . In many respects they were geographically 
l imited non-prol iferat ion t r e a t i e s . He told that i f any p a r t i c u l a r 
country fee ls that i t i s in i t s i n t e re s t to declare i t s e l f a 
nuclear weapons-free zone or a part of the zone, India wi l l be 
the l a s t to object to t h a t . I t i s up to any p a r t i c u l a r covin t r y 
to decide for i t s e l f . He added, "the point i s tha t if the 
General Assembly were to endorse the concept in p r inc ip le in 
advance of mutual consultat ions and mutual agreements, then the 
countr ies which have serious questions, in regard to f e a s i b i l i t y 
of proposals are a t a disadvantage". He cautioned against hasty 
ac t ion . He further to ld that "we would not l ike to inpose our 
views on anyone, however, small or big that country might b e . 
At the same time, we cannot accept imposition of a concept from 
anyone. That i s a matter of pr inciple , that i s a matter of 
sovereign equal i ty of s t a t e s represented here, I am afraid I must 
say with a l l humility and with a l l respect that concepts are 
acceptable to us if there i s a mutual agreement which has arisen 
from mutual consultation but not otherwise" . 
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Both the d r a f t s were debated in the F i r s t Committee. There 
were a t t empt s for a c»mmon d r a f t to be evolved, which could no t 
be s u c c e s s f u l . An at tempt was made to get both the r e s o l u t i o n s 
passed by India a s well as P a k i s t a n , Ind ia had s e r i o u s r e s e r -
v a t i o n s about P a k i s t a n ' s d r a f t and t h a t ' s why i t r e j e c t e d t h a t . 
F i n a l l y , both the r e s o l u t i o n s were subjec ted to v o t e . The Indian 
d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n ob ta ined n i n e t y vo te s with t h i r t y - t w o a b s t e n t i o n s 
and none vot ing aga ins t i t , ''• The Pakis tan d r a f t o b t a i n e d e i g h t y -
four v o t e s with t h i r t y - s i x a b s t e n t i o n s and Ind ia and Bhutan 
22 
voted a g a i n s t i t . The F i r s t Committee sent both the d r a f t s 
to the General Assembly to be voted upon them. The Indian d r a f t 
r e s o l u t i o n , 3265(A), got one hundred and four vo t e s with twenty-
seven abs t en t ion and Dahomey voted a g a i n s t i t . While the 
Pakis tan d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n , 3265(B) got n i n e t y - s i x v o t e s with 
. 23 
t h i r t y - s i x abs t en t ion and Ind ia and Bhutan voted a g a i n s t i t . 
The Indian r e s o l u t i o n expressed i t s view t h a t c o n d i t i o n s 
and procedures for the es tab l i shment of such a zone d i f f e r e d 
from region to r eg ion . I t expressed f u r t h e r t h a t t he i n i t i a t i v e 
for the es tab l i shment of such zones in the a p p r o p r i a t e region 
Of Asia must come from the s t a t e s of the region concerned^ with 
the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of i t s spec i a l f e a t u r e s and geograph ica l e n t i t y , 
2 1 . A/C, 1/L. 681, 2024 meeting, November 20, 1974. 
22 . A/9911 (XXIX), Report of the f i r s t committee on Agenda 
item 107. 
2 3 . A/PV 2309. 
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Pakistan resolution accepted the r ight of s t a t e s to harness 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but expressed apprehensions 
about the dangers that might be appear due to i t s diversion 
to mi l i ta ry purposes. I t said that the establishtnent of a nuclear 
weapons-free zone needs commitin«:it by the s t a t e s concerned to use 
the nuclear materials and f a c i l i t i e s under t h e i r j u r i sd i c t i on 
for peaceful purposes only and to prevent the t e s t i ng , use, 
manufacture, production, acquisi t ion or storage of nuclear weapons, 
or nuclear laimching devices. I t would also need an equi table 
and non-discriminatory system of ver i f ica t ion and inspection to 
ensure that nuclear programme were following the commitments. I t 
vjould seek an undertaking by nuclear weapon s t a t e s not to use 
or threaten to use the nuclear weapons against the s t a t e s of the 
region. I t also said that these s t a t e s should i n i t i a t e necessary 
consultation without delay with a view to es tabl ishing nuclear 
weapons-free zone, and to refrain from any action going against 
the achievement of these ob jec t ives , 
India voted against the Pakis tan ' s draft resolution both 
in the F i r s t Committee and in the Plenary Meeting of the General 
Assembly, The Indian representat ive to ld the Assembly tha t India 
did not feel bound by the terms of that reso lu t ion . B.C. Misra 
while explaining Ind i a ' s vote in the F i r s t Committee, on 2oth 
November 1974, had explained the Indian objec t ions . He to ld 
24. V C . 1/PV 2026, pp. 7-12. 
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tha t there were certain points both in the preanibular par t as 
well as in the operative par t of the Pakistan resolution that 
did not suited the Indian pos i t ion . 
He discarded the fourth preantoular paragraph of the 
Pakis tan ' s draft which provided that the establishment of nuclear 
vjeapons-free zones could contr ibute to hal t the nuclear weapons 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n . Misra argued that i t could not be done by binding 
the hands of the non-nuclear powers only. He corainented upon the 
seventh preanibular paragraph which provides for the inspection 
and ver i f ica t ion system by saying tha t India was in favour of 
universal , function and non-discriminatory safeguards, whether 
they were nuclear weapon s t a t e s or non-nuclear s t a t e s , and they 
should apply to a n programmes. He spoke that " i t i s not poss ib le 
for us to agree to a system of ver i f ica t ion and inspection which 
would be applicable to the peaceful a c t i v i t i e s of non-nuclear 
weapon s t a t e s only, or a t best , applicable to the peaceful a c t i -
v i t i e s of a l l s t a tes while leaving open the mi l i ta ry a c t i v i t i e s 
of nuclear weapon s t a t e s . ' «25 
Commenting upon the operative paragraph 1 of the Pakis tani 
draft resolution which brought out the affirmation of the s t a t e s 
of the region not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons, 
25, K.R. Singh, The Indian Ocean ; gig.govjer^Presence and 
Local Response, op , c l t " , p'[^2"49~ 
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Indian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e sa id t h a t those s ta tements were of u n i -
l a t e r a l n a t u r e . He argued t h a t i f any i n t e r n a t i o n a l commitment 
was t o be en t e r ed in to by t h e Government of Ind ia t h a t would had 
been on a p a r t i c u l a r b a s i s and t h e r e f o r e o p e r a t i v e paragraph 
1 d id not seem s u i t a b l e . Regarding t h e o p e r a t i v e paragraph 2 
of the r e s o l u t i o n which endorsed, in p r i n c i p l e , t h e concept of 
nuclear-weapons f ree zone in South Asia, I n d i a ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
r epea t ed i t s s tand t h a t South Asia was an i n t e g r a l p a r t of a 
l a r g e region and i t was imposs ib le fo r I nd i a to endorse , even 
in p r i n c i p l e , the concept of a n u c l e a r weapons-free zone in South 
As ia , He argued t h a t endorsement of the concept wDuld be 
disadvantageous fo r those who were at n e g o t i a t i o n s fo r a l a r g e 
r e g i o n . Reacting to the o p e r a t i v e paragraph 5, which expressed 
t h a t t h e Secre ta ry-Genera l should convene a meeting for the 
o b j e c t i v e of c o n s u l t a t i o n as mentioned in o p e r a t i v e paragraph 3, 
Indian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e sa id t h a t Secre ta ry -Genera l should not be 
involved iii such c o n s u l t a t i o n s without the agreement of s t a t e s 
concerned. 
United S t a t e s and France were among the s t a t e s which 
decided s ince e f f o r t s to reach a t a compromise so lu t ion had not 
or 
succeeded^ they would abs ta in on both r e s o l u t i o n s , 
Bangladesh, t he USSR and Bhutan s t a t e d t h a t they would 
26 . Year Book of the United N a t i o n s . Vol . 28, 1974, 
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not support the Pakis tan ' s text as the countr ies of the region 
must had consultation among themselves on questions concerning 
the nuclear weapons-free zone before seeking the endorsement of 
27 the Assembly. 
The question of nuclear weapons-free zone was then 
debated in the t h i r t i e t h session (1975) of the United Nations, 
The Secretary General through i t s report , document A/10325(XXX), 
said that he had been in contact with South Asian s t a t e s and 
noted the differences in approach to the question of the declara-
tion and creation of the nuclear weapons free zone in South 
Asia, In view of the differences, he had not convened the 
meeting of the South Asian S t a t e s . The Ad Hoc Group of Quali-
fied Governmental Experts also discussed th i s issue and agreed 
on the basic thing that the i n i t i a t i v e for the creation of such 
zones should come from a l l the countr ies of the region and that 
28 the par t ic ipa t ion must be voluntary. India had pa r t i c ipa ted in 
that group and her delegate welcomed the report during the 
F i r s t Committee on 14th November 1975, 
India submitted a draft resolut ion, t./Q i/L 730, to the 
F i r s t Committee which followed the submission of Pakistan draf t 
27. i^Lid. 
28. CCD/476, Chapter I I I , para 9, quoted iii A/C. l/PV 2088, 
14 iMovember 1975, p , 37. 
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resolution, A/C. 1/L. 733, Both the draf t s were introduced in 
the F i r s t Committee and were adopted without voting on 4th 
December 1975, Both the draf t s were adopted as Resolution 
3476(XXX) on 11th December 1975, 
The operative par t of the Indian half of the Resolution, 
3476 A(XXX), repeated her e a r l i e r stand and welcomed the report 
of the Ad Hoc Group of Qualified Governmental Experts . 
The operat ive par t of the Pakis tan ' s half of the Resolutior 
3476B(XXX), noted the report of the Secretary-General and pointed 
out that in the introduction of h is annual report on the work 
of the Organization, the Secretary-General had urged the 
in t e res t ed s t a t e s of different regions to consult together with 
the motto of the creation of addit ional nuclear-weapons-free 
29 
zones. The resolution urged the South Asian S ta tes to continue 
the ef for t s to make South Asia, a nuclear weapons-free zone as 
incorporated in Resolution 3265 E(XXIX) and to refrain from any 
action going against t h i s , Pakistan pointed out these things 
for r e i t e r a t i n g i t s e a r l i e r stand and added a clause that no 
action can be taken by. the South Asian Sta tes to be considered 
contrary for the creation of a nuclear weapons-free zone in 
South Asia, 
29, A/10001/Add. 1# P .9 . 
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The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from Pakis tan sa id t h a t i t vrauld 
vjelconie o t h e r non-nuclear v?eapon s t a t e s around the South Asian 
region to j o in the group. He, however, expla ined i t s vie-w t h a t 
a nuc l ea r weapons-free zone could be developed only among the 
non-nuclear s t a t e s . I t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e sa id t h a t t h e r e was a 
common commitment by each of the South Asian s t a t e s t h a t i t vx?uld 
not acqu i r e o r develop nuc lea r weapon. He s t a t e d f u r t h e r t h a t 
"my de lega t ion i s no t unhopeful t h a t through f u r t h e r c o n s u l t a t i o n s , 
the S t a t e s of South Asia w i l l f ind i t p o s s i b l e to agree on t h e 
n o d a l i t i e s and procedure by which t h e i r common de te rmina t ion no t 
to exe r c i s e the nuc l ea r weapon opt ion can be j o i n t l y and formal ly 
e j ^ r e s s e d . We hope t h a t the Assembly w i l l encourage them in 
. . 3 1 t h a t endeavour" . 
The Indian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t rong ly r e j e c t e d those arguments 
and t o l d t h a t t he re would no n e g o t i a t i o n s o r c o n s u l t a t i o n s on 
32 
t h i s i s s u e . 
During the debate on disarmament in the Assembly's F i r s t 
Committee, in 1975, China and Bangladesh expressed t h e i r suppor t 
for the c r e a t i o n of nuc lea r weapons-free zone in South As ia , 
Bangladesh emphasized the importance of c o n s u l t a t i o n s , co -ope ra t ion 
and consent among c o u n t r i e s of the region for the s a i d p u r p o s e . 
30 , A/C. VPV 2102, 2 Decerrber 1975, p . 4 1 , 
3 1 , A/C. 1/PV 2074, 21 October 1975, p p . 63-6 4 , 
3 2 . A/C. 1/PV, 2102, 2 December 1975, p . 5 1 
3 3 . Year Book of the United N a t i o n s . Vol . 29, 1975, o p . c i t , , 
1978, p"."42. " " 
-112-
China said that if the tvjo draft resolut ions had put to vote, 
i t would have abstained on the Indian tex t and voted in favour 
of Pakistan t ex t , 
Bhutan expressed i t s view that without agreement among 
member s t a t e s of the region i t would be f u t i l e to es tab l i sh nuclear 
weapons free zone and therefore i t wi l l oppose.Pakistan if i t 
had te vo te . 
United Sta tes said that i t would have abstained on both, 
because again the two proposals had embodied quite d i f fe ren t 
approaches. I t added that i t s a t t i t u d e towards any p a r t i c u l a r 
nuclear weapons-free zone arrangement would be based on whether 
such an arrangement effect ively prohibi ted the indigenous devel-
opment of any nuclear explosive capabi l i ty for whatever the 
purpose might be . 
In 1976, Pakistan again submitted a draf t resolut ion which 
vjas adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution 31/73, India 
and Bhutan opposed i t . China voted in favour while France, USSR, 
UK, and USA abstained from vot ing, 
36 During the debate India r e i t e r a t e d her view that the 
s t a t e s of the region must f i r s t agree themselves on the idea of 
34. Abid./ p . 43, 
3 5 . ^±d. 
36. Official Records of the General Assembly, T h i r t y - f i r s t 
Session, F i r s t Committee (A/C-j 1/31/PV. 20-52). 
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creat ing a zone in an appropriate region of Asia before bringing 
the question to the U.N. 
Pakistan, for i t s par t , held that there was broad agree-
ment on the subject among the s t a t e s of South Asia and the most 
fundamental point of agreement was the i r common commitment not 
to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. I t further s ta ted tha t 
i t had an open mind in respect of considerat ions mentioned by 
India including the questions of the extent of the region, 
jpj_]_itary a l l iances , foreign bases and the need for wider and 
fu l l e r consul ta t ion . 
In 1977, the United States voted in favour of the draf t 
37 
resolut ion of the F i r s t Committee adopted by General Assembly 
as resolut ion 3 2/83 ca l l ing for the creat ion of nuclear weapons-
free zone in South Asia, I t supported the concept of nuclear 
weapons-free zones as a means to enhance the secur i ty of the 
p a r t i e s and to reinforce non-prol iferat ion on a regional b a s i s . 
I t f e l t tha t the actual provisions governing the establishment 
of such a zone should be negotiated and agreed on among the 
p a r t i e s concerned before the s t a tes could be expected to under-
take commitments regarding t h i s . 
38 India reca l led i t s stand that i t was against the nuclear 
weapons and had no intention of exercising the nuclear weapon 
opt ion. I t was in te res ted in nuclear technology for peaceful 
37, The Ifrij.ted Nations Pisarmament Year Book. Vol. 2:1977, 
op . c i t . , 1978, p.'lso'". ~ 
38. i b i d . 
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purposes and would no t allow any obs t ruc t ion in i t . I t s t a t e d , 
fu r the r , t h a t Ind ia remained opposed to the N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n 
Treaty and any such agreement t h a t were d i s c r i m i n a t o r y . I t 
exp la ined the view t h a t the whole world should be f ree of n u c l e a r 
weapons, Subreg iona l i za t ion would no t only be i n c o n s i s t e n t with 
the g l o b a l approach to the problem bu t a l so change i t from a 
u n i v e r s a l to a svib-regional o r r eg iona l concep t . I n d i a f e l t t h a t 
nuc l ea r weapons-free zones would no t he lp to combat t h e n u c l e a r 
t h r e a t to the world a t l a r g e bu t would p rov ide an advantage to 
nuc l ea r weapon s t a t e s s ince nuc l ea r weapons and t h e i r deliveiry 
systems were i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l in n a t u r e . I t remained opposed to 
a n u c l e a r weapons-free zone in South Asia and could n o t agree to 
coopera te to implement P a k i s t a n ' s p r o p o s a l . I t sa id , s ince o t h e r 
c o u n t r i e s in the region might have d i f f e r e n t views, i t w i l l 
abs ta in from v o t i n g . 
Replying to I n d i a ' s po in t t h a t South Asia was an a r t i f i -
c i a l l y r e s t r i c t e d area, Pakis tan sa id t h a t i t had no ob jec t ion to 
the inc lus ion of such o t h e r neighbouring non-nuc lear weapon s t a t e s 
39 
a s might be i n t e r e s t e d in the zone, 
U,K. s a id t h a t i t could support the r e s o l u t i o n , a s i t 
cons idered t h a t such zones could make a p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to 
n a t i o n a l and r eg iona l s e c u r i t y , to the cause of n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n 
and to the reduct ion of the r i s k of n u c l e a r w a r , ^ 
3 9 , Year Book of_the_United N a t i o n s . Vol , 31 , 1977, 
op. cit~7''l9807 p"25,'"" 
40 . i b i d . 
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During the 3 3rd session of General AsseiTtoly in 1978, 
Pakistan while introducing a draft resolution on the subject 
reaffirmed i t s view that the creation of a nuclear weapons-free 
zone in South Asia was r e a l i s t i c end des i rab le . While noting tha t 
some reservat ions and objections remained to overcome, Pakistan-
held that a l l the necessary condit ions for the creat ion of such 
a 2X)ne eocisted. In t h i s connection, i t considered that s t a t e s 
of the region had xjnilaterally renounced the acquisi t ion and 
development of nuclear weapons. 
The F i r s t Committee approved the draft , which on 
14 December, 1978 was adopted by General Assembly as Resolution 
33 /65 . 
India maintained its opposition and said that it did not 
regard South Asia as either appropriate or adequate for the 
purpose and it could not equated with regions such as Latin 
• = 42 America, 
On 4 October 1979, the Secretary-General reported that 
he had been in contact with s t a t e s of the South Asian region 
and that there had been no request by the s t a t e s concerned for 
h is ass is tance in connection with the subject . In the General 
Assembly session in 1979, Pakistan reaffirmed i t s be l i e f that the 
creat ion of nuclear weapons-free zones was the most feas ib le way 
41 . i ^ id . , Vol. 32, 1978, op, c i t , , 1981, p , 8 l , 
42. i b i ^ . 
43 . A/34/527. 
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of preventing the pro l i fe ra t ion of nuclear vjeapons in various 
p a r t s of the world. I t ca l led for Pakis tan ' s f l e x i b i l i t y and 
openness for suggestions in order to accommodate the object ions 
which had been ra ised by cer ta in s t a t e s , Pakistan was ready to 
accept the full-scope IAEA safeguards on a reciprocal bas i s and 
to explore other ways and means of mutually reassuring s t a t e s 
in South Asia against the danger of p ro l i fe ra t ion of nuclear 
44 
weapons, ^ 
India voted against the draft and maintained i ts posi t ion 
that , while i t did not oppose the concept of nuclear weapons-
free zoneS/ the i n i t i a t i v e for the i r establishment should derive 
voluntar i ly from a l l the s t a t e s of the region concerned^ avoiding 
pre-judgement to the concept, features and de l inea t ion . South 
Asia i s a sub-region and an in tegra l par t of the region of Asia 
and pacif ic , which could not be t rea ted in i so la t ion but the 
securi ty environment of a region as a whole had to be taken into 
account, A genuine nuclear weapons-free zone in that region 
could only be establ ished in the t o t a l absence of nuclear 
weapons. In i t s view, the existence of nuclear weapons in the 
region of Asia and the Pacific and the presence of foreign 
mi l i ta ry a c t i v i t i e s and the bases in the Indian Ocean complicated 
the securi ty environment of the region and made the s i tua t ion 
inappropriate for the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free 
44, The United Nations Disarmament_Year Book, 
"^TIl : 1979, op. cit";7 pT"l98o7''pp. 181-82, 
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zone in South A s i a . 
46 The U . S . , w h i l e e x p l a i n i n g t h e a f f i r m a t i v e v o t e , s t a t e d 
t h a t e f f e c t i v e n u c l e a r w e a p o n s - f r e e zones , n e g o t i a t e d and 
s u p p o r t e d by t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p a r t i e s , c o u l d enhance t h e s e c u r i t y 
of t h e s t a t e s c o n c e r n e d and r e i n f o r c e t h e g o a l s of n o n - p r o l i -
f e r a t i o n on a r e g i o n a l b a s i s . For any n u c l e a r w e a p o n s - f r e e zone 
a r r a n g e m e n t to a c c o m p l i s h o b j e c t i v e s , i t would have to p r e c l u d e 
t h e c o n d u c t of any n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n s , w h a t e v e r t h e i r d e c l a r e d 
p u r p o s e . In t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , t h e U . S . emphas ized t h e i m p o r t a n c e 
of o p e r a t i v e p a r a g r a p h 2 of t h e d r a f t , which c o n t a i n e d an 
s u g g e s t i o n u r g i n g a l l s t a t e s in t h e r e g i o n of S o u t h A s i a to 
r e f r a i n from any a c t i o n c o n t r a r y to t h e o b j e c t i v e s of t h e r e s o -
l u t i o n . 
Dur ing t h e 3 5 t h s e s s i o n of G e n e r a l Assembly, P a k i s t a n t o l d 
t h a t i t was c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e c r e a t i o n of such a zone was r e a -
l i s t i c o b j e c t i v e . I t i s from t h e p o i n t of v i e w / g e o g r a p h i c a l ^ 
h i s t o r i c a l , c u l t u r a l and o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , t h e Sou th Asian 
r e g i o n was d i s t i n c t and q u a l i f i e d f o r t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e z o n e . 
Moreover, t h e c o u n t r i e s of t h e r e g i o n had more than o n c e d e c l a r e d 
u n i l a t e r a l l y t h e i r commitment to n u c l e a r n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n . In 
P a k i s t a n ' s view the n e x t s t e p s h o u l d b e a j o i n t endeavour to 
t r a n s l a t e t h o s e commitments i n t o a b i n d i n g r e g i o n a l d e c l a r a t i o n . 
4 5 . i b i d . , p . 182 . 
4 6 . i t d d . 
^^* I^L.^22}! 2l United__Na_tions. V o l . 34, 1980, 
6 p . c i t . , 1983, 5 7 4 9 , 
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48 Before the vote in the F i r s t Committee, Ind ia s t a t e d 
t h a t i t had c o n s i s t e n t l y c a l l e d for the t o t a l e l imina t ion of a l l 
nuc lea r weapons and d id no t in tend to develop or acqu i re them, 
i t s nuc l ea r programme was e n t i r e l y devoted to peacefu l pu rposes . 
I t , however, opposed to the nuc l ea r weapons-free zone in South 
Asia bo th on p r i n c i p l e and p r a c t i c a l d e c l a r a t i o n s . 
Pakis tan has been c o n s i s t e n t l y stood for such a zone in 
South As i a . While India changed her s tand and argued t h a t such 
a zone became u n r e a l i s t i c and the deployment of n u c l e a r weapons 
in va r ious reg ions of the world by the n u c l e a r weapon powers 
vjere fundamentally i r r e c o n c i l a b l e with the very idea of n u c l e a r 
weapons f r ee zones , I n d i a ' s Foreign Minis te r , in UMSSOD-II 
in 1982 t o l d t h a t h i s count ry could no t subscr ibe to the l e g i -
t i m i s a t i o n of the possess ion of n u c l e a r weapons by a few powers 
by agreeing to l i v e under t h e i r p r o t e c t i o n in the form of n u c l e a r 
49 
weapons-free zones . 
In 1983, Pakis tan in t roduced a d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n in the 
F i r s t Committee, by r e c a l l i n g the r e l e v a n t paragraph of the F i n a l 
Document of the f i r s t s p e c i a l session of the General Assembly 
devoted to disarmament and the r ea f f i rma t ion of the o b j e c t i v e 
of e s t a b l i s h i n g nuc l ea r weapons-free zones by the Conference of 
the Heads of S t a t e o r Government of Non-Aligned Coun t r i e s in 
50 litw Delhi in 1983, Pakis tan sa id t h a t i t shared with o t h e r 
48 , i b i d . 
49 , 11]^J^iiS^Natig2^_and_Di^arma^nent. 1945-1985, 
United Nat ions P u b l i c a t i o n s , New""York, 1985, p p . 102-3 , 
50 . O f f i c i a l Records of the General Assembly, Thi r ty-e ight j i 
sess ion , supplement No , (A/38/42), appendix I I (CD/42 l ) , V o l . l l . 
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s t a t e s of the South Asian region a deep commitment to the 
objective of keeping the area free of nuclear weapons tha t had 
been ref lec ted in the un i l a t e r a l declara t ions made by individual 
s t a t e s in the region not to acquire nuclear weapons. I t considered 
that there were proper conditions in the South Asian region to 
carry forward the objective to make i t a nuclear weapons free 
zone. I t considered further that such 2ones cons t i tu ted an irrpor-
t a n t ' p a r t i a l measure in a step by step approach to general and 
complete disarmamant, 
India expressed the view that a draf t resolut ion on the 
nucieaJtr weapons-free zone in South Asia had become an annual and 
po in t less r i t u a l for the F i r s t Committee, 
Pakistan had been continuing in i t s e f fo r t s to keep the 
proposal on U.N, agenda. Every year, i t had been submitting a 
draft resolution for the application of a nuclear weapons free 
zone in South Asia, These draft resolut ions were adopted by 
General Assembly as Resolutions. 
In 1985, India declared that i t had gone along with 
proposals for nuclear weapons-free zones in cer ta in regions 
because they enjoyed the support of a l l s t a t e s of those regions, 
although i t had, a t the same time, expressed reservat ions about 
the efficacy of such p a r t i a l nuclear disarmament measures p a r t i -
51 
cular ly in the context of the findings of nuclear winter . I t 
5 1 , The_^jAiited Nationj Disarmament Year Book, 
Vol, 10:1985, op, c i t , , 19867*"?,~80~ * 
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recal led the c r i t e r i a of 19 78 Final Document for the establishrrient 
of nuclear vjeapons-free zones and s ta ted that i t had been evident 
that no consensus exis ted on the establishment of such zones in 
South Asia. I t said that the proposal for the creat ion of such 
zone in South Asia must be viewed in terms of regional and global 
arms and nuclear weapons, as -well as in terms of the process of 
regional confidence building in which the s t a t e s of the region 
were' engaged. I t concluded that a nuclear weapons-free zone 
could be es tabl ished only if and when a l l the s t a t e s of the region 
had successfully and freely arr ived a t arrangements to e s t ab l i sh 
one and the cha rac t e r i s t i c s of the region being proposed for a 
zone could objectively be seen as jus t i fy ing i t s es tabl ishment . 
Both these countr ies took posi t ion regarding the concept 
according to the i r securi ty percept ions . Pakistan perceives 
danger from India going nuclear and consequently advocates for 
the nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia, On the other hand, 
India counts China, the hos t i l e nuclear weapon power, and 
Pakistan, the v i t r ua i a l ly of the United States , before stepping 
towards the commitment for the nuclear weapons-free zone in South 
Asia, Their perceptions rooted in d i s t r u s t and suspicion are 
incompatible with the creation of nuclear weapons-free 2!one 
in South Asia, 
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CCNCLUSICNb 
Ind ia pursued her foreign p o l i c y as a cha l l enge t o 
hegemonist ic des igns of g r e a t povjers. She took the s tand 
regarding the concept of peace zone in the Indian Ocean and the 
n u c l e a r weapons f ree zones as the d e n i a l to g r e a t powers t h e i r 
mode of governing the o t h e r s t a t e s . While adher ing t o these 
concep t s Ind ia exposed t h e i r r e a l p o l i c i e s in connect ion with 
the achievement of g loba l peace and disaritiament and what could 
be seen in them — a r e fu sa l to the e f f o r t s of neo -co lon i a l i s r a . 
The concept of peace zone in the Indian Ocean and the 
n u c l e a r weapons f ree zones emerged as the r eg iona l measures t o 
disarmament. Both these concepts were designed to r e l a x the 
t ens ion and to avoid c o n f l i c t s in a p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n . The 
s t a t e s concerned app rec i a t ed these p roposa l s in p r i n c i p l e bu t 
contended t h e i r very e s sence . What these g r e a t powers a c t u a l l y 
wanted was to have command so t h a t they could ge t b e n e f i t from 
these weaker s t a t e s in socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l m a t t e r s . 
The peace zone proposa l fo r the Indian Ocean came as a r e s u l 
of the a s p i r a t i o n s of l i t t o r a l and h i n t e r l a n d s t a t e s to p r o t e c t 
t h e i r sovere ignty bnd independence, and of arms race and e l i m i -
na t ion of the p o s s i b i l i t y of war to ensure peace and s e c u r i t y . 
The breaking-up of war among these c o u n t r i e s involv ing the g r e a t 
powers w i l l be more harmful to r eg iona l s t a t e s in t h e i r soc io -
economic development and sove re ign ty . The d e c l a r a t i o n for Indian 
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Ocean as a peace zone was focussed on great powers' military 
presence and rivalry among them and thus called for halting the 
further escalation and expansion of their military presence 
in the Indian Ocean and then to eliminate them (all bases, 
military installations, logistical supply facilities, the 
disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction 
and any manifestation of great power rivalry),But it did not 
propose any restriction on the freedom of commercial shipping and 
innocent passage of naval vessels. 
This proposal was criticized by the great powers but 
later on, they began to respond. But their- response was in no 
way helpful to achieve the purpose. The Soviets began to support 
the peace zone but abstained from voting in the United Nations 
General Assembly. The Soviet Union explained its abstention as 
the resentment over the term 'big power military presence' and 
said it did not have any military base. 
The U.S. did not consider the military presence as a threat 
to peace but said that unlike the Soviet Union, the military 
presence of other states had served the maintenance of peace. 
The other great powers' response could be summarised as following 
that of the U.S. 
Attempts were made to divert the attention from the 
peace zone proposal in which the regional states became instru-
mental. Taking into account the benefits of regional conflicts 
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and tensions they made the prospects for peace zone b leak . 
In the mid-seventies, some s t a t e s in the Indian Ocean 
began demanding the acceptance of nuclear weapons free zones as 
compiamentary to peace zone proposal . The U.S. and U.S.S.R. 
held b i l a t e r a l t a lk s regarding l imi ta t ion on naval arms 
but the t a l k s broke-up. Both these great powers have 
continued in c r i t i c i z i n g each o the r . 
India favoured the peace zone idea because of the percep-
tion that these mi l i t a ry presence of great powers are bound to 
proven d i sas t rous , I n d i a ' s policy towards peace zone i s not 
devoid of security percept ions . The great powers have been busy 
in enhancing the i r influence in the th i rd world count r ies to get 
benef i t s in socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l f i e l d s . In doing so, 
they need to counter each other by means of aligning with these 
weaker s t a t e s . Besides the danger erupting out of t h e i r conf l ic t 
they often get involved in local conf l ic t s , e .g . In do-Bangladesh 
war of 1971 e t c . India apprehended that, the increased mi l i t a ry 
and naval presence in the area and the fear of involvement of 
great powers wil l only add tensions in the region ra ther than ease , 
India wanted to remove the danger of in te rven t ion i s t 
t h r ea t s from these powers. I t advocated for the o r ig ina l peace 
zone proposal based on the policy of non-alignment and o r i g i n a l l y 
formulated by the NAM. I t asked for strengthening the e f fo r t s to 
achieve the aim at the General Assembly meetings and Non-aligned 
Conferences. 
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The concept of nuclear v?eapons free zones emerged in the 
in te rna t iona l r e l a t ions to eliminate the danger of nuclear war 
in any pa r t i cu la r region of the non-nuclear vx)rld. Regarding 
t h i s concept, the s t a t e s have differed on many p r inc ip le s but 
agreed tha t i t could be establish- in an appropriate region " 
comprising of non-nuclear s t a t e s on the bas i s of consensus of 
a l l s t a t e s . In return, they wil l get guarantee from nuclear 
weapon s t a t e s of non-resort to t h r ea t . But the exis t ing nuclear 
weapons free zones ref lec ted the great powers a t t i t u d e of 
get t ing prof i tab le posit ion regardless of contributing to regional 
de tente . 
The Treaty of Antarctic was declared a demil i tar ized 
zone but in ac tua l i t y i t granted the r igh t to a few powers for 
the exploration of i t s vast na tura l resources . All the other 
nuclear weapons free zones have loopholes. 
India opposed to the nuclear weapons free zones idea 
because i t considered t h i s instrumental for legi t imis ing nuclear 
weapons in the hands of a few nuclear weapon powers. I t has been 
an ardent supporter of general and complete disarmaaent and 
therefore, argued that without the inclusion of nuclear weapon 
powers in these programmes, the danger of nuclear war could not 
be el iminated. I t held that nuclear weapons free zone would not 
help to corrbat the nuclear threa t to the world but provide an 
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advantage to the nuclear weapon s t a t e s since nuclear weapons and 
the i r delivery system were in tercont inenta l in nature-; Thus, 
India advocated for the global disarmament as the only way to 
remove the danger of nuclear war. 
However, India supported such proposals when they were the 
tesult of consensus in an appropriate region. I t considered tha t 
t h i s . w i l l encourage the idea to make ul t imately the world free 
of nuclear weapons. But with the passing of time India reversed 
her stand. By reca l l ing the findings of the panel of s c i e n t i s t s 
about nuclear winter i t said that t h i s concept has become 
meaningless as any event of nuclear war wil l not respect the 
s ta tus of nuclear weapons free .zones. 
Regarding the proposal of nuclear weapons-free zone in 
south Asia, India made objections both on pr inc ip le and p r ac t i c a l 
cons ide ta t ions . India reacted adversely to Pakis tan ' s proposal 
for the South Asian nuclear weapons free zone as i t did not adhere 
to the basic p r inc ip les of consul tat ions before presenting the 
proposal to the United Nations, Besides, India did not consider 
i t an appropriate region for the creation of nuclear weapons 
free 2Dne. India apprehended that t h i s proposal was boiind to 
hamper i t s nuclear programme for peaceful purposes. I t saw the 
Pakistan move with suspicion as i t did not include China and 
Pakistan i t s e l f has been an a l ly of the United S t a t e s . 
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India i s of the view that Nuclear Weapons Free zone idea 
creates a pro tec tora te in which the non-nuclear weapon s t a t e s 
Seek the jo in t protection of the nuclear weapon s t a t e s . This 
idea envisages leaving nuclear securi ty in the hands of nuclear 
powers in exchange for accepting safeguards and a pledge of 
non-nuclear s t a t u s . I nd i a ' s stand i s that i t i s id le to ta lk 
of regional nuclear-free zones when there would s t i l l be zones 
wnich could continue to be endangered by nuclear weapons. 
Actually, there cannot be a l imited approach to the problem of 
freedom from nuclear th rea t s and dangers and the whole world 
should be declared a nuclear-free zone, 
India maintains that the concept of nuclear weapons free 
zones i s u n r e a l i s t i c as t h i s wil l not save any zone in the event 
of any nuclear war. 
- 1 2 7 -
APPENDIX - I 
DECEMBER 1971 UN RESOLUTIOJ CN I N D I / ^ OCEAN 
The General Assembly, 
Conscious of the de terminat ion of the peoples of the 
l i t t o r a l and h i n t e r l a n d S t a t e s of the Indian Ocean t o p r e s e r v e 
t h e i r independence, sovere ignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , and 
t o remove t h e i r p o l i t i c a l , economic and s o c i a l problems under 
c o n d i t i o n s of peace and t r a n s q u i l i t y . 
Reca l l ing the Dec la ra t ion of t h e Third Conference of Heads 
of S t a t e or Government of Non-Aligned Count r ies , he ld a t Lusaka 
in September 1970, c a l l i n g upon a l l s t a t e s t o cons ide r and 
r e s p e c t the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which g r e a t 
power r i v a l r i e s and competi t ion as well as bases conceived in 
the contex t of such r i v a l r i e s and competi t ion should be excluded, 
and dec l a r i ng t h a t the a rea should a l s o be f ree of n u c l e a r 
weapons. 
Convinced of the d e s i r a b i l i t y of ensur ing the maintenance 
of such condit icjns in the a rea by means o the r than m i l i t a r y 
a l l i a n c e s , as such a l l i a n c e s e n t a i l f i n a n c i a l and o t h e r o b l i g a -
t i o n s t h a t c a l l for the d ive r s ion of the l i m i t e d r e sou rces of 
these S t a t e s from the more compelling and p roduc t ive t a s k of 
economic and s o c i a l r econs t ruc t i on and could f u r t h e r invo lve them 
in the r i v a l r i e s of power b l o c s in a manner p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e i r 
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independence and freedom of action, thereby increasing i n t e r -
nat ional tens ions . 
Concerned at recent developments that portend the exten-
sion of the arms race in to the Indian Ocean area,^ thereby 
posing a serious threa t to the maintenance of such conditions 
in the a rea . 
Convinced that the establishment of a zone of peace in the 
Indian Ocean would contribute towards ar res t ing such developments, 
relaxing in te rna t iona l tensions and strengthening in t e rna t iona l 
peace and secur i ty . 
Convinced further that the establishment of a zone of 
peace in an extensive geographical area in one region could have 
a benef ic ia l influence on the establishment of permanent un i -
versal peace based on equal r igh t s and j u s t i c e for a l l , in 
accordance with the purposes and pr inc ip les of the Charter of 
the United Nations, 
1. Solemnly declares that the Indian Ocean, within l imi t s 
to be determined, together with the a i r space above and the 
ocean floor sujacent thereto, i s hereby designated for a l l 
time as a zone of peace; 
2, c a l l s upon the great powers, in conformity with t h i s 
Declaration, to enter in to immediate consul ta t ions with the 
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littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to ; 
a) Halting the further escalation and expansion 
of their military presence in the Indian Ocean; 
b) Eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, 
military installations, logistical supply faci-
lities, the disposition of nuclear v^ eapons and 
weapons of mass destnaction and any manifesta-
tion of great Power military presence in the 
Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great 
power rivalrjj'; 
3, calls upon the littoral and hinterland States of the 
Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and 
other major maritime users of the Indian Oc;ean in pursuit of 
the objective of establishing a system of universal collective 
security without military alliances and strengthening inter-
national security through regional and other cooperation, to 
enter into consultations with a view to the implementation of 
this Declaration and such action as may be necessary to ensure 
that : 
a) warships and military aircraft may not use the 
Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or independence 
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of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian 
Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations; 
b) Subject to the foregoing and to the norms and 
principles of international law^  the right to free and 
unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations 
is unaffected; 
c) Appropriate arrangements are made to give effect 
to any international agreement that may ultimately be 
reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a 
zone of peace; 
4, Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General 
Assembly at the twenty-seventh session on the progress that has 
been made with regard to the implementation of this Declaration; 
5, Decides to include the item entitled "Declaration of the 
Indian Ocean as a zone of peace" in the provisional agenda of its 
twenty-seventh se-ssion, 
Recorded Vote j 
In Favour s Afghanistan, Algeria, Bhutan, Burma, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, 
Cyprus, Egypt, Elsalvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Gyane, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Jordan, 
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Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, 
Mali, Malta, Mauri tania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicragua 
( l a t e advised the S e c r e t a r i a t i t had in tended to a b s t a i n ) , 
N ige r i a , Pak is tan , Panama, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syr ia , Togo, Tr in idad and Tobago, 
Tunis ia , Ugenda, Uni ted Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Yemen, 
Yogoslavia, Zambia 
Tota l : 6 2 
Against i None 
Absta ining : Argentina, A u s t r a l i a , Aus t r i a , Belgium, Bo l iv ia , 
B r a z i l , Bulgar ia , Byeloruss ia , Canada, Cen t ra l African Republic, 
Chi le , Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican 
Republic, F i j i , Finland, France, Greece, Guetemala, H a i t i , 
Honduras, Hungary, I r e l a n d , I s r a e l , I t a l y , Inory Coast, Jamaica, 
Lesotho, Luxemourg, Madagascar, Mongolia, Ne ther lands , New 
Zealand, Normay, P e o p l e ' s Republic of Yemen, Peru, P h i l i p i n e s , 
Poland, Por tuga l , Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, Turkey, Ukraine, 
USSR, U.K., U.S.A., Upper Volta, Venezuela, Z a i r e . 
Tota l : 55 
^ s e n t : Albania, Bahrain, Barbados, Botswana, Ecuador, Gobon, 
Gambia (Later advised the S e c r e t a r i a t i t had in tended t o vo te in 
favour) , I r aq , Malawi, Maldives, Maur i t ius , Niger , Oman, Paraguay, 
S i e r r a , Leone, United Arab Emira tes . 
Tota l : 16 
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APPENDIX - II 
AN TARCTIC TREATY 
The Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, 
the French Republic, Japan, Nev; Zealand, Norvv-ay, the Union of 
south Africa, the Union of soviet Socialist Republics, the 
united Kingdom of Great Britain and tJorthem Ireland, and 
the United States of America, 
Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that 
Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of 
international discord; 
Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific 
knowledge resulting from international cooperation in scientific 
investigation in Antarctica; 
Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for 
the continuation and development of such cooperation on the 
basis of freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica as 
applied during the International Geophysical Year accords with 
the interests of science and the progress of all m^kind; 
Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica 
for peaceful purposes only and the continuance of international 
harmony in Antarctica will further the purposes and principles 
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embodied in the Charter of the United Nations: 
Have agreed as follows: 
Articj.e I I 
1, . ^ t a r c t i c a shal l be used for peaceful purposes only. 
There shal l be prohibited, i n t e r a l i a , any measures of a mi l i t a ry 
nature, such as the establishment of mi l i t a ry bases and f o r t i -
f i ca t ions , the carrying out of mi l i t a ry manoeuvers, as well as 
the t es t ing of any type of weapons, 
2 , The present Treaty shal l not prevent the use of mi l i t a ry 
personnel or equipment for s c i en t i f i c research or for any other 
peaceful purpose, 
Art_ic le 11__ J 
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and 
cooperation towards that end, as applied during the International 
Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject to the provisions of 
the present Treaty, 
Article III : 
1. In order to promote in ternat ional cooperation in s c i e n t i f i c 
invest igat ion in Antarctica, as provided for in Ar t ic le I I of the 
present Treaty, the Contracting Pa r t i e s agree that , to the 
grea tes t extent feasible and prac t icab le : 
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(a) information regarding plans for scientific programs 
in Antarctica shall be exchanged to permit maximum economy and 
efficiency of operations; 
(b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica 
betv?een expeditions and stations; 
(c) scientific observations and results from Antarctica 
shall be exchanged and made freely available, 
2, In implementing this Article, every encouragement shall 
be given to the establishment of cooperative working relations 
with those Specialized Agencies of the United Nations and other 
international organizations having a scientific or technical 
interest in Antarctica, 
Article ly : 
1, Nothing contained in the present Treaty sha l l be i n t e r -
preted as: 
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously 
asser ted r igh t s of or claims to t e r r i t o r i a l sovereignty in 
Antarct ica; 
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party 
of any bas i s of claim to t e r r i t o r i a l sovereignty in Antarct ica 
which i t may have whether as a r e su l t of i t s a c t i v i t i e s or those 
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of i t s nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; 
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as 
regards i t s recognition or non-recognition of any other Sta te ' s 
right of or claim or basis of claim to t e r r i t o r i a l sovereignty in 
Antarctica, 
2, No acts or ac t iv i t ies taking place while the present 
Treaty i s in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, support-
ing or denying a claim to t e r r i to r i a l sovereignty in Antarctica 
or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica, No new claim, 
or enlargement of an existing claim, to t e r r i t o r i a l sovereignty 
in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty i s in 
force. 
Article V : 
1, Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal 
there of radio-active waste material shall be prohibited, 
2, In the event of the conclusion of international agree-
ments concerning the use of nuclear energy, including nuclear 
explosions and the disposal of radiocative waste material, to 
which all of the contracting Parties whose representatives are 
entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under 
Article IX are parties, the rules established under such agree-
ments shall apply in Antarctica, 
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Article _ yi : 
The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the 
area south of 6 0 South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but 
nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect 
the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under 
international la-w with regard to the high seas within that area, 
Article_ VII : 
1, In order to promote the objectives and ensure the 
observance of the provisions of the present Treaty, each 
Contracting Party whose representa t ives ' are e n t i t l e d to p a r t i c i -
pate in the meetings referred to in Ar t ic le IX of the Treaty shal l 
have the r igh t to designate observers to carry out any inspec-
tion provided for by the present A r t i c l e . Observers shal l be 
na t iona l s of the Contracting Pa r t i e s vjhich designate them. The 
names of observers shal l be communicated to ever^'' o ther Contracting 
par ty having the r ight to designate observers, and l ike not ice 
shal l be given of the termination of t he i r appointment. 
2, Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions 
of paragraph l of t h i s Ar t ic le shal l have complete freedom of 
access at any time to any or a l l areas of i^ntarctica. 
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3 , All areas of Antarctica^ including a l l s ta t ions , i n s t a l l a -
t ions and equipment vi thin those areas, and a l l ships and a i r -
c ra f t a t poin ts of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel 
in Antarctica, shal l be open at a l l times to inspection by any 
observers designated in accordance with paragraph 1 of t h i s 
Ar t i c l e . 
4, Aerial observation may be car r ied out a t any time over 
any or a l l areas of Antarctica by any of the Contracting Pa r t i e s 
having the r ight to designate observers, 
5 , Each Contracting Party shal l , a t the time when the 
present Treaty enters into force for i t , inform the o ther 
Contracting Par t i e s , and thereaf te r shal l give them not ice in 
advance, of 
(a) a l l expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the pa r t 
of i t s ships or nat ionals , and a l l expeditions to Antarctica 
organized in or proceeding from i t s t e r r i t o r y ; 
(b) a l l s t a t ions in Antarctica occupied by i t s nationals;and 
(c) any mi l i t a ry personnel or equipment intended to be 
introduced by i t in to Antarctica subject to the conditions 
prescribed in paragraph 2 of Ar t ic le I of the present Treaty, 
Ar t ic le VIII I 
1, In order to f a c i l i t a t e the exercise of t h e i r functions 
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under the present Treaty, and without prejudice to the respect ive 
pos i t ions of the Contracting Pa r t i e s re la t ing to j u r i s d i c t i o n 
over a l l other persons in Antarctica, observers designated xinder 
paragraph I of / ^ t i c l e VII and sc i en t i f i c personnel exchanged 
under subparagraph I (b) of Ar t ic le I I I of the Treaty, and 
members of the staff accOTipanying any such persons, shal l be 
subject only to the ju r i sd ic t ion of the Contracting Party of 
which they are na t iona l s in respect of a l l ac t s or omissions 
occurring while they are in Antarctica for the purpose of 
exercising t h e i r funct ions. 
2 , Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of 
t h i s Art ic le , and pending the adoption of measures in pursuance 
of subparagraph l (e) of Ar t ic le IX, the Contracting Pa r t i e s 
concerned in any case of dispute with regard to the exercise of 
j u r i sd i c t ion in Antarctica shal l immediately consult together 
with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable so lu t ion . 
Ar t ic le IX $ 
1, Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the 
preamble to the present Treaty shall meet at the City of Canberra 
within two months after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, 
and thereafter at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose 
of exchanging information, consulting together on matters of 
common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and 
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considering^ and recommending to their Governments, measures 
in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty, 
including measures regarding: 
(a) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only; 
(b) faci l i tat ion of scientific research in Antarctica; 
(c) faci l i tat ion of international scientif ic cooperation 
in Antarctica; 
(d) faci l i tat ion of the exercise of the rights of inspec-
tion provided for in Article VII of the Treaty; 
(e) questioiB relating to the exercise of jurisdiction 
in Antarctica; 
(f) preservation and conservation of living resources 
in Antarctica; 
2, Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the 
present Treaty by accession under Article XIII shall be ent i t led 
to appoint representatives to participate in the meetings referred 
to in paragraph 1 of the present Article, during such time as 
that Contracting Party demonstrates i t s interest in Antarctica by 
conducting substantial scientific research act ivi ty there, such 
as the establishment of a scientific station or the despatch of 
a scientif ic expedition. 
3 . Reports from the observers referred to in Article VII of 
the present Treaty shall be transmitted to the representatives 
of the Contracting Parties participating in the meetings referred 
to in paragraph 1 of the present Art icle, 
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4, The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of t h i s Art ic le 
shal l become effective when approved by a l l the Contracting 
Pa r t i e s whose representat ives were e n t i t l e d to p a r t i c i p a t e ±n 
the meetings held to consider those measures. 
5 , Any or a l l of the r igh t s es tabl i shed in the present Treaty 
may be exercised as from the date of entjry in to force of the 
Treaty whether or not any measures f a c i l i t a t i n g the exercise 
of such r igh t s have been proposed, considered or approved as 
provided in t h i s Ar t i c le . 
Ar t ic le X : 
Each of the Contracting Par t i e s undertakes to exert 
appropriate effor ts , consistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations, to the end that no one engages in any a c t i v i t y in 
Antarct ica contrary to the pr inc ip les or purposes of the present 
Treaty , 
Ar t i c l e XI : 
1, If any dispute ar ises between two or more of the Contractinc 
P a r t i e s concerning the in terpreta t ion or appl icat ion of the presen-t 
Treaty, those Contracting Par t i es shal l consul t among themselves 
with a view to having the dispute resolved by negot ia t ion, 
inquiry* mediation, conci l ia t ion, a r b i t r a t i o n , j u d i c i a l settlement 
or o ther peaceful means of t h e i r own choice . 
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2, Any dispute of t h i s character not so resolved sha l l , with 
the consent, in each case, of a l l p a r t i e s to the dispute, be 
referred to the In ternat ional Court of Jus t i ce for settlement, 
but fa i lu re to reach agreement on reference to the In te rna t iona l 
court sha l l not absolve p a r t i e s to the dispute frcro the responsi-
b i l i t y of continuing to seek to resolve i t by any of the various 
peaceful means referred to in paragraph 1 of t h i s A r t i c l e , 
Ar t ic le XII : 
1, (a) The present Treaty may be modified or amended at any 
time by unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parties whose 
representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
provided for under Article IX, Any such modification or amend-
ment shall enter into force when the depositary Government has 
received notice from all such Contracting Parties that they have 
ratified it. 
(b) Such modification or amendment shall thereafter enter 
into force as to any other Contracting Party when notice of 
tatification by it has been received by the depositary Government, 
Any such Contracting Party fran which no notice of ratification 
is received within a period of two years from the date of entry 
into force of the modification or amendment in accordance with 
the provisions of subparagraph l (a) of this Article shall be 
deemed to have withdrawn from the present Treaty on the date 
of the expiration of such period. 
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2, (a) If after the expiration of thirty years from the 
date of entry into force of the present Treaty, any of the 
Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to 
participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX so 
requests by a caninunication addressed to the depositary Government, 
a Conference of all the Contracting Parties shall be held as soon 
as practicable to review the operation of the Treaty, 
(b) Any modification or amendment to the present Treaty 
which is approved at such a Conference by a majority of the 
Contracting Parties there representee, jjncluding a majority of 
those whose representatives are entitled to participate in the 
meetings provided for under Article IX, shall be commu.nicated 
by the depositary Government to all the Contracting Parties 
immediately after the termination of the Conference and shall entei 
into force in accordance with the provisions of paragraph l of 
the present Article. 
(c) If any such modification or amendment has not entered 
into force in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph l 
(a) of this Article within a period of two years after the date 
of its communication to all the Contracting Parties, any 
Ccjutracting Party may at any time after the expiration of that 
period give notice to the depositary Government of its withdrawal 
from the present Treaty; and such withdrawal shall take effect 
two years after the receipt of the notice by the depositary 
Govemmen t. 
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Article XIII : 
1, The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the 
signatory States, It shall be open for accession by any State 
which is a >fember of the United Nations, or by any other State 
which may be invited to accede to the Treaty with the consent 
of all the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled 
to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX of 
the Treaty, 
2, Ratification of or accession to the present Treaty shall 
be effected by each State in accordance vjith its constitutional 
processes, 
3, Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession 
shall be deposited with the Government of the United States 
of America, hereby designated as the depositary Government. 
4, The depositary Government shall inform all signatory 
and acceding States of the date of each deposit of an instrument 
of ratification or accession, and the date of entry into force 
of the Treaty and of any modification or amendment thereto, 
5, Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by all 
the signatory States, the present Treaty shall enter into force 
for those States and for States which have deposited instruments 
of accession. Thereafter the Treaty shall enter into force for 
-144-
any acceding State upon the deposit of i t s instnamoit of 
accession, 
6 . The present Treaty shal l be reg is te red by the depositary 
Government pursuant to Ar t ic le 102 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, 
Ar t ic le XIV i 
The present Treaty, done in the English, French, Russian, 
and Spanish languages, each version being equally authentic , 
sha l l be deposited in the archives of the Govemment of the 
United S ta tes of America, vjhich shal l transniit duly c e r t i f i e d 
copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding 
S t a t e s . 
In witness whereof, the undersigned P len ipo ten t ia r ies , 
duly authorized, have signed the present Treaty, 
Done at Washington t h i s f i r s t day of December, one 
thousand nine hundred and f i f ty -n ine . 
For Argentina: For New Zealand: 
Adolfo Scilingo G.D.L, White 
F . Bello 
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For A u s t r a l i a : 
Howard Beale 
For Norway j 
Paul Koht 
For Belgium: 
Obert de Thieusies 
For the Union of South Africa: 
Wentzel C, du Plessis 
For Chile : 
Marcial Mora M 
E. Gajardo V 
J u l i o Escudero 
For the Union of Soc ie t Socia-
l i s t Republ ics : 
V, Kuznetsov (Romanization) 
For the French Republic: 
P i e r r e Charpen t ie r 
For Japan : 
Koichi ro Asakai 
T, Shimod^ 
For the United Kingdcip of 
Great B r i t a i n and Northern 
I r e l a n d : 
Harold Caccia 
For the United S t a t e s of 
America j 
Herman Ph leger 
Paul C, D a n i e l s -
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APPENDIX - I I I 
TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
IN LATIN AMERICA 
Signed a t T l a t e l o l c o , Mexico February 14, 1967 
-Entered in force April 22, 1968. 
Preamble : 
In the name of t h e i r peoples and fa i th fu l ly in te rp re t ing 
the i r des i res and aspi ra t ions , the Governments of the Sta tes 
v;hich sign the Treaty for the Prohibit ion of Nuclear Vfeapons in 
Latin America, 
Desiring to contr ibute, so far as l i e s in t h e i r power, 
towards ending the armaments race, especia l ly in the f i e l d of 
nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world a t peace, 
based on the sovereign equal i ty of Sta tes , mutual respect and 
good neighbourliness. 
Recalling that the United Nations General Assembly, in 
i t s Resolution 808 (IX), adopted xmanimously as one of the three 
po in t s of a coordinated programme of disarmament "the t o t a l 
prohibi t ion of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and 
weapons of mass destruction of every type". 
Recalling that m i l i t a r i l y denuclearized zones are not an 
end in themselves but ra ther a means for achieving general and 
conplete disarmament at a l a t e r s tage . 
Recalling United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
1911 (XVIII), which establ ished that the measures that should be 
-147-
agreed upon for the denuclearization of Latin America should be 
taken "in the l igh t of the pr inc ip les of the Charter of the 
uni ted Nations and of regional agreements". 
Recalling United Nations General Assenibly 2028 (XX), 
which es tabl ished the p r inc ip le of an acceptable balance of 
itiutual r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and dut ies for the nuclear and non-
nuclear powers and 
Recalling that the Charter of the Organization of American 
Sta tes proclaims that i t i s an essen t i a l purpose of the Organiza-
tion to strengthen the peace and securi ty of the hemisphere, 
Convinced : 
That the incalculable destructive power of nuclear weapons 
has made it imperative that the legal prohibition of war should be 
strictly observed in practice if the survival of civilization 
and of mankind itself is to be assured. 
The nuclear weapons, whose terribjfe effects are suffered, 
indiscriminately and inexorably, by military forces and civilian 
population alike, constitute, through the persistence of the 
radioactivity they release, en attack on the integrity of the 
human species and ultimately may even render the whole earth 
uninhabitable. 
That general and complete disarmament under effective 
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intemational control is a vital matter which all the peoples 
of the vrarld equally demand. 
That the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which seems 
inevitable unless States, in the exercise of their sovereign 
rights, impose restrictions on themselves in order to prevent it, 
would make any agreement on disarmament enormously difficult 
and wpuld increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear 
conflagration. 
That the establishment of military denuclearized zones 
is closely linked with the maintenance of peace and security in 
the respective regions, 
That the military denuclearization of vast geographical 
zones, adopted by the sovereign decision of the States comprised 
therein, will exercise a beneficial influence on other regions 
where similar conditions exists. 
That the privileged situation of the signatory States, 
whose territories are wholly free from nuclear weapons, imposes 
upon them the inescapable duty of preserving that situation both 
in their own interests and for the good of mankind, that the 
existence of nuclear weapons in any country of Latin America 
would make it a target for possible nuclear attacks and would 
inevitably set off, throughout the region, a ruinous race in 
nuclear weapons which would involve the unjustifiable diversion. 
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for warlike purpose^ of the limited resources required to r 
economic and social development. 
That the foregoing reasons, together with the t r a d i t i o n a l 
peace-loving outlook of Latin Ainerica^ give r i s e to an inescapable 
necessi ty that nuclear energy should be used in tha t region 
exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that the Latin American 
countr ies should use the i r r ight to the greates t and most equi t -
able possible access to t h i s new source of energy in order to 
expedite the economic and social development of t he i r peoples. 
Convinced Final ly ; 
That the mi l i ta ry denuclearization of Latin America -
being understood to mean the undertaking enetered into i n t e r -
nat ional ly in t h i s Treaty to keep the i r t e r r i t o r i e s for ever 
free from nuclear weapons- wi l l cons t i tu te a measure which wi l l 
spare t he i r peoples from the squandering of the i r l imited 
resources on nuclear armaments and wi l l protect them against 
possible nuclear a t tacks on the i r t e r r i t o r i e s , and wi l l also 
con t i tu te a s ignif icant contribution towards preventing the pro-
l i f e r a t ion of nuclear weapons and a powerful factor for general 
and complete disarmament, and 
The Latin America, fa i thful to i t s t r ad i t ion of uni-
ve r sa l i ty / must not only endeavour to banish from i t s homelands 
the scourge of a nuclear war, but must also s t r ive to promote 
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the well-being and advancement of i t s peoples, a t the same time 
co-operating in the fulfilment of the idea l s of mankind, tha t 
i s to say, in the consolidation of a permanent peace based on 
equal r igh t s , economic fa i rness and social j u s t i c e for a l l , 
in accordance -with the p r inc ip les and purposes set for th in the 
Charter of the United Nations and in the Charter of the 
Organization of American States , 
Have agreed as follows: 
Obligations 
Ar t ic le 1 I 
1. The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use, 
exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and 
facilities which are under this jurisdiction, and to prohibit 
and prevent in their respective territories* 
(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or 
acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, 
by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on 
behalf of anyone else or in any other way, and 
(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment end 
any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly 
or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on 
their behalf or in any other way. 
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(2) The contract ing Par t i es also undertake to refra in from 
engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, d i rec t ly or ind i rec t ly , 
or in any way pa r t i c ipa t ing in the tes t ing , use, manufacture, 
production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon. 
Definition of the Contracting Par t i e s 
Ar t ic le 2 : 
For the purposes of this Treaty, the Contracting Parties 
are those for whom the Treaty is in force. 
Definition of Territory 
Article 3 : 
For the purposes of t h i s Treaty, the terra " t e r r i t o ry" shal l 
include the t e r r i t o r i a l sea, air space and any other space over 
which the Sta te exercises sovereignty in accordance with i t s own 
l e g i s l a t i o n . 
Zone of application 
Article 4 j 
1, The zone of application of this Treaty is the whole of the 
territories for which the Treaty is in force. 
2, Upon fulfilment of the requirements of Article 28, 
paragraph l, the zone of application of this Treaty shall also 
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be that which is situated in the western hemisphere within the 
following limits (except the continental part of the territory 
of the United States of America and its territorial waters): 
starting at a point located at 35 north latitude, 75 west longi-
tude; from this point directly southward to a point at 30 north 
latitude, 75 west longitude; from there, directly eastward to a 
point at 30 north latitude, 50 west longitude; from there, along 
a loxodromic line to a point at 5 north latitude, 20 west longi-
tude; from there, directly southward to a point at 60 south lati-
tude, 20 west longitude; from there, directly westward to a 
point at 60 south latitude, 115 west longitude; from there, 
directly northward to a point at 0 latitude, 115 west longitude; 
from there, along a loxodromic line to a point at 35 north 
latitude, 150 west longitude; from there, directly eastward to 
point at 35 north latitude, • 75 west longitude. 
Definition of nuclear weapons 
Article 5 : 
For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear weapon is any 
device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an 
uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that 
are appropriate for use for warlike purposes. An instrument 
that may be used for the transport or propulsion of the devise 
is not included in this definition if it is separable from the 
device and not an indivisible part thereof. 
Meeting of signatories 
-153-
Article 6 : 
At the request of any of the signatory States or if the 
Agency established by Article 7 should so decide, a meeting of 
all the signatories may be convoked to consider in common questions 
vhich may affect the very essence of this instrument, including 
possible amendments to it. In either case/ the meeting will be 
convoked by the General Secretary, 
Organization 
Article 7 : 
1, In order to ensure compliance with the obl iga t ions of t h i s 
Treaty, the Contracting Par t i e s hereby es tab l i sh an in te rna t iona l 
organization to be known as the "Agency for the Prohibit ion of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America", hereinaf ter refer red to as 
"the Agency", Only the Contracting Pa r t i e s shal l be affected 
by i t s decis ions , 
2, The Agency shal l be responsible for the holding of 
periodic or extraordinary consul ta t ions among Member S ta tes on 
matters r e l a t i ng to the purposes, measures and procedures set 
forth in t h i s Treaty and to the supervision of compliance with 
the obl iga t ions ar is ing therefrom, 
3 , The Contracting Pa r t i e s agree to extend to the Agency fu l l 
and prompt co-operation in accordance with the provisions of t h i s 
Treaty, of any agreements they may conclude with the Agency and 
of any agreements the agency may conclude with any other 
in te rna t iona l organization or body. 
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4, The headquarters of the Agancy shall be in Mexico City, 
Organ s 
Article 8 : 
1, There are hereby established as principal organs of the 
Agency a General Conference/ a Council and a Secretariat, 
2, Such subsidiary organs as are considered necessary by the 
General Conference may be established within the purview of this 
Treaty. 
The General Conference) 
Article 9 : 
1, The General Conference, the supreme organ of the Agency, 
shall be composed of all the Contracting Parties; it shall hold 
regular sessions every two years and may also hold special sessions 
whenever this Treaty so provides or, in the opinion of the Council, 
the circumstances so require. 
2. The General Conference 
(a) hay consider and decide on any matters or questions 
covered by this Treaty, within the limits thereof, including those 
referring to powers and functions of any organ provided for in 
this Treaty, 
(b) Shall establish procedures for the control system to 
ensure observance of this Treaty in accordance with its provisions. 
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(c) Shall elect the Members of the Council and the 
General Secretary, 
(d) May remove the General Secretary from office if the 
proper functioning of the Agency so requires, 
(e) Shall receive and consider the biennial and special 
reports submitted by the Council and the General Secretary, 
(f) Shall initiate and consider studies designed to faci-
litate the optimum fulfilment of the aims of this Treaty, without 
prejudice to the power of the General Secretary independently 
to carry out similar studies for submission to and consideration 
by the Conference, 
(g) Shall be the organ competent to authorize the 
conclusion of agreements with Governments and other in ten:! a t ion al 
organizations and bodies, 
3, The General Conference shall adopt the Agency's budget 
and fix the scale of financial contributions to be paid by Member 
States, Taking into account the systems and criteria used for 
the same purpose by the United Nations, 
4, The General Conference shall elect its officers for 
each session and may establish such subsidiary organs as it 
deems necessary for the performance of its functions, 
5, Each Member of the Agency shall have one vote. The 
decisions of the General Conference shall be taken by a two-
thirds majority of the Members present and voting in the case of 
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matters relating to the control system and measures referred 
to in article 20, the admission of new members, the election 
or removal of the General Secretaty, adoption of the budget and 
matters related thereto. Decisions on other matters, as well 
as procedural questions and also determination of which questions 
must be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be taken by a 
simple majority of the members present and -voting, 
6. ' The General Conference shall adopt its owm rules of 
procedure, 
The Council 
Article 10 : 
1, The Council shall be composed of five Members of the 
Agency elected by the General Conference from among the Contractin 
parties, due account being taken of equitable geographic dis-
tribution , 
2, The Members of the Council shall be elected for a term of 
four years. However, in the first election three will be elected 
for two years. Outgoing Members may not be re-elected for the 
following period unless the limited number of States for which 
the Treaty is in force so requires, 
3, Each Member of the Council shall have one representative, 
4, The Council shall be so organized as to be able to function 
continuously. 
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5, In addition to the functions conferred upon it by this 
Treaty and to those which may be assigned to it by the General 
Conference, the Council shall, through the General Secretary, 
ensure the proper operation of the control system in accordance 
vith the provisions of this Treaty and with the decisions 
adopted by the General Conference. 
6, The Council shall submit an annual report on its work 
to the General Conference as well as such special reports as it 
deems necessary or which the General Conference requests of it, 
7, The Coxincil shall elect its officers for each session. 
8, The decisions of the Council shall be taken by a simple 
majority of its Members present and voting. 
9, The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure. 
The Secretariat 
Article 11 : 
1, The Secre ta r ia t shal l consis t of a Goieral Secretary, who 
shal l be the chief administrative off icer of the Agency, and of 
such staff as the Agency may requ i re . The term of off ice of the 
General Secretary shal l be four years and he may be re -e lec ted 
for a single addit ional term. The General Secretary may not be a 
nat ional of the country in which the Agency has i t s headquarters, 
In case the office of General Secretary becomes vacant, a new 
elect ion shal l be held to f i l l the off ice for the remainder of 
the terra. 
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2, The staff of the Secre ta r ia t shal l be appointed by the 
General Secretary, in accordance with ru le s l a id down by the 
General Conference, 
3 , In addition to the functions conferred upon him by t h i s 
Treaty and to those which may be assigned to him by the General 
QQjjference^ - the General Secretary shal l ensure, as provided 
by a r t i c l e 10, paragraph 5, the proper operation of the control 
system establ ished by t h i s Treaty, in accordance -with the 
provisions of the Treaty and the decisions taken by the General 
Conference, 
4 , The General Secretary shal l act in that capacity in a l l 
meetings of the General conference and of the Council and shal l 
make an annual report to both the bodies on the work of the Agency 
and any special repor ts requested by the General Conference or 
the Council or which the General Secretary may deem des i r ab le , 
5 , The General Secretary shal l e s t ab l i sh the procedures for 
d i s t r ibu t ing to a l l Contracting Pa r t i e s information received by 
the Agency from governmental sources and such information from 
non-govemmental sources as may be of i n t e r e s t to the Agency. 
6 , In the performance of t he i r dut ies the General Secretary 
and the staff shal l not seek or receive ins t ruc t ions from any 
Government or from any other authori ty external to the Agency 
and shal l refrain from any action which might r e f l e c t on t h e i r 
posi t ion as in ternat ional o f f i c i a l s responsible only to the Agency 
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sxibject to their responsibility to the Agency, they shall not 
disclose any industrial secrets or other confidential information 
coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties in 
the Agency, 
7, Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to respect 
the exclusively international character of the responsibilities 
of the General Secretary and the Staff and not to seek to 
influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. 
Control system 
Article 12 i 
1, For the purpose of verifying compliance with the obl iga t ions 
entered into by the Contracting Par t i e s in accordance with 
a r t i c l e 1, a control system shall be establ ished which shal l be 
put into effect in accordance with the provisions of a r t i c l e 
13-18 of th i s Treaty. 
2, The control system shal l be used in pa r t i cu la r for the 
purpose of verifying: 
(a) That devices, services and f a c i l i t i e s intended for 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy are not used in the tes t ing or 
jpanufacture of nuclear weapons, 
(b) That none of the a c t i v i t i e s prohibited in a r t i c l e 1 
of t h i s Treaty are ca r r ied out in the t e r r i t o r y of the Contracting 
Pa r t i e s with nuclear mater ia ls or weapons introduced from abroad, 
and 
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(c) That explosions for peaceful purposes are compatible 
with a r t i c l e 18 of t h i s Treaty, 
IAEA safeguards 
Ar t ic le 13 : 
Each contract ing Party shal l negot ia te mu l t i l a t e r a l or 
b i l a t e r a l agreements vjith the In ternat ional Atomic Energy Agency 
for the application of i t s safeguards to i t s nuclear a c t i v i t i e s . 
Each Contracting Party shal l i n i t i a t e negot ia t ions within a per iod 
of 180 days after the date of the deposit of i t s instrument of 
r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s Treaty. These agreements shal l enter into 
force, for each Party, not l a t e r than eighteen months af te r the 
date of the i n i t i a t i o n of such negot ia t ions except in case of 
unforeseen circumstances or force majeure. 
Reports of the Pa r t i e s 
Ar t i c le 14 : 
1, The Contracting Pa r t i e s shal l submit to the Agency and to 
the In te rna t iona l Atomic Energy Agency for the i r information, 
semi-annual repor ts s ta t ing that no a c t i v i t y prohibi ted under 
t h i s Treaty has occurred in the i r respect ive t e r r i t o r i e s , 
2. The contract ing Par t i e s shal l simultaneously transmit to 
the Agency a copy of any report they may submit to the Internat ion. 
Atomic Energy Agency which r e l a t e s to matters that are the subject 
of t h i s Treaty and to the application of safeguards. 
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3. The Contracting Parties shall also transmit to the 
Organization of American States, for its information, any reports 
that may be of interest to it, in accordance with the obligations 
established by the Inter-American System, 
Special reports requested by the General Secretary, 
Article 15 : 
1, With the authorization of the Council, the General Secretary 
may request any of the Contracting Par t i e s to provide the Agency 
v i th complementary or supplementary information regarding any event 
or circumstance connected with compliance with t h i s Treaty, 
explaining h is reasons. The Contracting Pa r t i e s undertake to 
co-operate promptly and ful ly with the General Secretary, 
2, The General Secretary shal l inform the Council and the 
Contracting Pa r t i e s forthwith of such requests and of the r e s -
pect ive r e p l i e s . 
Special inspect ions 
Ar t i c le 16 : 
1, The In ternat ional Atomic Energy Agency and the Council 
establ ished by th i s Treaty have the power of carrying out special 
inspections in the following cases: 
(a) In the case of the In terna t ional Atomic Energy Agency, 
in accordance with the agreements referred to in a r t i c l e 13 of 
t h i s Treaty; 
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(b) In the case of the Council: 
( i ) When so requested, the reasons for the request being 
stated, by any Party which suspects that some a c t i v i t y 
prohibi ted by t h i s Treaty has been car r ied out or i s about 
to be car r ied out, e i the r in the t e r r i t o r y of any other 
Party or in any other place on such l a t t e r P a r t y ' s behalf, 
the Council shal l iinniediately arrange for such an inspec-
• tion in accordance with a r t i c l e 10, Oaragraph 5 . 
( i i ) When requested by any Party which has been suspected 
of or charged with having viola ted t h i s Treaty, the Council 
shal l imroediately arrange for the special inspection 
requested in accordance with a r t i c l e 10, paragraph 5 , 
The above requests wil l be made to the Council through the 
General Secretary. 
2, The costs and expenses of any special inspection ca r r i ed out 
under paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), sect ions ( i ) and ( i i ) of 
t h i s a r t i c l e shal l be borne by the requesting Party or Par t i es , 
except where the council concludes on the bas i s of the report 
on the special inspection that , in view of the circumstances 
exis t ing in the case, such costs and expenses should be borne 
by the Agency, 
3 . The General Conference shal l formulate the procedures for 
the organization and execution of the special inspect ions car r ied 
out in accordance with paragraph l, sub-paragraph (b), sect ions 
( i ) and ( i i ) of t h i s a r t i c l e . 
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4, The Contracting Pa r t i e s undertake to grant the 
inspectors carrying out such special inspections fu l l and free 
access to a l l places and a l l information which may be necessary 
for the performance of the i r dut ies and v;hich are d i r ec t l y 
and int imately connected with the suspicion of v iola t ion of 
th i s Treaty. If so requested by the au thor i t i e s of the Contracting 
Party in whose t e r r i t o r y the inspection i s car r ied out, the 
inspectors designated by the General Conference shal l be 
accompanied by representat ives of said au tho r i t i e s , provided 
tha t t h i s does not in any way delay or hinder the work of the 
inspec tors . 
5, The Council shal l immediately transmit to a l l the 
pa r t i e s , through the General Secretary, a copy of any report 
resu l t ing from special inspect ions, 
6 , Similarly, the Council shal l send through the General 
Secretary to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for 
transmission to the Itoited Nations Security Council and General 
Assembly, and to the Council of the Organization of American 
States , for i t s information, a copy of any report resu l t ing from 
any special inspection car r ied out in accordance with paragraph l, 
sub-paragraph (b), sections (i) and ( i i ) of t h i s a r t i c l e . 
7, The Council may decide, or any Contracting Party may request, 
the convening of a special session of the General Conference for 
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the purposes of considering the repor ts resu l t ing from any special 
inspect ion. In such a case, the General Secretary sha l l take 
immediate steps to convene the special session requested. 
8, The General Conference, convened in special session under 
t h i s a r t i c l e , may make recommendations to the Contracting Pa r t i e s 
and submit repor ts to the Secretary-General 06 the United Nations 
to be transmitted to the United Nations Security Council and the 
General Assembly, 
Use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
Ar t ic le 17 ; 
Nothing in the provisions of t h i s Treaty shal l prejudice 
the r i g h t s of the Contracting Par t i es , in conformity with t h i s 
Treaty, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purpose, in p a r t i c u l a r 
for t he i r economic development and social progress , 
Eaqjlosions for peaceful purposes 
Ar t i c l e 18 : 
1, The Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of 
nuclear devices for peaceful purposes — including explosions 
which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons — 
or collaborate with third parties for the same purpose, provided 
that they do so in accordance with the provisions of this article 
and the other articles of the Treaty, particularly articles 1 and ^  
(a) The nature of the nuclear device and the source from 
which it was obtained. 
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(b) The place and purpose of the planned explosion, 
(c) The procedures which wil l be followed in order to 
comply with paragraph 3 of t h i s a r t i c l e , 
(d) The expected force of the device, and 
(e) The fu l l e s t possible information on any poss ible 
radiocat ive fa l l -ou t that may r e su l t from the explosion 
or explosions, and measures which wi l l be taken to avoid 
danger to the population, flora, fauna and t e r r i t o r i e s 
of any other Party or P a r t i e s . 
3 , The General Secretary and the technical personnel designated 
by the Council and the In ternat ional Atomic Energy Agency may 
observe a l l the preparations, including the explosion of the device, 
and shal l have unres t r i c ted access to any area in the v i c i n i t y 
of the s i t e of the explosion in order to ascertain whether the 
device and the procedures followed during the explosion are in 
conformity with the information supplied under paragraph 2 of 
t h i s a r t i c l e and the other provisions of t h i s Treaty, 
4 . The Contracting Pa r t i e s may accept the collaborat ion of 
th i rd p a r t i e s for the purpose set forth in paragraph 1 of the 
present a r t i c l e , in accordance with paragraph 2 and 3 thereof. 
Relations with other in te rna t iona l organizat ions. 
Ar t ic le 19 J 
1, The Agency may conclude such agreements with the Inter-
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national Atomic Energy Agency as are authorized by the General 
Conference and as it considers likely to facilitate the efficient 
operation of the control system established by this Treaty* 
2, The Agency may also enter into relations viith any 
international organization or body, especially any which may be 
established in the future to supervise disarmament or measures 
for the control of armaments in any part of the vorld. 
3, The Contracting Parties may, if they see fit, request the 
advice of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission on all 
technical matters connected with the application of this Treaty 
with which the Commission is competent to deal under its Statute, 
Measures in the event of violation of the Treaty 
Article 20 : 
1, The General Conference shal l take note of a l l cases in 
^hich, in i t s opinion, any Contracting Party i s not complying fu l ly 
with i t s obl igat ions under t h i s Treaty and shal l draw the matter 
to the at tent ion of the Party concerned, making such recoranienda-
t ions as i t deems appropriate. 
2, If, in i t s opinion, such non-compliance cons t i tu t e s a 
violat ion of t h i s Treaty which might endanger peace and securi ty 
the General Conference shal l report thereon simultaneously to 
the Itaited wations Security Council and the General Assembly 
through the Secretary-General of the United iMations, and to the 
the Council of the Organization of America s t a t e s . The General 
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Conference shal l likevjise report to the In te rna t iona l Atomic 
Energy Agency for such purposes as are relevant in accordance with 
i t s S t a t u t e . 
Iftiited Nations and Organization of American S t a t e s . 
Ar t ic le 21 : 
jMone o± the provisions of t h i s Treaty shal l be construed 
as impairing the r i g h t s and obl igat ions of the Pa r t i e s under the 
Charter of the Ifeited Nations or^ in the case of S ta tes Members 
of the Organization of American States , under exis t ing regional 
t r e a t i e s . 
Pr iv i leges and immunities 
Ar t ic le 22 : 
1, The Agency shall enjoy in the territory of each of the 
Contracting Parties such legal capacity and such privileges and 
immunities as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions 
and the fulfilment of its purposes, 
2, Representatives of the Contracting Parties accredited to 
the Agency and officials of the Agency shall similarly enjoy 
such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the perfor-
mance of their fvinctions, 
3, The Agency may conclude agreements with the Contracting 
parties with a view to determining the details of the application 
of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article. 
Notification of other agreements. 
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Ar t ic le 23 : 
Once t h i s Treaty has entered into force, the Sec re ta r i a t 
shal l be no t i f ied immediately of any in te rna t iona l agreement 
concluded by any of the Contracting p a r t i e s on matters v i th 
which t h i s Treaty i s concerned; the Secre ta r ia t shal l r e g i s t e r 
i t and notify the other Contracting P a r t i e s , 
Settlement of disputes 
Ar t ic le 24 : 
Unless the Parties concerned agree on another mode of 
peaceful settlement, any question or dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Treaty which is not settled 
shall be referred to the International Court of Justice with the 
prior consent of the Parties to the controversy. 
Signature 
Article 25 : 
1, This Treaty shall be open indefinitely for signature by: 
(a) All the Latin American Republics, and 
(b) All other sovereign States situated in their entirety 
south of latitude 35 ijorth in the western hemisphere; and, 
except as provided in paragraph 2 of this article, all 
such States which become sovereign, when they have been 
admitted by the General Conference, 
2, The General Conference shall not take any decision regardinc 
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the admission of a p o l i t i c a l en t i ty par t or a l l of whose t e r r i t o r y 
i s the subject^ pr ior to the date when th i s Treaty i s opened for 
signature, of a dispute or claim between an ext ra-cont inenta l 
country and one or more Latin American States , so long as the 
dispute has not been s e t t l ed by peaceful means. 
Rat i f icat ion and deposi t . 
Ar t ic le 26 : 
1, This Treaty shal l be subject to r a t i f i c a t i o n by signatory 
Sta tes in accordance with the i r respect ive cons t i tu t iona l 
procedures. 
2, This Treaty and the instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n shal l be 
deposited with the Government of the Mexican United S ta tes , which 
i s hereby designated the Depositary Government. 
The Depositary Government shal l send c e r t i f i e d copies of 
t h i s Treaty to the Governments of signatory S ta tes and shal l no t i fy 
them of the deposit of each instrument of r a t i f i c a t i o n . 
Reservations 
Ar t ic le 27 : 
This Treaty shal l not be subject to r e se rva t ions . 
Entry into force 
Ar t ic le 28 » 
1, Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of t h i s a r t i c l e , 
t h i s Treaty shal l enter into force among the Sta te that have 
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r a t i f i e d i t as soon as the following requirements have been met: 
(a) Deposit of the instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s 
Treaty v i th the Depositary Government by the Governments of the 
Sta tes mentioned in a r t i c l e 25 which are in existence on the date 
•when t h i s Treaty i s opened for signature and which are not 
affected by the provisions of a r t i c l e 25, paragraph 2; 
(b) Signature and r a t i f i c a t i on of addi t ional Protocol 1 
annexed to t h i s Treaty by a n extra-cont inental or cont inental 
Sta tes having de ju re or de facto in terna t ional r e spons ib i l i t y 
for t e r r i t o r i e s s i tua ted in the zone of applicat ion of the Treaty? 
(c) Signature and r a t i f i c a t i on of the Additional Protocol I ] 
annexed to t h i s Treaty by a l l powers possessing nuclear weapons; 
(d) Conclusion of b i l a t e r a l or mul t i l a t e ra l agreements on 
the application of the Safeguards System of the In te rna t iona l 
Atcxnic Energy Agency in accordance with a r t i c l e 13 of t h i s Treaty. 
2 , All signatory Sta tes shal l have the imprescr ipt ible r igh t 
to waive* wholly or in part* the requirements l a id down in the 
preceding paragraph.They may do so by means of a declarat ion which 
shal l be annexed to the i r respective instrument of r a t i f i c a t i o n 
and which may be formulated a t the time of deposit of the ins t ruv 
ment or subsequently. For those S ta tes which exercise t h i s right* 
t h i s Treaty shal l enter into force upon deposit of the declarat ion, 
or as soon as those requirements have been met which have not 
been expressly waived. 
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3 , As soon as t h i s Treaty has entered into force in accordance 
v i th the provisions of paragraph 2 for eleven States , the 
Depositary Government shal l convence a preliminary meeting of 
those S ta tes in order that the Agency may be set up and commence 
i t s work, 
4, After the entry into force of t h i s Treaty for a l l the 
coxintries of the zone, the r i s e of a new power possessing nuclear 
weapons shal l have the effect of suspending the execution of t h i s 
Treaty for those countr ies which have r a t i f i e d i t without waiving 
requirements of paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c) of t h i s a r t i c l e , 
and which request such suspension; the Treaty shal l remain 
suspended u n t i l the new power, on i t s own i n i t i a t i v e or upon 
request by the General Conference, r a t i f i e s the annexed Additional 
Protocol I I . 
Art iele ,29 : 
1, Any Contracting Party may propose amendments to t h i s Treaty 
and shal l submit i t s proposals to the Council through the General 
Secretary, who shal l transmit them to a l l the other Contracting 
p a r t i e s and, in addition, to a l l other s ignator ies in accordance 
•with a r t i c l e 6 . The Council, through the General Secretary, shal l 
immediately following the meeting of s ignator ies convene a 
special session of the General Conference to examine the proposals 
made, for the adoption of which a two-thirds majority of the 
Contracting Pa r t i e s present and voting shal l be required. 
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2. Amendments adopted shall enter into force as soon as the 
requirements set forth in article 28 of this Treaty have been 
compiled with. 
Duration and denunciation 
Article 30 s 
1, This Treaty shal l be of a permanent nature and shal l remain 
in force indef in i te ly but any Party may denounce i t by notifying 
the General Secretary of the Agency if, in the opinion of the 
denouncing State, there have arisen or may a r i s e circumstances 
connected with the content of the Treaty or of the annexed 
Additional Protocol I and I I which affect i t s supreme i n t e r e s t s 
or the peace and security of one or more Contracting P a r t i e s . 
2, The denunciation shal l take effect three months a f te r the 
delivery to the General Secretary of the Agency of the no t i f i ca t ion 
by the Government of the signatory Sta te concerned. The General 
Secretary shal l immediately communicate such no t i f i ca t ion to the 
other Contracting Par t i es and to the Secretary-General of the 
united Nations for the information of the United Nations Securi ty 
Council and the General Assembly, He shal l also communicate i t 
to the Secretary-General of the organization of American S t a t e s . 
Authentic t ex t s and r e g i s t r a t i o n . 
Ar t ic le 31 : 
This Treaty, of which the Spanish, Chinese, English, 
French, Protuguese and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall 
be registered by the Depositary Government in accordance with 
article 102 of the United Nations Charter, The Depositary 
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Govemwent sha l l notify the Secretary-General of the United 
wations of the signatures, r a t i f i c a t i o n s and amendments r e l a t ing 
to t h i s Treaty and shal l communicate them to the Secretary-General 
of the Organization of American Sta tes for i t s information. 
Transi t ional Ar t ic le 
Denunciation of the declaration referred to in a r t i c l e 28, 
paragraph 2, shal l be subject to the same procedures as the 
dentinciation of t h i s Treaty, except tha t i t wi l l take effect on 
the date of delivery of the respect ive no t i f i c a t i on , 
liM WIIMESS WHEREOF the undersigned P len ipo ten t ia r ies , 
having deposited t h e i r fu l l powers, found in good and due form, 
sign th i s Treaty on behalf of the i r respect ive Governments, 
Done at Mexico, D i s t r i t o Federal, on the Fourteenth day 
of February, one thousand nine hundred and s ixty-seven. 
(a) Additional Protocol I ' 
The undersigned Plenipotent iar ies , furnished with fu l l 
powers by the i r respect ive Governments, 
Convinced that the Treaty for the Prohibit ion of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America, negotiated and signed in accordance with 
the recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations 
(a) The United Kingdom and the Netherlands are p a r t i e s to 
t h i s Protocol , The United S ta tes has signed. 
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in Resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, represents an 
important step towards ensuring the non-prol i ferat ion of 
nuclear weapons. 
Aware that the non-prol iferat ion of nuclear weapons i s not 
an end in i t s e l f but, ra ther , a means of achieving general and 
complete disarmament a t a l a t e r stage, and 
Desiring to contr ibute, so far as l i e s in t he i r power, 
towards ending the armaments race, especia l ly in the f i e ld of 
nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world a t peace,based 
on mutual respect and sovereign equal i ty of S ta tes , 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 : To undertake to apply the statute of denuclearization 
in respect of warlike purposes as defined in articles 1; 3, 5 and 13 
of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America in territories for whhich, de jure or de facto, they are 
internationally responsible and which lie within the limits of 
the geographical zone established in that treaty. 
Article 2 : The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as 
that of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America of which this Protocol is an annex^ ^ and the provisions 
regarding ratification and denunciation contained in the Treaty 
shall be applicable to it. 
Article 3 : This Protocol shall enter into force, for the 
States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of 
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the i r respect ive instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n . 
IN Wins ESS WHEREOF the undersigned P len ipo ten t ia r ies , 
having deposited the i r fu l l powers, foimd in good and due form, 
sign t h i s Protocol on behalf of the i r respect ive Governments, 
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APPENDIX - IV 
THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY 
Adopted by the South P a c i f i c Forxum a t i t s meeting in 
Rarotonga on 6 August 1985, and signed ( sub jec t to r a t i f i c a t i o n ) 
on the same day by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Governments of New 
Zealand, A u s t r a l i a , Cook I s l a n d s , F i j i , K i r i b a t i , Niue, Tuvalu and 
Western Samoa, 
Preamble : 
The P a r t i e s to t h i s Trea ty 
United in t h e i r commitment to a world a t peace; 
Gravely concerned t h a t the cont inu ing nuc l ea r arras r ace 
p r e s e n t s the r i s k of nuc l ea r war which would have d e v a s t a t i n g 
consequences for a l l people ; 
Convinced t h a t a l l c o u n t r i e s have an o b l i g a t i o n to make 
every e f f o r t to achieve the goal of e l i m i n a t i n g n u c l e a r weapons, 
the t e r r o r which they hold for humankind and the t h r e a t which they 
pose to l i f e on e a r t h ; 
Bel ieving t h a t r e g i o n a l arms c o n t r o l measures can c o n t r i -
b u t e to g loba l e f f o r t s to r eve r se the nuc l ea r arras r a c e and 
promote the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y of each count ry in the region and 
the common s e c u r i t y of aj.1; 
Determined to ensure, so fa r as l i e s within t h e i r power, 
t h a t the bounty and beauty of the land and sea in t h e i r region 
s h a l l remain the h e r i t a g e o t t h e i r peoples and t h e i r descendants 
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in perpetui ty to be enjoyed by a l l in peace; 
Reaffirming the importance of the Treaty on the won-
Prol i fera t ion of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in preventing the p r o l i -
feration of nuclear weapons and in contributing to vrarld secur i ty ; 
Noting, in par t i cu la r , that Ar t ic le VII of the NPT 
recognises the r igh t of any group of S ta tes to conclude regional 
t r e a t i e s in order to assure the t o t a l absence of nuclear weapons 
in thei^ respect ive t e r r i t o r i e s ; 
Noting, that the prohibi t ions of empiantation and emplace-
ment of nuclear -weapons on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in 
the sub-soil thereof contained in the Treaty on the Prohibit ion 
of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass 
Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Sub-soil 
thereof apply in the South Pacif ic ; 
Noting also that the prohibit ion of tes t ing of nuclear 
weapons in the atmosphere or under water, iiicluding t e r r i t o r i a l 
waters or high seas, contained in the Treaty Banning Nuclear 
weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water 
applies in the South Pacif ic ; 
Determined to keep the region free of environmental 
pollut ion by radioact ive wastes and other radioact ive matter; 
Guided by the decision of the Fif teenth South Paci f ic -
Ebrum a t Tuvalu that a nuclear free zone should be es tabl ished 
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in the region a t the e a r l i e s t possible opportunity in accordance 
v i th the pr inc ip les set out in the communique of that meeting; 
Have agreed as follows: 
Ar t i c le 1 8 Usage of Terms 
For the purposes of t h i s Treaty and i t s Protocols; 
(a) 'South Pacif ic Nuclear Free Zone' means the areas 
described in Annex l as i l l u s t r a t e d by the msp at tached to tha t 
Annex, 
(b) ' t e r r i t o r y ' means in te rna l waters, t e r r i t o r i a l sea 
and archipelagic waters, the sea-bed and sub-soil beneath, the 
land t e r r i t o r y and the airspace above them; 
(c) 'nuclear explosive device' means any nuclear weapon 
or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, 
i r respec t ive of the purpose for which i t could be used. The term 
includes such a weapon or device in inassembled and p a r t l y assembla 
forms, but daes not include the means of t ransport or del ivery 
of such a weapon or device i f separable from and not an ind iv i s ib l e 
par t of i t ; 
(d) ' s t a t i on ing ' means emplantation, emplacement, t r ans -
portat ion on land or inland waters, stockpil ing, storage, ins -
t a l l a t i o n and deployment. 
Ar t ic le 2 t Application of the Treaty 
(l) Except where otherwise specified/ t h i s t r ea ty and i t s 
Protocols shal l apply to t e r r i t o r y within the South Pacif ic 
Nuclear Free zone. 
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(2) Nothing iii t h i s Treaty shal l prejudice or in any way 
affect the r igh t s , or the exercise of the rights^ of any Sta te 
under in te rna t iona l lav? with regard to freedom of the seas . 
Ar t ic le 3 ; Renunciation of Nuclear Sxglosiye Devices 
Each Party Ibdertakes: 
(a) not to manufacture or otherwise ac«fuire, possess or 
have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means any 
where inside or outside the South Pacif ic Nuclear Free Zone; 
(b) not to seek or receive any assis tance in the manufacture 
or acquisi t ion of any nuclear explosive device; 
(c) not to take any action to a s s i s t or encourage the 
manufacture or acquisi t ion of any nuclear explosive device by 
any S t a t e . 
Ar t i c l e 4 t Peaceful Nuclear_Ac^ivities 
Each par ty Undertakes : 
(a) not to provide source or special f i ss ionable mater ial , 
or equipment or material especial ly designed or prepared for the 
processing, use or production of special f iss ionable material 
for peaceful purposes to ; 
(i) any non-nuclear-weapon s ta te unless subject to the 
safeguards required by Ar t i c le I I I , 1 of the NPT, or 
( i i ) any nuclear-weapon State unless subject to applicable 
safeguards agreements with the In te rna t iona l Atomic Energy 
iigency (IAEA) , 
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Any such provision sha l l ,be in accordance with s t r i c t non-
pro l i fe ra t ion measures to provide assurance of exclusively 
peaceful non-explosive use? 
(b) to support the continued effect iveness of the 
in te rna t iona l non-prol iferat ion systean based on the NPT and the. 
IAEA safeguards system. 
Ar t ic le 5 : Prevention of Stationing of Nuclear Explosive Devices 
(1) Each party xindertakes to prevent in i t s t e r r i t o r y the 
s ta t ioning of any nuclear explosive device. 
(2) Each party in the exercise of i t s sovereign r i gh t s remains 
free to decide for i t s e l f whether to allow v i s i t s by foreign ships 
and a i r c r a f t to i t s por ts and a i r f i e l d s , t r a n s i t of i t s a irspace 
by foreign a i r c ra f t , and navigation by foreign ships in i t s 
t e r r i t o r i a l sea or archipelagic waters in a manner not covered 
by the r i g h t s of innocent passage, exchipeiagic sea lanes passage 
cr t r a n s i t passage of s t r a i t s . 
Ar t ic le 6: Prev^t ion_of Testing of Nuclear Explosive Devices 
Each party Undertakes: 
(a) to prevent in i t s t e r r i t o r y the tes t ing of any nuclear 
explosive device; 
(b) not to take any action to a s s i s t or encourage the 
tes t ing of any nuclear explosive device by any S t a t e . 
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Ar t ic le 7 : Prevention of Dumping 
(1) Each Party Undertakes: 
(a) not to dump radioact ive wastes and other radioact ive 
matter a t sea anywhere within the South Pacif ic Nuclear Free Zone; 
(b) to prevent the dumping of radioact ive wastes and o ther 
radioact ive matter by anyone in i t s t e r r i t o r i a l sea; 
(c) not to take any action to a s s i s t or encourage the 
dumping by anyone of radioact ive wastes and other radioact ive 
matter a t sea anywhere within the South Pacif ic Nuclear Free zone; 
(d) to support the conclusion as soon as possible of the 
proposed Convention re la t ing to the protect ion of the na tura l 
resources and environment of the South Pacif ic region and i t s 
Protocol for the prevention of the pol lut ion of the South Pacific 
region by dxomping, with the aim of precluding dumping a t sea of 
radioact ive wastes and other radioact ive matter by anyone anywhei 
dumping at sea of radioact ive wastes and other radioact ive matter 
by anyone anywhere in the region, 
(2) paragraph 1 (a) and 1(b) of t h i s Ar t i c l e shal l not apply 
to areas of the South Pacif ic Nuclear Free Zone in respect of whic 
such a Convention and Protocol have entered into force* 
Art ic le 8 ; Control System 
(1) The Pa r t i e s hereby es tab l i sh a control system for the 
purpose of verifying compliance with the i r obl igat ions under t h i s 
Treaty, 
(2) The control system shal l comprise* 
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(a) repor ts and exchange of information as provided 
for in Ar t ic le 9; 
(b) consul ta t ions as provided for in Ar t i c le 10 and 
Annex 4(1); 
(c) the application to peaceful nuclear a c t i v i t i e s of 
safeguards by the IAEA as provided for in Annex 2, 
(d) a complaints procedure as provided for in Annex 4 , 
Ar t ic le 9 : Reports and Exchanges of Inforroation 
(1) Each par ty shal l report to the Director of the South 
pac i f ic Bureau for Economic Cooperation (the Director) as soon as 
possible any s igni f icant event within i t s j u r i sd i c t i on affecting 
the implementation of t h i s Treaty, The Director shal l c i r cu l a t e 
such repor ts promptly to a l l p a r t i e s . 
(2) The p a r t i e s shal l endeavour to keep each other informed or 
matters arising under or in re la t ion to t h i s Treaty, They may 
exchange information by communicating i t to the Director, who 
shal l c i r cu l a t e i t to a l l P a r t i e s . 
(3) The Director shal l report annually to the South Pacif ic 
Forum on the s ta tus of t h i s Treaty and matters ar i s ing under or 
in re la t ion to i t , incorporating repor ts and communications made 
under paragraphs 1 and 2 of t h i s Ar t i c le and matters ar is ing 
under Ar t i c les 8(2) (d) and 10 and Annex 2 (4 ) . 
Ar t ic le 10: Consultation and Review 
Without prejudice to the conduct of consul ta t ions among 
Pa r t i e s by other means, the Director, a t the request of any Party, 
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shal l convene a meeting of the Consultative Committee es tab l i shed 
by Aiinex 3 for consultat ion and cooperation on any matter a r i s ing 
in re la t ion to t h i s Treaty or for reviewing i t s operat ion. 
Ar t ic le 11 : Amendment 
The Consultative Committee shal l consider proposals for 
amendment of the provisions of t h i s Treaty proposed by any Party 
and c i rcu la ted by the Director to a l l Pa r t i e s not l e s s than three 
months p r io r to the convening of the Consultative Committee for 
th i s purpose. Any proposal agreed upon by consensus by the 
Consultative Committee shal l be communicated to the Director 
vho shal l c i r cu la t e i t for acceptance to a l l P a r t i e s , An amendment 
shal l enter into force t h i r t y days af ter rece ip t by the deposi tary 
of acceptances from a l l P a r t i e s , 
^ ^ i c l e _ 12__: Signature and Ratif icat ion 
(1) This Treaty shal l be open for signature by any Member of 
the South Pacif ic Forum, 
(2) This Treaty shal l be subject to r a t i f i c a t i o n . Instruments 
of r a t i f i c a t i on shal l be deposited with the Director who i s 
hereby designated depositary of t h i s Treaty and i t s p ro toco l s , 
(3) If a Member of the South Pacif ic Forum whose t e r r i t o r y 
i s outside the South Pacif ic Nuclear Free Zone becomes a par ty 
to th i s Treaty, Annex I shal l be deemed to be amended so far as 
required to enclose at l ea s t the t e r r i t o r y of that Party within 
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the boundaries of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The 
delineation of any area added pursuant to this paragraph shall be 
approved by the South Pacific Forum, 
Article 131 Withdrawal 
(1) This Treaty is of a permanent nature and shall remain in 
force indefinitely, provided that in the event of a violation 
by any Party of a provision of this Treaty essential to the 
achievement of the objectives of the Treaty or of the spirit of 
the Treaty, every other Party shall have the right to withdraw 
from the Treaty, 
(2) Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice twelve 
months in advance to the Director who shall circulate such 
notice to all other Parties, 
Article 14t Reservations 
This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. 
Article 15: Entry Into Force 
(1) This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit 
of the eighth instrument of ratification, 
(2) For a signatory which ratifies this Treaty after the date 
of deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification, the Treaty 
shall enter into force on the date of deposit of its instrument 
of ratification. 
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A r t l c l e I6i Deposi tary Fxinctions 
The depos i t a ry s h a l l r e g i s t e r t h i s Trea ty and i t s P r o t o c o l s 
pursuan t to A r t i c l e 102 of the Char te r o£ the United Na t ions and 
s h a l l t r ansmi t c e r t i f i e d cop ies of the Trea ty and i t s P r o t o c o l s 
t o a l l Members of t h e South P a c i f i c Foirura and a l l S t a t e s e l i g i b l e 
to become P a r t y to the P r o t o c o l s to the Trea ty and s h a l l n o t i f y 
than of s i g n a t u r e s and r a t i f i c a t i o n s of the Trea ty and i t s 
P r o t o c o l s . liM WIISJJESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly 
a u t h o r i s e d by t h e i r Governments, have signed t h i s T r e a t y . 
DOME a t Rarotonga, t h i s s i x t h day of August, 1985, in a s i n g l e 
o r i g i n a l in the Engl ish language. 
ANNEX - 1 
SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE 
(Specifies the area of the SPNFZ geographically by 
reference to latitude, longitude or other defined 
marks; this is depicted in the map opposite.) 
B. (Provides that Australian islands westward of the above 
area and north of latitude 6 0 deg, S-i,e, in the Indian Ocean -
while included with Area A in the SPNFZ, shall cease to be so if 
they have became subject to another, similar treaty). 
ANNEX - 2 
IAEA SAFEGUARDS 
Annex 2 concerns the safeguards referred to in Art.8. Each 
party to the NFZ will conclude an agreement with the IAEA on all 
fissionable material used in peaceful nuclear activities within 
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i t s terr i tory or under i t s jurisdiction or control, with 
the object of verifying the non-division of nuclear material 
from peaceful ac t iv i t ies to nuclear explosive devices, 
ANNEX - 3 
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE 
Annex 3 establishes a Consultative Committee consisting of one 
representative of each Party, with advisers. Subject to the 
Provisions of Article 11, decisions of the Consultative Committee 
shall be taken by consensus or, failing consensus, by a two-thirds 
majority of those present and voting ,,,, 
ANNEX - 4 
COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE 
(1) A party which considers that there are grounds for a 
complaint that another Party is in breach of its obligations 
under this Treaty shall, before bringing such a complaint to the 
Director, bring the subject matter of the complaint to the 
attention of the Party complained of and shall allow the latter 
reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation and to 
resolve the matter, 
(2) If the matter is not so resolved, the complaint Party may 
bring the complaint to the Director with a request that the 
Consultative Committee be convened to consider it. Complaints 
shall be supported by an account of evidence of breach of 
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obligations knovjn to the complainant Party. Upon receipt of 
a complaint the Director shall convene the Consultative Committee 
as quickly as possible to consider it, 
(3) The Consultative Committee, taking account of efforts made 
under paragraph 1, shall afford the Party complained of a 
reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation of the 
matter, 
(4) to (8) (Provide for any special inspection deemed necessary^ 
to which the Party complained against must afford all required 
facilities and evidence,). 
(9) If the Consultative Committee has decided that the Party 
complained of is in breach of its obligations xander this Treaty^ 
or that the above provisions have not been complied with, or at 
any time at the request of either the complainant or complained 
of party, the Parties shall meet promptly at a meeting of the 
South Pacific Forum. 
DRAFT PROTOCOLS 
The draft Protocols involve countr ies tha t are not members 
of the South Pacif ic Forum, 
Under Protocol I any such covin t ry may apply, in respect 
of the t e r r i t o r i e s for which i t i s in te rna t iona l ly responsible 
s i tua ted within the South Pacif ic Nuclear Free Zone, the prohib i -
t ions contained in Ar t ic les 3, 5, and 6, in so far as they r e l a t e 
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to the manufacture, s tat ioning and tes t ing of any nuclear 
esqjlosive device within those t e r r i t o r i e s , and the safeguards 
specified in Art ic le 8 (2) (c) and hnney. 2 of the Treaty, 
Under Protocol 2 i t may undertake not to contr ibute 
to any act which cons t i tu tes a violat ion of the Treaty or i t s 
Protocols by the Pa r t i e s to them, and further not to use or 
threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against : (a) P a r t i e s 
to the Treaty; or (b) any t e r r i t o r y within the SPNFZ for which 
a Sta te subscribing to Protocol I i s in te rna t iona l ly responsible 
This Protocol i s open for signature by France, the People ' s 
Republic of China, the USSR, the Uiited Kingdom and the USA, 
Under Protocol 3 each Party may undertake not to t e s t 
any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the South Paci f ic 
Nuclear Free Zone. 
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